Open access
Author
Date
2006-10Type
- Working Paper
ETH Bibliography
yes
Altmetrics
Abstract
This paper analyzes overlapping-generations models where natural capital is owned by sel sh agents. Transfers in favor of young agents reduce the rate of depletion and increase output growth. It is shown that intergenerational transfers may be preferred to laissez-faire by an inde nite sequence of generations: if the resource share in production is su¢ ciently high, the welfare gain induced by preservation compensates for the loss due to taxation. This conclusion is reinforced when other assets are available, e.g. man-made capital, claims on monopoly rents, and R&D investment. Transfers raise the welfare of all generations, except that of the first resource owner: if resource endowments are taxed at time zero, all successive generations support resource-saving policies for purely sel sh reasons. Show more
Permanent link
https://doi.org/10.3929/ethz-a-005286662Publication status
publishedJournal / series
Economics Working Paper SeriesVolume
Publisher
Eidgenössische Technische Hochschule ZürichSubject
FISKALPOLITIK; Distortionary Taxation; GENERATIONS + AGE GROUPS (SOCIOLOGY); Renewable Resources; Overlapping Generations; Intergenerational Transfers; FISCAL POLICY; Technological Change; Sustainability; GENERATIONEN + ALTERSKLASSEN (SOZIOLOGIE)Organisational unit
03635 - Bretschger, Lucas (emeritus) / Bretschger, Lucas (emeritus)
02045 - Dep. Geistes-, Sozial- u. Staatswiss. / Dep. of Humanities, Social and Pol.Sc.
More
Show all metadata
ETH Bibliography
yes
Altmetrics