Open access
Author
Date
2010-09Type
- Working Paper
ETH Bibliography
yes
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Abstract
We introduce the notion of verifiable information into a model of sequential debate among experts who are motivated by career concerns. We show that self-censorship may hamper the efficiency of information aggregation, as experts withhold evidence contradicting the conventional wisdom. In this case, silence is telling and undermines the prevailing view over time if this view is incorrect. As a result, withholding arguments about the correct state of the world is only a temporary phenomenon, and the probability of the correct state of the world being revealed always converges to one as the group of experts becomes large. For small groups, a simple mechanism the principal can use to improve decision-making is to appoint a devil’s advocate. Show more
Permanent link
https://doi.org/10.3929/ethz-a-006168697Publication status
publishedJournal / series
Economics Working Paper SeriesVolume
Publisher
ETH Zurich, Center of Economic Research (CER-ETH)Subject
Experts; Committees; Career concerns; Verifiable information; Information aggregationOrganisational unit
02045 - Dep. Geistes-, Sozial- u. Staatswiss. / Dep. of Humanities, Social and Pol.Sc.
Related publications and datasets
Is previous version of: http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11850/41187
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ETH Bibliography
yes
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