Who gains from non-collusive corruption?

Metadata Label Value
Author(s): Föllmi, Reto, Oechslin, Manuel
Publisher: Institute for Empirical Research in Economics, University of Zurich
Citation:

Föllmi, Reto and Oechslin, Manuel. Who gains from non-collusive corruption?. Institute for Empirical Research in Economics, University of Zurich (2003). http://dx.doi.org/10.3929/ethz-a-004491943

Document Type: Reports  
Documents: Text (775.83KB)

Detailed Information

Metadata Description
Title Who gains from non-collusive corruption?
Author(s) Föllmi, Reto
Oechslin, Manuel
Publication Place Zurich
Publisher Institute for Empirical Research in Economics, University of Zurich
Publication Date 2003
Series Working paper / Institute for Empirical Research in Economics no. 142
Language English
DOI http://dx.doi.org/10.3929/ethz-a-004491943
Subject(s) Economics, Law and Politics, General
Keyword(s) CORRUPTION
BRIBERY
POLITICS
Organisational Unit University of Zurich, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics (IEW)
Online Publication Date 2002
Description File Name MIME Type Size
Text   eth-26232-01.pdf application/pdf 775.83KB
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E-Collection record created: Sat, 19 Apr 2008, 01:00:31 CET