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Democratization and Ethno-Nationalist Civil War: The Role of Political Leaders

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*For my father, Christian.
Thank you for everything.*

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Abstract

In recent years, studies have repeatedly shown that countries face a higher risk of inter-state and civil war during democratization than during other periods in their history. The cause for this elevated risk is often seen in the dynamic of the democratization process, with political leaders as a crucial element.

The literature knows two opposing theoretical positions regarding the level of influence political elites can have on the likelihood of conflict. *Elite-manipulation* theorists argue that leaders incite ethno-nationalism as a diversion to secure their hold on power. Others see structural factors like an *ethnic security dilemma* as the driving forces behind conflict onset, leaving elites virtually without influence on the outcome. Both theories have been applied to the study of democratization periods, but they are equally applicable during other periods of regime-type change or state weakness and therefore cannot account for the high conflict risk specific to democratization processes. The fundamental question remains: how much influence do political leaders have on the likelihood of violent conflict in ethnically heterogeneous, democratizing countries?

This dissertation introduces a new theory that connects political leaders with two dynamics inherent to any democratization process. Firstly, establishing democracy creates the need to solve the *demos* question—before a country can enjoy “rule by the people,” it first needs clarify who “the people” are. And secondly, democratization triggers competition for political power that is often more chaotic than later repetitions. I argue that these two factors amplify any pre-existing security worries about the behavior of other ethnic groups by forcing the people to consider the trust they have for other ethnic groups with whom they will have to share political power. If such trust is lacking due to prior ethnic exclusion or discrimination, the process of *elite selection* during the first elections provides candidates with incentives to campaign on this lack of trust. Thus, security concerns will be highlighted and exacerbated even if these worries were not considered pressing before the move towards democracy.

In this dissertation, I test the theories of *elite manipulation*, *elite selection* and *ethnic security dilemma* in two parts using a mixed-methods approach. Part I con-

ducts a large-N quantitative check for the influence of three factors that should be associated with a higher likelihood of civil-war onset according to theory: democratization, politicization of ethnicity and indications of a threat to the current incumbent. To enable these tests, a new method of coding democratization periods is developed that substantially improves on the rigid coding mechanisms of previous methods. Moreover, a summary indicator of the risk towards incumbents is introduced based on a regression analysis of potential risk factors. The final assessment shows that ongoing democratization processes, the politicization of ethnicity and a present threat to the incumbent all are associated with a higher likelihood of civil-war onset.

Part II augments the correlations found in Part I by studying the causal mechanisms at work in two case studies of conflictuous democratization processes. The Burundian democratization attempt of 1988–1993 shows that conflict can arise even in situations where virtually the entire political elite and population are working towards peace, as long as a small amount of actors continues to foster violence. The democratization and subsequent break-up of Yugoslavia highlights clear attempts by political leaders to use nationalist emotions for their own political benefit, but it also shows that nationalist messages need to be grounded in the perceived reality of the audience.

In summary, this dissertation shows that political leaders have a clear influence on the likelihood of civil-war onset. While they may not be able to prevent the outbreak of violence against the will of determined opponents, it seems clear that they can add fuel to the fire. Unlike suggested by some, this is neither a manipulation nor a diversion in the true sense of these words—the divisive messages broadcast by leaders clearly rely on the presence of nationalistic identities and perceptions of a security dilemma.

Zusammenfassung

In den letzten Jahren haben Studien wiederholt gezeigt, dass Länder während einer Demokratisierungsphase ein größeres Risiko haben, einen zwischenstaatlichen Krieg oder Bürgerkrieg zu erleiden, als in anderen Perioden ihrer Geschichte. Die Ursache für das erhöhte Risiko wird häufig in der Dynamik des Demokratisierungsprozesses gesehen—und politische Führungspersönlichkeiten spielen darin eine entscheidende Rolle.

Die Literatur kennt zwei entgegengesetzte Theorien bezüglich dem Einfluss, den politische Führer auf das Konfliktrisiko haben. Vertreter der *Elitenmanipulationstheorie* behaupten, dass Politiker Ethno-Nationalismus als Ablenkung anzetteln, um ihre Macht zu schützen. Andere sehen strukturelle Faktoren wie das *ethnische Sicherheitsdilemma* als treibende Kraft hinter dem Konfliktausbruch, ohne dass Eliten hierauf Einfluss nehmen können. Beide Theorien wurden zum Studium von Demokratisierungsperioden verwendet, aber sie sind gleichermaßen auf andere Perioden des Regimetyrwandels oder der Staatsschwäche anwendbar und können deshalb nicht das besonders hohe Risiko während Demokratisierungen erklären. Die grundlegende Frage bleibt: wieviel Einfluss haben politische Führungspersönlichkeiten auf die Wahrscheinlichkeit gewalttätigen Konflikts in ethnisch heterogenen, demokratisierenden Ländern?

Diese Dissertation schlägt eine neue Theorie vor, die politische Eliten mit zwei Dynamiken verbindet, die in Demokratisierungsphasen inhärent sind. Zum einen stellt die Errichtung einer Demokratie die Herausforderung, die *Demos-Frage* zu beantworten—bevor ein Land "Herrschaft durch das Volk" praktizieren kann, muss erst geklärt werden, wer "das Volk" ist. Zweitens löst Demokratisierung einen Wettbewerb um die politische Macht aus, der oft deutlich chaotischer ist als in späteren Wahlphasen. Ich behaupte, dass diese zwei Faktoren alle bereits vorhandenen Sicherheitsbedenken über das Verhalten anderer ethnischer Gruppen verstärken, in dem sie die Bewohner dazu zwingen, das Vertrauen das sie für die anderen ethnischen Gruppen empfinden zu überdenken. Wenn solches Vertrauen fehlt, weil Ethnizität bereits früher benutzt wurde, um Bevölkerungsteile von der Macht auszuschließen oder sogar zu

diskriminieren, dann wird der Prozess der *Elitenauswahl* in den ersten Wahlen den Kandidaten Anreize bieten, den Mangel an Vertrauen zum Wahlthema zu machen. Dadurch werden die Sicherheitsbedenken hervorgehoben und verstärkt, selbst wenn diese Sorgen vor Beginn der Demokratisierung nicht drängten.

In dieser Dissertation teste ich die Theorien der *Elitenmanipulation*, der *Elitenauswahl* und des *ethnischen Sicherheitsdilemmas* in zwei Schritten mit einem Mixed-Method-Design. Teil I prüft quantitativ mit einer hohen Fallzahl, ob drei theoretisch mit höherem Konfliktrisiko verbundene Faktoren einen Einfluss haben: Demokratisierung, die Politisierung von Ethnizität und Anzeichen der Bedrohung des Amtsinhabers. Um diese Tests zu ermöglichen wurde eine neue Methode, Demokratisierungsperioden zu kodieren, entwickelt, die die rigiden Kodiermechanismen bisheriger Methoden deutlich übertrifft. Darüber hinaus wird ein Übersichtsindikator für das Risiko für Amtsinhaber auf Basis einer Regressionsanalyse potentieller Risikofaktoren eingeführt. Die abschließende Bewertung zeigt, dass laufende Demokratisierungsprozesse, die Politisierung von Ethnizität und eine vorhandene Herausforderung des Amtsinhabers alle mit einem gesteigerten Risiko des Bürgerkriegsausbruchs verbunden sind.

Teil II erweitert die in Teil I identifizierten Korrelationen durch das Studium der Kausalmechanismen an Hand von zwei Fallstudien konfliktreicher Demokratisierungsprozesse. Der burundische Demokratisierungsversuch von 1988–1993 zeigt, dass Konflikt selbst in Situationen entstehen kann, wo fast die vollständige politische Elite und Bevölkerung auf den Frieden hinarbeiten, solange es eine kleine Anzahl Akteure gibt, die Gewalt säen. Die Demokratisierung und der anschließende Zerfall Jugoslawiens hebt den deutlichen Versuch politischer Führer hervor, nationalistische Gefühle für ihren eigenen politischen Vorteil zu nutzen, aber sie zeigt auch, dass nationalistische Botschaften auf der wahrgenommenen Realität des Publikums fußen müssen.

Zusammengefasst zeigt diese Dissertation, dass politische Führungspersonlichkeiten einen klaren Einfluss auf das Risiko haben, dass Bürgerkrieg ausbricht. Auch wenn sie nicht notwendigerweise in der Lage sind, den Ausbruch gegen den Willen entschlossener Gegner zu verhindern, so ist doch klar, dass sie Öl in die Flammen gießen können. Anders als von Einigen behauptet, ist dies weder eine Manipulation noch eine Ablenkung im wahren Sinne dieser Worte—die entzweierenden Botschaften, die politische Führer senden, stützen sich auf die Anwesenheit nationalistischer Identitäten und auf die Wahrnehmung eines Sicherheitsdilemmas.

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Abbreviations

ABP	<i>Agence Burundaise de Presse</i> , Burundian Press Agency
ACD	Armed Conflict Data set
CGV	Cheibub, Gandhi, and Vreeland
COW	Correlates of War
ECPR	European Consortium for Political Research
ELF	Ethno-Linguistic Fractionalization
EPR	Ethnic Power Relations
ETH	Eidgenössische Technische Hochschule, Federal Institute of Technology (Switzerland)
Frodebu	<i>Front pour la Démocratie au Burundi</i> , Front for Democracy in Burundi
FSU	Former Soviet Union
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
HDZ	<i>Hrvatska demokratska zajednica</i> , Croatian Democratic Union
HEGG	Hegre, Ellingsen, Gates, and Gleditsch
IMF	International Monetary Fund
ISA	International Studies Association
JNA	<i>Jugoslovenska Narodna Armija</i> , Yugoslav People's Army
LL	Log-likelihood
M&S	Mansfield and Snyder
MAR	Minorities at Risk
NCCR	National Centre of Competence in Research (Switzerland)
NSA	Non-State Actor
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
P4	Polity IV
Palipehutu	<i>Parti pour la libération du peuple hutu</i> , Party for the Liberation of the Hutu People (Burundi)
PARREG	Regulation of Participation
PARCOMP	Competitiveness of Participation
PF	Period Finder

PRIO	Peace Research Institute Oslo
SIP	Scalar Index of Polities
SPS	<i>Socijalistička partija Srbije</i> , Socialist Party of Serbia
UCDP	Uppsala Conflict Data Program
Uprona	<i>Union pour le Progrès national</i> , Union for National Progress (Burundi)
USSR	Union of Socialist Soviet Republics
XCONST	Executive Constraints

Introduction: The Riskiness of Democratization

1.1 Background

Democratization is a time of hope! The previous, autocratic power structures are being reformed, the population will be given a voice in the affairs of their country and inhabitants can look forward to a more peaceful and prosperous future as a result. Yet, transitions toward democracy are also troubled periods: there is no guarantee that democracy will successfully take root and democratizing countries have to face many problems until the reformation of their regime is complete. During democratization, countries are more likely to experience international conflict (Mansfield and Snyder, 1995a,b, 2002, 2005) and pressing internal problems, such as violent repressive behavior practiced by the outgoing regime, which are unlikely to be solved until the democratization process is concluded (Davenport, 2004). Even more regrettably, the likelihood of civil war rises significantly during periods of democratization (Cederman, Hug, and Krebs, 2010; Mansfield and Snyder, 2008). How can it be that countries that are close to throwing off the yoke of autocratic rule succumb to a brutal civil war along the way? And who bears responsibility for this?

Political leaders have often been blamed for the outbreak of civil wars. Yet their role needs to be assessed within the political context in which they act. Two prominent theories delineate the trade-off between the personal responsibility of political leaders and the influence of structural forces. At one end of the scale, the *elite manipulation* theory posits that political leaders have substantial, if not complete control over their environment (Gagnon, 2004; Snyder, 2000). Using the Yugoslavian break-up to illustrate this theory, one would argue that Slobodan Milošević and Franjo Tuđman manipulated their people into an unlikely civil war because the public's desire for political and economic change threatened their

hold on power. At the other extreme of the scale, the theory of *ethnic security dilemmas* (Posen, 1993a)¹ argues that political leaders don't have a strong influence on the path to civil war. Here, leaders like Milošević and Tuđman bear less blame—the conflict results from concerns about potential threats from other ethnic groups arising once the first cracks in the uniting Yugoslav Federation are visible. This is the nature of the dilemma: whatever the leaders do, the structural conditions of the socio-political environment will drive their people towards conflict.

While both of these theories have been applied to democratization cases by their proponents, neither of them explains why democratization periods should be more prone to the risk of the outbreak of civil war than other times in a country's history. Incumbents clinging to their position may attempt to manipulate the masses whenever their position is threatened, not just during a democratization attempt. Indeed, recent data on the reigns of political leaders confirm the intuition that the likelihood of irregular removal or even punishment of incumbents is highest in autocracies, and that only a small minority of such removals occurs during democratization periods.² A security dilemma does not require democratization, either. The absence of a protective party that can credibly assure all population groups of their safety is sufficient to initiate the spiral towards violence. State weakness and state failure fulfill this condition, again independent of an attempt to democratize the country. So what can explain the higher likelihood of civil-war onset during democratization periods?

This dissertation proposes an alternative theory that focuses on two components of the democratization process as the driving mechanisms: firstly, the need to solve the *demos* question, to define the people on which rule by the people will be established, and secondly, the selection of political leaders that will represent the people. The *elite selection* theory argues that security worries can arise when democratization *forces* citizens to consider their willingness to share political power with members of other population groups in the country. If ethnicity was the foundation for earlier, politicized divisions, concerns may be well-founded: prior episodes of exclusion, discrimination or even violence along ethnic lines may predispose people against sharing power with anyone but their ethnic kin.³ At the same time, candidates—incumbents and challengers—are competing for political power. The literature shows that first elections are generally more chaotic than later repetitions, with a greater variety of candidates and parties vying for the attention of a newly mobilized electorate (see e.g. Turner, 1993). If well-founded security concerns exist within the population due to the politicization of ethnicity in the past, candidates that address these fears should be able to capture the attention of their constituents better than candidates campaigning on less pressing issues, such as long-term economic development, abstract political rights, etc. The two necessary ingredients of democratization—defining the *demos* and campaigning for political power—can explain why ethnic divisions suddenly become the focus of national discourse, even when they were on the minds of few people prior to the onset of democratization.

The analysis of the role of political leaders' influence on conflict risk in democratization settings is highly relevant. The outbreak of conflict and the implied failure of the democratization attempt constitute a substantial set-back for society and enormous suffering for its members as well as the neighboring region.⁴ If political leaders have a measurable effect that can be elucidated, preventative action can be targeted towards them in the hope that individuals prove easier to influence than societies at large. For this reason and with the ultimate goal of providing policy advice towards conflict prevention, all three theories will be assessed using a combination of large-N regression analysis and process tracing applied to two relevant cases: Burundi and Yugoslavia.

The following section briefly presents the three research areas underlying this dissertation.

1.2 Subject of Research

Democratization Periods Kant (1796) was the first to argue that democracies should be more peaceful than other types of regimes, at least among themselves. While Kant was not suggesting a static law but rather a learning process (Cederman, 2001), there is substantial quantitative evidence that democracies do not fight with each other.⁵ This argument has often been used to encourage and justify democracy promotion abroad (Cederman, Hug, and Wenger, 2008; Daxecker, 2007), be it by peaceful or war-like means. However, peace among democracies does not imply that countries on the path towards democracy are equally peaceful. Instead, democratizing countries have triggered substantial amounts of violence both historically⁶ and in current times, as shown by Mansfield and Snyder (1995a,b, 2002, 2005) and Ward and Gleditsch (1998) regarding the risk of inter-state warfare and by Cederman, Hug, and Krebs (2010) and Mansfield and Snyder (2008) regarding the risk of civil war.

The source of this problem is still under debate. A substantial part of the literature has argued that democratization attempts that did not succeed completely were the driving force behind the finding. However, the category of *anocracies* containing regimes that mix traits of democracies and autocracies has since been criticized for being too broad and evidence for the war-prone nature of anocracies has been discredited due to the implicit measurement of political violence in the popular Polity indicator (Vreeland, 2008). Recent studies show instead that the process of democratization is inherently problematic and that movements towards democracy yield an elevated risk of civil-war onset for a longer period than autocratization attempts (cf. Cederman, Hug, and Krebs, 2010, which is the foundation of Chapter 3). An important factor may be the fact that masses are being mobilized while the political institutions are temporarily weak due to the ongoing process of deconstruction and reformation (Huntington, 1968).

This dissertation aims to replicate the results showing the problematic nature of democratization periods (Chapters 3 and 5) and to elaborate on the dynamics that cause democratization processes to be inherently problematic (Chapter 2 provides a theoretical overview and the qualitative case studies in Part II provide detailed accounts illustrating the different theories).

Ethnicity as a Source of Conflict The role of ethnicity in explaining the origin of civil war has long been disputed. In recent years, the “greed or grievance” debate has dominated the academic literature. Political economists have argued that economic factors such as the availability of easily lootable natural resources as a potential income stream, the lack of opportunity costs due to low GDP per capita and insufficient education, and the low costs of rebellion due to state weakness provide the best explanations of civil-war onset. (Collier and Hoeffler, 2004 and Fearon and Laitin, 2003 are the two corner stones of this side of the debate.) In their analysis, the political economists focus predominantly on the individual as the most relevant level of analysis. Here, ethnic groups play a limited role at best, serving merely as efficient organizational units due to shared language and culture, but could just as well be replaced by soccer clubs as loyalty-generating organizational units. (Mueller, 2000). However, both the income-driven component and the capturing of groups through the perspective of the individual represent simplifications. Firstly, the proponents of “greed” as a driving mechanism have chosen to focus on a minimalistic definition of income that includes ground rent, such as diamonds, but ignores substantial income streams available to those who have access to the state itself, such as income from taxes (Ehrke, 2004). Moreover, by denigrating ethnic groups to the role of simple organizational tools, political economists have ignored the substantial influence of group dynamics and nationalist loyalties that can come from sharing language, religion, culture and history—which explains why even those Serbs who were fans of *Fudbalski Klub Crvena Zvezda* went into war wearing the colors of their nation, not their soccer club.

Recent results have been able to re-establish that ethnicity plays a substantial role. Much of the world is still defined by artificial borders drawn based on colonial interests that divide members of the same ethnic groups and join different groups in ethnically heterogeneous states (Vorrath and Krebs, 2009). New data on the access to political power available to different ethnic groups over time shows that it is precisely the combination of ethnic loyalties and (lack of) access to state power that can lead to an elevated risk of violent conflict. Two articles (Cederman, Wimmer, and Min, 2010; Wimmer, Cederman, and Min, 2009) show that the exclusion of an ethnic group from political power is a risky move—even more so when combined with more intensive discrimination.

This result is particularly relevant when it comes to democratization attempts: while the opening of the political arena to all members of society should decrease the likelihood of conflict, this may only hold in the long run. In the short term,

the redistribution of political power may cause intense security concerns. Groups that enjoyed access to political power while others were excluded may fear retribution; those being allowed in have little reason to trust groups that previously excluded or discriminated them. It is only reasonable for actors to use past experience as a yardstick when forecasting future behavior, and the remaining mistrust can lead people to choose a more closely-knit ethnic identity over broader, state-wide loyalties that would force them to cooperate with former antagonists.

This dissertation replicates the results showing that politicization of ethnicity increases conflict risk (Chapter 5) and shows how ethnic divisions are used by political leaders in two case studies (Part II).

Influence of Political Leaders So far, we have only considered process factors, such as democratization dynamics and ethnic cleavages. The next logical step is to focus on the actors that play a crucial role in shaping the process: political leaders. Already Bismarck was using nationalism as a tool for reshaping society and promoting a political agenda (Pflanze, 1955) and there is a long-standing academic tradition in the analysis of a particular type of nationalist manipulation, *diversionary warfare* (Levy, 1989). Snyder (2000) and Gagnon (2004) have made substantial contributions in establishing the *elite manipulation* school of thought as an explanation for the outbreak of *civil wars* with particular reference to ongoing democratization processes. Their argument is that threatened incumbents try to divert the attention of the public from topics where they have a weak hand—particularly democratic rule and economic development—and focus it on an area where they can present themselves as “protectors of the people”: the potential threat from ethnic *others*. While this strategy may not work at the international level,⁷ Tir and Jasinski (2008) argue that alienating ethnic minorities—“domestic diversion”—is an option open to many political leaders and less risky than interstate diversion.

Yet, while the proponents of elite manipulation can draw on substantial empirical evidence, there are two problems with the diversionary theory that arise from the argument that the elite behavior constitutes an actual diversion, i.e. that the public did not care about a potential threat from other groups until their attention was drawn to it by political leaders.⁸ However, ethnic identities are rarely as conveniently flexible as would be necessary for this argument to work (Brubaker, 1998) and more importantly, leaders may be representative of their people (Toft, 2009), which implies that their message finds resonance because they share an understanding with their people of the relevance of political topics.

Moreover, structural forces may cause violence to break out without the need for explicit manipulation by leaders. A *security dilemma*—the lack of a credible way for social groups to commit to peace and the absence of a third-party enforcer—may lead individual groups worried about their safety to increase their defensive capabilities. Since most weapons can be used both for offensive and defensive purposes, bolstering one’s defenses looks like an increased threat to other

groups, who may feel the need to improve their defenses in turn (Posen, 1993a). The resulting arms race constitutes a vicious circle leading to violence that can function even if all sides (including their leaders) seek to avoid conflict.

These two schools of thought, elite manipulation and ethnic security dilemma, constitute the endpoints of the scale for the influence of political leaders. This dissertation proposes a third theory that focuses on how the *selection of elites* reinforces the problem of answering the *demos* question during democratization attempts. Chapter 2 provides a theoretical overview and a structured comparison of *ethnic security dilemma*, *elite manipulation* and *elite selection*. Chapter 5 provides quantitative evidence confirming the positive influence of democratization attempts, politicization of ethnicity and time periods during which the power of the incumbent is threatened on the likelihood that civil war will break out. Two case studies in Part II trace the democratization process to find support for the individual theories. Finally, Chapter 9 concludes with a discussion of policy alternatives that result from the evidence provided in this dissertation.

The next section will provide a brief overview of the individual contributions of this dissertation.

1.3 Key Contributions

This dissertation provides several contributions to our understanding of the role of political leaders in promoting or avoiding civil war in democratizing, multi-ethnic states.

Conceptual contribution: Theory of *elite selection*. Firstly, it introduces the theory of elite selection that can explain why democratization periods face a higher risk of civil-war onset than other times in a country's history (Chapter 2). It argues that the need to define the *demos* while initiating intense political competition leads to a process where the public needs to address its security concerns and political leaders are presented with incentives for addressing these worries. While not denying the importance of *ethnic security dilemmas*, this theory allows actors such as political leaders to influence the situation. But unlike the theory of *elite manipulation*, the *elite selection* process does not focus solely on top-down communication, leaving room for bottom-up stimuli from the public to political leaders competing for popular support.

Methodological contribution: Identifying regime-type changes. As part of this dissertation, I contributed to the development of a novel method for identifying democratization and autocratization periods. Chapter 3 describes the "period-finding method" as originally published (Cederman, Hug, and Krebs, 2010), extends it to identify democratization attempts, and finally replicates the original results of Cederman, Hug, and Krebs (2010) using both the original Polity IV data and the more robust SIP indicator.

Empirical contribution: Quantitative evidence for the relevance of democratization, ethnic politicization and leadership influences. Part I provides an initial assessment of the factors explaining the onset of civil wars at the global level using large-N logistic regression. Using the democratization codings based on the “period finder” described in Chapter 3, an estimated threat level towards the incumbent indicating an incentive for competition and manipulation developed in Chapter 4 and external data on the relevance and politicization of ethnicity (Cederman, Wimmer, and Min, 2010; Wimmer, Cederman, and Min, 2009), Chapter 5 builds regression models on the risk of civil-war onset. All three factors are shown to significantly increase the likelihood of civil war.

Empirical contribution: Process tracing of the dynamic from democratization to potential conflict. The quantitative evidence provided in Chapter 5 do not provide sufficient proof to confirm the causal relationships described in the theories of *elite manipulation*, *elite selection* and *ethnic security dilemma*, especially since the development of violent conflict, the coming and going of political leaders and larger political processes such as regime-type transitions often have longer lead and lag times. For this reason, Part II provides two case studies that investigate the roles played by relevant political actors in detail using methodology and sources described in Chapter 6. Chapter 7 discusses how a careful democratization process in Burundi led to horrific violence in spite of attempts by all relevant political actors to bridge ethnic cleavages. Chapter 8 discusses the extent to which political leaders in Yugoslavia were broadcasting divisive messages without corresponding incentives from their constituents.

Finally, Chapter 9 concludes by interpreting the quantitative and qualitative evidence in this dissertation in the context of policy decisions: given that political leaders can play a key role in keeping their country from harm or driving it towards civil war, what incentive structures can internal and external actors create to avoid large-scale violence?

Notes

¹Posen (1993a) was also published as a chapter (Posen, 1993b) in the edited volume by Brown (1993).

²Descriptive statistics for the Archigos data set (Goemans, Gleditsch, and Chiozza, 2009) show that 43.46% of all irregular removals occur in autocracies, and of these, only 8% take place during a democratization attempt. See chapter 4 for a discussion of this data set.

³Cf. Wimmer, Cederman, and Min (2009) and Cederman, Wimmer, and Min (2010) for new data and results linking these factors to the onset of political violence.

⁴Collier, Chauvet, and Hegre (2008) estimate that the cost of the average civil war amounts to US\$ 60 bn., a multiple of yearly GDP for many countries. Even worse, recovery from a civil war is estimated to take almost an entire generation: on average, civil wars last seven years and are followed by fourteen years of reconstruction.

⁵Chan (1997) and Ray (1998) provide literature overviews, Raknerud and Hegre (1997) replicate and discuss the results.

⁶Cf. Mansfield and Snyder (1995a) for a discussion of Britain in the Victorian era, France under Napoleon III, Germany prior to World War I and Japan during the *Taishō* democracy.

⁷Chiozza and Goemans (2003) find that inter-state warfare makes it more likely that the incumbent loses office and that an increased risk of losing office makes incumbents less likely to initiate an international crisis.

⁸Consider the survey statistics quoted by Gagnon (2004) that indicate that few inhabitants of Yugoslavia considered members of other ethnic groups as a threat and that a substantial part of the population subscribed to the overarching Yugoslav identity instead of professing primary loyalty to one of the constituent ethnic groups.

Three Paths to the Same Conflict: A Theoretical Overview

2.1 Democracy, Democratization, Peace & War

In his seminal work, *Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch*, Kant (1796) describes a three-step process that should lead to stable, international peace. First, states adopt a republican constitution.¹ Secondly, republican states join in the *foedus pacificum*, a league of peaceful states that seeks to protect republics from their non-republican environment. Finally, world citizenship arises from the peaceful, long-term interaction among republics and further cements the constructive relationship between the involved states. Kant's sketch matches the empirical fact of the *democratic peace*, the observation that democracies rarely fight each other, if ever. This finding has been confirmed time and again: "The empirical evidence in favor of the proposition that democratic states have not initiated and are not likely to initiate inter-state wars against each other is substantial" (Ray, 1998, p. 43; see also Chan, 1997; Raknerud and Hegre, 1997).

What do we understand by *democracy*, and which of its characteristics can explain the lack of war among democracies? Schmitter and Karl (1991, p. 76) define democracy as "a system of governance in which rulers are held accountable for their actions in the public realm by citizens, acting indirectly through the competition and cooperation of their elected representatives." This definition matches well with Saward's (2003) core principles of democracy: participation or rule by the people, either directly or through intermediaries; regulated, fair and open competition to gain access to political power; and accountability of those in power. Tilly (2000, p. 4) combines accountability and participation into the requirement of "binding consultation" of the people, and it is precisely the requirement of broad and binding consultation that Kant sees as the driving motor of the peaceful behavior of modern democratic states: "If [...] the consent of the

citizenry is required in order to determine whether or not there will be war, it is natural that they consider all its calamities before committing themselves to so risky a game" (Kant, 1912, p. 351 as translated in Humphrey, 1983, p. 113).

However, this is meant to be a learning process, not an iron law. Cederman (2001, p. 28) shows that "democracies are indeed faster learners when interacting among themselves, and their relations become more peaceful with common experience of long duration." Turning this argument on its head, one would not expect democratizing states to offer the same level of peacefulness as mature democracies. Indeed, democratizing countries seem to be *more* at risk of war than either mature democracies or mature autocracies, and have been for a long time: Mansfield and Snyder (1995a) discuss historical cases of inter-state warfare related to democratization in Victorian Britain, France under Napoleon III, Germany prior to World War I and Japan during the *Taishō* democracy. They also show that this finding is still valid by providing quantitative evidence that the same relationship holds true in the post-World War II period.

A first attempt to explain the significantly larger risk of conflict for democratizing states focused on whether the democratization attempt was completely successful or not. Mansfield and Snyder (1995a,b) argued that *anocracies*, mixed regimes exhibiting both autocratic and democratic traits, are the cause of these democratization conflicts. However, the debate has moved to the dynamics of democratization itself since then: Gleditsch (2002a) found that both anocracies and the process of democratization have separate influences on the likelihood of conflict, Vreeland (2008) argues that anocracies are not a sensible category in themselves and that their "influence" on the likelihood of war is due to the problematic operationalization of the variable used to measure regime type, and finally, Narang and Nelson (2009) argue that the combination of incomplete democratization, weak institutions and war described by the proponents of the anocracy-conflict link is rare (though this is debated by Mansfield and Snyder, 2009).

If it is not the extent of democratization success that explains whether a country is at risk of war, then it must be the process itself. In general, democratization is understood as any move towards more democracy, if one conceptualizes regimes on a scale defined by perfect democracy and perfect autocracy as endpoints (Bogaards, 2009). However, this uni-dimensional understanding may be misleading given that democracy consists of multiple components that may change at different times and at different speeds (Munck, 2001). Democratization paths may diverge depending on the choice to prioritize state capacity or broad consultation (Tilly, 2000), depending on the type of the previous regime, and depending on whether incumbents or challengers took the lead in changing the system (Huntington, 2009). Given that both democracy and democratization processes are multifaceted, problems may have multiple origins.

Returning to the democratic principles identified above, we find potential causes of conflict in participation, competition and regulation. Firstly, in order to allow participation by the people, one has to define the people and this prob-

lem cannot be solved by democratic means. For this reason, Rustow (1970) argues that national unity is the sole background condition for democratization. However, many democratizing countries are ethnically heterogeneous and therefore are faced with multiple ways of combining ethnons into one or more demoi. Mann (2005) has shown that the risk of conflict rises when demoi and ethnons do not align and competing projects to converge demoi and ethnons exist. Secondly, competition for political office before and during democratic elections is very intense (Bunce, 2003) and more chaotic than in following rounds of elections (Turner, 1993). Finally and simultaneously, the institutions that are supposed to regulate political competition and to hold candidates and elected representatives accountable are weak and undergoing reform (Huntington, 1968; Mansfield and Snyder, 1995a), with old power structures being dismantled and new organizations still lacking experience and legitimacy. While mature democracies provide regulated space and means for political competition (Cederman, Hug, and Wenger, 2008), newly developing democracies are faced with a hard task: Tilly (2000, p. 6) argues that “no democracy survives in the absence of substantial governmental capacity” and Huntington (1968) adds that the failure to channel mass mobilization with strong institutions yields a high risk of violence.

Given these well-founded explanations for the higher conflict risk of democratizing states, it is not surprising that Mansfield and Snyder’s (1995a) original empirical findings have stood up to the test of time. While Mansfield and Snyder have been challenged often (Thompson and Tucker, 1997; Wolf et al., 1996), they have continued to improve their data and methodology and have reaffirmed their findings repeatedly (Mansfield and Snyder, 1997, 2002, 2005). The insight that democratization can lead to a higher risk of war has also been replicated by others (Gleditsch, 2002a; Ward and Gleditsch, 1998) and is accepted by many, if not most scholars.

Moreover, new research indicates that the same logic also holds true for the risk of civil war (Cederman, Hug, and Krebs, 2010; Mansfield and Snyder, 2008). The problem of defining the *demos* is particularly associated with the risk of civil wars during democratization. In large parts of the world, artificial boundaries separate ethnic kin, corral different ethnic groups into one state and therefore provide potential cleavages along which conflict may erupt (Vorrath and Krebs, 2009). The following section discusses the link between ethnicity and conflict.

2.2 Ethnicity, Nationalism & Conflict

According to Weber (1912), the nation “ist eine gefühlsmäßige Gemeinschaft, deren adäquater Ausdruck ein eigener Staat wäre, die also normalerweise die Tendenz hat, einen solchen aus sich hervorzutreiben.”² The definition already contains a hint of nationalism, the “political principle, which holds that the political and national unit should be congruent” (Gellner, 2006, p. 1). The realignment

of borders to suit nationalistic projects has caused the disintegration of states consisting of more than one people (or ethnic group), such as the Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman empires, and the merging of states containing what is perceived to be the same people, such as Germany and Italy. This process has been conflict-ridden since its beginning in the 18th century and has led to many wars with countless victims, including both World Wars.

The nation is a powerful concept, “an all-encompassing social totality” that works as a “social, economic, political and cultural unit” and is simultaneously paired with territorial borders (Wimmer, 2002, p. 53). At the same time, it does not seem to be founded on anything solid. Anderson (1991, p. 6) coins the term of the “*imagined* political community”, arguing that the sense of community is imagined because even members of small nations are unlikely to ever be in physical community with most of their compatriots, yet they feel connected in a “deep, horizontal comradeship” (ibid., p. 7). Gellner (1964, p. 168) makes a similar argument when he writes “nationalism is not the awakening of nations to self-consciousness; it *invents* nations where they do not exist” (emphasis mine).

This community has limits that separate any nation from the next (Anderson, 1991). Along all important dimensions, the nation is considered to be homogeneous while the outside is considered heterogeneous. This begs the question: what is an important dimension? After all, some nations such as Switzerland cope with heterogeneity in multiple dimensions, yet maintain a strong national identity. This is part of the larger question of identity. Unless one adopts a primordialist view that sees identities as given and everlasting, they are constructed, can be shaped and re-shaped, and co-exist in multiple layers. Brubaker and Cooper (2000, p. 1) argue that this “soft” understanding of identity does not easily lend itself to explaining its “hard” effects, including political violence: “if identity is everywhere, it is nowhere”. If that were true, identity would have lost any useful meaning as an explanatory concept.

The flexibility of identity in general and ethnic identities in particular, combined with the fact that group identities are inherently situated at the collective rather than the individual level, has made it an unappetizing concept for political economists of a rationalist-individualistic persuasion (Kaufmann, 2005). Authors such as Fearon and Laitin (2003) and Collier and Hoeffler (2004) have used the argument that ethnic heterogeneity is too widespread to explain anything (Cederman, Wimmer, and Min, 2010, p. 89). They reject identity-based grievances theoretically and have condemned them to insignificance by operationalizing them in ways that deprive them of their meaning, such as the Ethno-Linguistic Fractionalization (ELF) index.³

Where do we find meaning in ethnicity? Firstly, ethnicity provides structure to society. Smith (1986) identifies three components that delineate ethnic groups: a common myth of descent or shared history, a distinctive, shared culture, and an association with a specific territory. These three components can be used to demarcate boundaries that are key to Tilly’s four characteristics of identity:

1. "A boundary separating me from you or us from them;
2. a set of relations within the boundary;
3. a set of relations *across* the boundary;
4. a set of stories about the boundary and the relations." (Tilly, 2003, p. 608)

Secondly, meaning comes from political processes that provide competing definitions of boundaries as well as stories and myths to reinforce them. The necessity of combining ethnic identities with the political process that feed them can be seen by contrasting the following two definitions of ethnic conflict. Toft (2009, p. 232) defines ethnic war as "groups of people fighting with other groups, where the 'other' is usually defined in terms of race, language, or religion, resulting in large-scale, organized violence." It should be noted that this definition provides no information about the actual cause of the conflict. Wimmer (1997, p. 631), on the other hand, focuses on the motivation: "ethnic struggles can [...] be interpreted as struggles for the collective goods of the nation-state." In essence, the cause of ethnic conflict is rooted in politics, while the structure of the conflict is driven by ethnicity—as was already suggested by Weber's understanding of the nation.

Since political processes can provide identities with meaning, it is only natural that ethnicity is studied in association with regime-type changes. Wimmer (1997, p. 631) argues that "the politicization of ethnicity is to be interpreted as a central aspect of modern state-building." (Cf. also Mann, 2001.) This is particularly true for democratization attempts, since democracy relies on self-determination by *the people*.

Multiple ways have been identified as to how political processes can make ethnicity the predominant level of identity "so that in people's perception the political landscape is made up of different *ethnic* groups" (Wimmer, 1997, p. 650). Hayden (1996) argues in reference to the Yugoslav break-up of the early 1990s that it was a process "of making existing heterogeneous [communities] unimaginable", and that there are multiple, sometimes mundane mechanisms that contribute to this process. Hayden himself focuses on bureaucratic homogenization e.g. by giving or denying citizenship, or more visibly, by rewriting the constitution. The new constitution of the Croat Republic accepted in 1990 is a good example of this. After a win by an ethnically defined party in the first democratic elections in the Croatian Republic within the Yugoslav Federation, the preamble of the new constitution is phrased to continue the politicization of ethnicity:

"The millenary identity of the Croatian nation and the continuity of its statehood, confirmed by the course of its entire historical experience within different forms of states and by the preservation and growth of the idea of a national state, founded on the historical right

of the Croatian nation to full sovereignty, manifested in [twelve historic examples beginning in the 7th century]. At the historic turning-point marked by the rejection of the communist system and changes in the international order in Europe, the Croatian nation reaffirmed, in the first democratic elections (1990), by its freely expressed will, its millennial statehood and its resolution to establish the Republic of Croatia as a sovereign state." (Croatia, 1990).

While the preamble also accepts "members of other nations and minorities who are its citizens" (ibid.), the tone clearly reinforces the Croatian identity and the Croatian claim to a sovereign nation-state.

The literature also shows other mechanisms in which ethnic identities are reinforced. Wimmer (1997, p. 651) points out that an ethnically-delineated struggle for the state arises "when the benefits and/or costs of state activity are distributed unequally along ethnic lines"; in essence a financial argument that was later broadened and empirically confirmed to apply to the access to state power in general (Cederman, Wimmer, and Min, 2010). Finally, violence itself draws ethnic boundaries, causing the most heterogeneous parts of the country to see the most violent fighting (as argued by Hayden, 1996 in reference to the spatial distribution of violence in the break-up of Yugoslavia).

The multitude of ways in which ethnicity can become reshaped in a way that leads to violence—particularly in the context of democratization periods—draws the attention to those actors who have the largest influence on public discourse, political leaders. The following section discusses three theories on their influence in promoting or avoiding ethnic violence.

2.3 Elite influences

The previous two sections have argued that democratization and ethnic divisions are factors that increase the risk of civil war—but who are the actors that drive the dynamic that leads to the outbreak of political violence? Bunce (2000, p. 707) argues that there is "widespread agreement that political elites play a central role in democratization", and that their individual decisions are key when it comes to the survival of democracy. It is therefore only natural that we turn from the factors of democratization and ethnicity and towards the actors that have the potential to lead their country towards peace or war.

An investigation into the role of political elites in the onset of civil war always involves a judgement on where to place responsibility: with the individual leader, with situational forces, or somewhere in between. The endpoints of this scale are defined by two theories. The theory of *elite manipulation*⁴ (e.g. Gagnon, 2004; Snyder, 2000) places the blame squarely with ethnic elites, which for the purpose of this study are defined as any political figures that hold or compete for national office.⁵ It is argued that these leaders use the danger of an inter-ethnic conflict as

a tool to secure their grip on power, and negligently or willfully accept the onset of violent conflict as a consequence of their own actions.

At the other extreme of the scale, the theory of the *ethnic security dilemma* (Posen, 1993a) argues that political leaders are relatively powerless in the face of structural and situational forces. If they work hard to improve the security of their people, they risk being seen by others as aggressors preparing for attack, potentially inviting a first strike by others. Yet neglecting the security of their people equally puts them at risk. Conflict may be unavoidable regardless of the choices made by elites.

Sections 2.3.1 and 2.3.2 illustrate these theories by means of their interpretation of the Yugoslavian break-up in the early 1990s. A third theory, *elite selection*, is then introduced as a possible hybrid of the two that is specifically suited to explain the higher conflict risk of democratizing states.

2.3.1 Elite Manipulation

The *elite manipulation* theory departs from the assumption that leaders have a clear influence on the views of the masses. Lippmann (1991, p. 79) argues that “our opinions cover a bigger space, a longer reach of time, a greater number of things, than we can directly observe.” For this very reason, the public has to rely on elites to shape their opinion (Zaller, 1994), but simultaneously, it invites the risk of being misled by self-serving leaders. Both Snyder (2000) and Gagnon (2004) see the civil wars in Yugoslavia in the early 1990s as the result of such behavior, i.e. incumbent elites seeking to defend their power in the face of mass mobilization and the threat of regime reformation. Their “goal was to bring an end to political mobilization that represented an immediate threat to the existing structure of power” (Gagnon, 2004, p. 181) and to control the “impending democratization [that] threatened the position of the communist elite” (Snyder, 2000, p. 206). Gagnon (2004) argues that both parties which emerged victoriously in the 1990 regional elections in Croatia and Serbia⁶ owed their success not to a strong backing by their respective populations but rather to legal and electoral trickery. At the same time, they were faced with “parts of the population that were actively mobilizing against the interests of conservative elites and calling for fundamental changes to the structures of economic and political power” (Gagnon, 2004, p. 180).

The response by both Croatian and Serbian leadership was to utilize “their near monopoly control over the news media” (Snyder, 2000, p. 213) to “shift the focus of political discourse *away* from issues of change *toward* grave injustices purportedly being inflicted on innocents [...] by *evil others* defined in ethnic terms” (Gagnon, 2004, pp. 180–181, emphasis mine). This change of subject served to demobilize any potential opposition: “anyone who questioned these stories or who criticized the president or the ruling party [...] was demonized as being in league with the enemy, of not caring about the innocent victims of the evil oth-

ers” (Gagnon, 2004, p. 179). This clearly included not only politicians from the opposition and their supporters, but also potential challengers from within. As such, the ethnic discourse is argued to be just a ploy that allowed a restructuring of political (and geographic) space favorable to the incumbents. Since both Slobodan Milošević and Franjo Tuđman engaged in such ethnic outbidding to hold on to their jobs, each of their efforts could serve as the best proof of their threatening intentions to the other.

Both Gagnon and Snyder argue that this mechanism is clearly applicable to other cases: “[...] the Yugoslav wars can be seen as falling within a broader universe of cases where elites construct images of a threatening outside world as a means of demobilizing the politically relevant population” (Gagnon, 2004, p. 189). While Gagnon sees any threat of regime change as a hazard, Snyder (2000, p. 32) argues that democratization is a particularly critical time: “democratization produces nationalism when powerful groups within the nation [...] want to avoid surrendering real political authority to the average citizen.”




Figure 2.1: The logic of the *elite manipulation* theory: Elites manipulate identities to create support for themselves, and end up creating conflicting groups

This allows us to summarize the views of the adherents to the *elite manipulation* school of thought along our three central dimensions. Firstly, democratization (or according to some, regime change in general) provides both motivation and means for manipulation. The threat of being dethroned can motivate incumbent elites to take drastic action, and the reforming media and institutions may be easier to control during the transition when regular checks and balances are not in place. Secondly, ethnicity is merely a convenient tool for mobilization rather than the core of the conflict. The manipulating elites simply need a credible outside group to portray as an existential threat, and may just as well choose a potential foe on the international stage. (Figure 2.1 illustrates this by showing how manipulating elites divide the population along arbitrary identity dimensions through their divisive message.) Finally, the role of leaders is clear: because they have access to means of manipulation and because a threat to their power motivates

them to use these means, political elites can and do trigger ethnic conflict and even civil war for their own selfish goals.

2.3.2 Ethnic Security Dilemma

In clear opposition to the *elite manipulation* school of thought, the proponents of the *ethnic security dilemma* argue that conflict is not caused by “short-term incentives for new leaders to ‘play the nationalist card’ to secure their power” (Posen, 1993a, p. 29). Instead, structural forces drive society to the brink of conflict, while political leaders have little or no ability to avoid the outbreak of violence.

Posen (1993a) argues that the weakening, reform or collapse of the central authority of ethnically heterogeneous states that is associated with periods of democratization (and regime-type transitions in general) causes anarchy similar to what exists at the international level. With the break-down of the previous order and the transitional *emerging anarchy*, the country experiences “special conditions that arise when proximate groups of people suddenly find themselves responsible for their own security” (Posen, 1993a, p. 27). In the absence of a credible, supra-ethnic authority that can guarantee the safety of ethnic groups, two factors kindle a rational fear for group survival.

Firstly, “the process of imperial collapse produces conditions that make offensive and defensive capabilities indistinguishable” (Posen, 1993a, p. 29) and therefore render it difficult or impossible for any group to credibly signal their defensive intent. Posen discusses a number of events that illustrate the difficulty of distinguishing offensive and defensive actions. For example, the predominantly Serbian-controlled Yugoslav People’s Army (JNA, *Jugoslovenska Narodna Armija*) confiscated heavy weapons stored on the territory of the Croatian Republic in October 1990. Given the preceding downgrading of the Serbian population on Croatian territory from “constituent nation” to “minority” and the associated condition that Serbs living in Croatia needed to swear their loyalty to the Croatian Republic, the impounding can be interpreted as a defensive act: the attempt to control access to weapons that could potentially be used against the Serbian minority. At the same time, the confiscated weapons provided the JNA with “a vast military advantage over the nascent armed forces of the [Croatian R]epublic” (Posen, 1993a, p. 37). Even with hindsight, it is difficult to say whether this action was intended to be purely defensive or purely offensive.

As long as it is impossible to judge an opponent’s intent by his actions, “the main mechanism that [ethnic groups] will use [to determine offensive implications of another’s sense of identity] is history: how did other groups behave the last time they were unconstrained” (Posen, 1993a, p. 30)? Posen points out that “Serbs and Croats have a terrifying oral history of each other’s behavior” (Posen, 1993a, p. 36) that extends beyond the recent history of more intense conflict dating back over 100 years. Given such a history of violent inter-ethnic conflict, any efforts to increase group cohesion by touting shared suffering and conflict is

likely to be seen as vilification and saber-rattling by others. Even without a history of conflict, “the ‘groupness’ of the ethnic, religious, cultural and linguistic collectives that emerge from collapsed empires gives each of them an inherent offensive military power” (Posen, 1993a, p. 30).

Secondly, group cohesion and a history of confrontation is not the only factor forcing ethnic groups to consider the actions of others through the lens of a possible attack. The risk-reward structure during democratization periods also makes it attractive for actors to “choose the offensive if they wish to survive” (Posen, 1993a, p. 28). A purely defensive intent is the less likely option because the offensive provides a substantial competitive advantage to the first mover.

In essence, the proponents of the *ethnic security dilemma* argue that the absence of a guarantor of peace creates an anarchic situation in which all groups must fear attack. This produces the actual dilemma: any move to increase the security of one group is seen as a threat by all others and leads everyone further down the slippery slope towards the outbreak of violence. According to this theory, political leaders can accomplish little. Even if they are aware of the dilemma they are facing, “the nature of the situation compels them to take the steps they do” (Posen, 1993a, p. 28).




Figure 2.2: The logic of *ethnic security dilemmas*: Perceived threats from other groups lead to a bolstering of defenses and an arms race that does not require political leaders to drive the process

Let us summarize the conflict dynamic described by the *ethnic security dilemma* along the three dimensions: democratization, ethnicity and leadership. In this school of thought, only the first two dimensions play a role. Democratization, or any other change in regime type that is substantial enough to remove any supra-ethnic, protective authority, creates a vicious circle in which all groups need to protect themselves, but in doing so appear more threatening. (Figure 2.2 is a visual representation of this dynamic of hardening inter-ethnic borders.) The ethnic dimension only determines between which groups conflict takes place,⁷ but the initial problem is anarchy at the state level. Individual efforts by political elites are considered to be ineffectual at best and conducive to conflict at worst, independent of their intentions.

2.3.3 Elite Selection

So far, the discussion has focussed on the two polar cases in the debate on the influence of political leaders. *Elite-manipulation* theorists place the blame of ethnic civil wars squarely with the leaders of ethnic groups, arguing that they encourage conflict in an attempt to bolster their waning power. Proponents of the *ethnic security dilemma* see structural or situational forces at work, leaving political elites little or no room to maneuver.

Both schools of thought make convincing arguments. Political leaders cannot reasonably be expected to be an exception to the principal-agent problem: it is rational for them to look out for their personal interest (Brubaker, 1998). At the same time, democratization does force ethnic groups to consider the intentions of their neighbors, especially if earlier interactions have been conflict-ridden.

Other parts of both arguments seem less convincing. Gagnon (2004) argues that elites were able to skillfully steer the public discourse away from political change towards ethnic conflict even though ethnicity was initially a non-issue for the majority of the population. Still, one needs to ask whether the likes of Slobodan Milošević and Franjo Tuđman could have been successful in framing the debate if ethnicity was not already meaningful to their audience. While the majority of people may have preferred to work towards increasing the standard of living, political rights and economic security—as polls at the turn of the decade indicate (Gagnon, 2004)—once the old system with its safe-guards is being dismantled, security considerations would become more urgent and their immediacy would trump longer-term considerations. As Smith (2006) argues: fear is not only a tool in the hands of political elites, it is also an “underlying condition for successful elite manipulation.” In essence, fear needs to be present for leaders to instigate more fear. De Figueiredo and Weingast (1999, p. 263) second this in their explanation of why the people desire peace, but are willing to follow their leaders into ethnic war: “citizens are willing to support extreme ends when they fear for their lives, livelihoods, and families.”

Just as the expectation of extensive elite control over public discourse seems too extreme, the assumption of anarchy in the *ethnic security dilemma* is overstated. While institutions will be weakened as the political regime is being reformed, a complete break-down of the apparatus of state power seems rare. In the case of Yugoslavia, there was no non-ethnic superior power that disappeared, leaving ethnic groups to their own devices. Rather, the same elites were at work both before and after the onset of reforms, and they had roughly the same power apparatus at their disposal until the conflict started to escalate.

Subsequently, this dissertation proposes a third alternative that takes the special situation of a transition towards democracy into account. As with the previous two theories, the three dimensions of democratization, ethnicity and leadership will be addressed in turn.

Recent empirical studies have clearly shown that periods of democratization are associated not only with a higher risk of international war (Mansfield and

Snyder, 2005 and earlier studies) but also with a higher risk of civil war (Cederman, Hug, and Krebs, 2010; Mansfield and Snyder, 2008). What can explain this significant difference from other periods in a country's history? Neither temporary weakness of state institutions nor the threat to personal positions of power make likely candidates: both can occur during other regime-type changes and even during regime changes that do not affect the nature of the political system.⁸

The key difference between democratization processes and other changes to the regime is that any move towards democracy requires an answer to the *demos* question. The issue of who can partake in government and influence the future of all inhabitants *forces* citizens to examine their loyalties. Is their allegiance to an ethnically heterogeneous state stronger than their loyalty to a more narrowly defined group of kin? This question is not contingent on the presence of anarchy, and it does not require that ethnic differences are of great concern immediately prior to the onset of the transition.

In the debate of the *demos* question, ethnic identities are one of multiple competing loyalties that inhabitants choose from. Assuming that they choose rationally, they can be expected to assess the utility of each of their identities. A history of ethnicity-based exclusion, discrimination, persecution and violence will lead them to prefer the loyalty to a smaller, ethnically defined group over the potentially risky cohabitation with members of other ethnicities. This can be an alternative origin of an ethnic security dilemma: even if there is no anarchy (yet), the potential of drastic consequences such as an attack by another ethnic group may lead risk-averse people to place their faith solely in their own group, even when this event very improbable. Such considerations also explain why the population of Yugoslavia shifted their focus from the issues of economic prosperity to ethnic divisions: physiological needs and safety considerations receive the highest priority (Maslow, 1943). The desire to avoid the worst-case scenario of a violent attack then leads to a spiral of mistrust and suspicion similar to the one described in the *ethnic security dilemma*.

In essence, democratization allows us to extend the theory of the ethnic security dilemma in two ways. Firstly, it allows us to let go of the assumption that a previous, protective authority has ceased to exist. Instead, it is the necessity to reflect on potential future behavior that causes the same dynamic. Moreover, democratization provides the reason why ethnicity suddenly becomes meaningful, even when—as critics of the *ethnic security dilemma* have pointed out⁹—it did not play a major role in public discourse before. The choice among different identities is at the heart of the democratization process, and this choice will be guided both by lived experience and expectations of future behavior.

However, it is unrealistic to expect that political leaders have no role to play in this dynamic: “it is scarcely controversial to point out the opportunism and cynicism of political elites, or to underscore the crucial role of elites” (Brubaker, 1998, p. 289), and the intuition behind the theory of elite manipulation is reasonable. Yet, here too, the democratization process is at the heart of the matter. The




Figure 2.3: The logic of the *elite selection* theory: security worries arise when the population needs to answer the demos question; people expect leaders to address their concerns and reward those leaders that do, leading to a strengthening of non-compatible identities

first democratic elections will create winners and losers, and they force political elites—both incumbents and challengers—to compete for votes. The politician that realizes and most effectively addresses the dominant issue for voters has the highest chance of being elected. But this is not merely a process of top-down manipulation, a re-framing of public discourse away from topics that the population actually values more. Instead, it is an accurate assessment of the subject which will influence voters most, a realistic assessment of the public's concerns. If fears for group survival resonate with the public at all, they will trump other concerns and they will lead the public to back the leader that most credibly promises to deal with this threat. (Figure 2.3 illustrates the dynamic of bottom-up signalling leading to a mutual reinforcement of the security-concern narrative that eventually divides society.) Unless they were removed from power at the start of the democratization process, incumbents often still possess preferential access to news media as well as control over the power apparatus of the state. This implies that they have better means to position themselves as a non-diplomatic “defender of the people”, and the impending loss of office would motivate them to do so.¹⁰ This in turn reaffirms the security dynamic made possible by the onset of democratization in the first place: now the potential safety threat posed by other ethnic groups becomes bigger with any leader arguing for the need of protection.

In essence, the *elite selection* theory argues that democratization in a county that has seen politicization of ethnicity provides both the ideal means to capture public attention—fear for personal safety—and an obvious motivation for any political candidate to use it. This dynamic is specific to democratization periods because they combine a redesign of the social order with the possibility of competition for political office and the necessity of “digesting” a past social order that was more exclusionary. By focussing on the democratization process, the *elite selection* process is able to position itself between the two extremes of the *ethnic security dilemma* and *elite manipulation* theories. The process of *elite selection* seems

more realistic in two ways: Firstly, elites are not powerful enough that they can create safety worries through skillful manipulation alone. These safety worries arise because society is being restructured, and it is up to the general public to debate its future shape. Secondly, there is an ongoing dialogue between political leaders and the general public that allows elites to know of and interact with a potential security concerns. This clearly differs from the *ethnic security dilemma* because political leaders have a real influence on the situation, and it differs from the *elite manipulation* theory because this influence is not so great as to allow elites to dictate the public discourse.

2.4 Chapter summary

This chapter has surveyed theoretical arguments and empirical evidence showing that periods of democratization and the presence of ethnic divisions increase the likelihood of civil-war onset. It has then presented three theories that combine the two factors of democratization and ethnicity with the behavior of a crucial class of actors—political elites—to explain why civil war breaks out. Table 2.1 summarizes the different arguments by these three theories.

Democratization All three theories allow for the onset of civil war during periods of democratization, but the theory of *elite selection* is the only theory to *require* a movement towards democracy. Here, the need to address the *demos* question causes a spiral of rising suspicion that eventually leads groups to favor taking the offensive. The two competing theories only require a transition period that either motivates and allows political leaders to manipulate public discourse in their favor (*elite manipulation*) or that causes national anarchy and ergo, security worries (*ethnic security dilemma*).

Ethnicity All three theories require the presence of ethnic identities: to be skillfully manipulated by self-serving leaders (*elite manipulation*), to serve as one potential level of loyalty competing with others as an answer to the *demos* question (*elite selection*), or to act as the primary level of loyalty for inhabitants in the absence of an overarching state authority (*ethnic security dilemma*).

However, the requirements posed by the *elite selection* theory are more stringent: only ethnic identities that have been politicized through exclusion, discrimination or violence should cause any realistic security worries during democratization periods.

Elite influences The *ethnic security dilemma* differs from the two other theories in predicting that elites do not play a role: not working to defend your group leaves it at the mercy of others, working to defend your group is perceived as

	Elite manipulation	Elite selection	Ethnic security dilemma
<i>Regime</i>	Weak/reforming institutions facilitate the use of state tools by elites for their own purposes.	Democratization requires an answer to the <i>demos</i> question. The population is forced to weigh their loyalty to state and ethnic kin based on the potential threat from others.	The absence of a stabilizing force engenders safety concerns at the level of ethnic groups.
<i>Ethnicity</i>	Ethnicity is a mobilization tool, with political leaders defining or choosing ethnic boundaries for their use and escalating conflict along the most convenient ethnic division.	Ethnic identities are one of several potential answers to the <i>demos</i> question. Loyalty to ethnic kin will be preferred if ethnic divisions have previously been politicized through exclusion, discrimination or conflict.	Given anarchy at the national level, ethnic groups are the most relevant organizations for inhabitants, and threats to their safety are perceived along ethnic divisions.
<i>Leadership</i>	Political leaders compete for public support by positioning themselves on the most relevant issues. Realizing that safety trumps more abstract economic and political issues, maverick politicians manipulate the public to create such fears, then portray themselves as undiplomatic defenders of one ethnic group, increasing/securing their personal power.	Political leaders compete for public support by positioning themselves on the most relevant issues. Given politicized ethnic divisions, personal safety trumps more abstract economic and political issues, leading elites to portray themselves as undiplomatic defenders to an ethnic group, and being selected for this trait.	Political leaders are by default aligned with an ethnic group and are trapped in a situation where any action makes their group less safe.

Table 2.1: Comparison of theories

preparation for an offensive and likewise invites attack. Once the dilemma has formed, the actions of any individual leader would not matter.

Both *elite manipulation* and *elite selection* assume instead that a threat to the power of the incumbent is associated with a higher risk of conflict. Proponents of the *elite manipulation* theory go furthest in arguing that conflict is the direct result of an active reframing of the public discourse by egotistic elites. The *elite selection* theory argues that while competing political leaders add momentum to the security worries (e.g. through a process such as ethnic outbidding), the initial cause is the democratization process, i.e. reducing the link to correlation rather than causation.

Part I will check for quantitative evidence linking democratization, ethnic divisions and situations in which the incumbent is threatened to a higher risk of conflict. Part II will trace the processes of three democratization attempts to test the causal logic of all three theories.

Notes

¹At the time of publication, modern representative democracies had not yet arisen, and Kant was weary of democracy as a tool for the majority to suppress the minority. However, it seems fair to argue that current democratic regimes fulfill the conditions of the republican constitution Kant describes. Cf. Cederman (2001, Footnote 2).

²Approximately: "The nation is a felt community whose appropriate expression would be its own state, that hence normally has the tendency to bring forth such."

³See Cederman and Girardin (2007) for a detailed critique of the ELF index.

⁴This school of thought is also referred to by the milder, but less common term "elite persuasion."

⁵Depending on the leaders' definition of *nation*, it does not necessarily follow that they are competing for high office in the current state.

⁶Respectively, *Hrvatska demokratska zajednica* (HDZ, Croatian Democratic Union) and the *Socijalistička partija Srbije* (SPS, Socialist Party of Serbia).

⁷The division should occur between the most cohesive groups, especially when they share a history of conflict.

⁸N.B. The threat to political leaders is substantially stronger in a non-democratizing context. E.g. the majority of irregular removals from power and punishments at the end of a leader's reign (incl. imprisonment, exile and death) occur in autocracies, and only a small minority coincides with a push for more democracy.

⁹See for example Gagnon (2004, p. 33), who reports that less than 20% of the population of the Croatian part of Yugoslavia perceived other ethnic groups as threatening.

¹⁰The *elite manipulation* theory is a clear case of a top-down dynamic as understood by Kaufman (2001). However, the *elite selection* process does not correspond directly to Kaufman's concept of a bottom-up dynamic. While leaders certainly react to bottom-up signalling, they are situated in a two-way communication where both sides listen to each other, possibly creating a self-reinforcing message of fear.

Part I

Quantitative Analysis

Overview

This part provides quantitative evidence that democratization periods, periods during which the position of the incumbent is threatened, and politicized ethnicity all increase the likelihood of civil-war onset.

Chapter 3 describes and tests a new method of identifying periods of democratization first published in Cederman, Hug, and Krebs (2010) and extended here to work with the SIP indicator and to detect both successful and attempted moves towards democracy. Chapter 4 uses leader-year regression analysis to derive an estimate for the threat to the position of incumbents as a proxy for the incentive for leaders to manipulate the masses (both for incumbents seeking to protect their power and for challengers competing to succeed the incumbent). Finally, Chapter 5 derives testable hypotheses based on the theories presented in Chapter 2 and tests them using logistic regression.

Identifying Democratization Attempts

This chapter is based on and partially excerpted from Cederman, Hug, and Krebs (2010), with additional modifications first introduced in Krebs (2009).

3.1 Introduction

In order to evaluate the effect of democratization periods on the likelihood of civil-war onset, a reliable way of identifying democratization periods is needed. The literature knows two ways of identifying democratization processes: changes in category and changes in score (Bogaards, 2009). Both methods are based on a uni-dimensional understanding of regime types, assuming that ideal democracies and ideal autocracies are the endpoints of the same scale. This implies that democratization is any movement closer to the democratic end of the scale.¹ Unfortunately, present methods of detecting changes of score and of category follow fairly rigid rules, resulting in codings that can be unrepresentative of the political developments they are supposed to measure in less than perfect conditions. Therefore, there is a need for a new method of detecting democratization periods that is flexible enough to code the broader changes in regime-type, while ignoring small variation in the indicator. This chapter describes such a coding mechanism, the “period finder.”

The following section illustrates some of the problems with existing ways of coding democratization processes by discussing how two previous studies would code the political developments in Pakistan between 1947 and 2005. Section 3.3 then presents the period finder as an alternative way of coding democratization. Section 3.4 uses the new method to conduct an initial test of the likelihood that

civil war breaks out during a democratization attempt. Finally, Section 3.5 concludes with a summary.

3.2 Two to Six Democratization Processes: Coding Pakistan

This section illustrates some of the problems caused by current methods of coding democratization, using Mansfield and Snyder (1995a) and Hegre, Ellingsen, Gates, and Gleditsch (2001) as examples. Both analyses are based on the Polity IV indicator (Marshall and Jaggers, 2009), which provides both regime-type scores and categories.²

Mansfield and Snyder (1995a) have relied on detecting changes in categories, coding democratization by analyzing one-, five- and ten-year periods, and determining whether a country has moved from the autocracy or anocracy categories to a more democratic category. Alternatively, Hegre et al. (2001) have focused on changes in scores, counting any improvement by two or more points on the Polity scale as a democratization. The pitfalls of these two methods will become visible by applying them to code the tumultuous political changes in Pakistan since the independence of the country.³ (Figure 3.1 shows the changes to Pakistan's regime as represented by the Polity IV score.)

Starting with coding regimes based on changes in broader categories rather than fine-grained scores, a first problem becomes immediately clear: a lot of valuable information is lost by condensing the 21 points on the Polity scale into only three categories. The middle category, anocracy, is particularly broad: it covers everything between the Polity scores from -5 to 5 , more than half of the entire scale. It is no surprise that anocracies are argued to be an uninformative catch-all category (Vreeland, 2008); after all, both Zimbabwe under Mugabe and France under de Gaulle fall into the same category. For similar reasons, it is problematic to assess democratization in five- or ten-year intervals: again, a substantial loss of information occurs.

How would the method employed by Mansfield and Snyder (1995a) code Pakistan? Immediately after independence, Pakistan shows a remarkable democratization of the political system, which the Polity indicator mirrors by jumping from -4 in 1947 to $+2$ in 1948, to $+4$ in 1949, and finally to $+5$ in 1951, a total improvement of nine points on a 21-point scale. However, since the anocratic category is so large, category-based coding only marks a democratization in 1956, once the threshold to the democratic category is crossed with a comparatively small improvement of 3 points.

Mansfield and Snyder (1995a) also use an alternative coding method in which they assess intervals of five or ten years. Looking at such long time periods can potentially cause democratization processes that were rolled back within the same period to be overlooked. At the end of the 1956-1960 period, the country has




Figure 3.1: Polity IV score for Pakistan

returned to the autocratic level of -7 due to a *coup d'état*, potentially causing the democratization to be ignored and to be counted as an autocratization instead. Similarly, when investigating ten-year periods starting with 1946 as the first year after the end of World War II, the period 1956-1965 runs the risk of counting as “no change”, since a partial restoration elevates the country’s score to +1 in 1962—back in the anocratic category.

Missing data may compound the problem. While there is a gap in the data between 1969 and 1972, history shows a genuine democratization attempt that results in civil war because the inhabitants of West-Pakistan did not recognize the victory of the East-Pakistani *Awami League*. With the secession of Bangladesh, the data series resumes and measures the regime-type of Pakistan in its 1972 borders. Until the coup in 1977, the country was considered democratic. The ten-year perspective (1966-1975) should code this as democratization, since the interval spans the entire gap in the data series and the Polity score in 1966 was anocratic (+1). However, the five- and one-year perspectives may miss the democratization depending on how they deal with lack of data in 1970 and 1972, respectively.

The remainder of the coding is less problematic at the one- and five-year perspective, though the ten-year perspective does not perceive the autocratization

following the military coup in 1977 as very deep, since the country had improved from autocracy to anocracy by 1985.

So far, the main problem has been the coarseness of the three-category indicator and the multi-year intervals. Since their ground-breaking 1995 articles, Mansfield and Snyder have refined their methodology and others have proposed alternatives. For example, Hegre, Ellingsen, Gates, and Gleditsch (2001) use a measure for identifying regime-type changes that codes any improvement of at least two points since the preceding year in the Polity indicator.

Returning to the example of Pakistan, Hegre et al.'s (2001) method codes moves towards democracy in 1948, 1949, 1956, 1962, 1984 and 1988, with moves towards autocracy detected in 1958, 1977 and 1999. This method mirrors the actual changes in the indicator better, but it may be too fine-grained in its approach. Consider that any country with a score of +6 or higher on the Polity scale is considered democratic. However, a score of up to +8 still leaves room for a two-point change that would be coded as a democratization—a democratizing democracy. Similarly, an autocratic regime making minor adjustments and improving its Polity score from -10 to -8 would also be coded as a democratization, even though hardly any of the citizens would have cause to celebrate.

This is the first problem that any new method should address: it should provide an instrument that is sensitive, but not too sensitive, avoiding the risk of missing major changes but ignoring changes that are too small to have a substantial influence on the nature of the regime. This is not only important for theoretical reasons, but also because small fluctuations in indicators can occur even when there are no corresponding changes in reality, e.g. due to coder changes and coding inconsistencies, or if the indicator was not set-up to allow for comparability over time (Arndt and Oman, 2006).

Secondly, it would be desirable for a new technique to deal with the issue of missing data, a problem shared by both prior methods. As in the case of Pakistan, regime-type changes can be associated with reduced or absent governance capacity, especially when the democratization process is not swift and entirely successful. Regime-type indicators may code missing values in such situations, and while it may not be possible to assess the missing values for information directly, the new coding scheme should minimally allow for a comparison with the time before the missing data.

A last requirement has become necessary due to the increasing criticism directed at the use of the Polity indicator for analyses explaining political violence. As Vreeland (2008) points out, the coding of the participation components (PARREG and PARCOMP) of the Polity indicator may acknowledge the outbreak of sectarian violence by adding two points to the value of the indicator. If political violence is the dependent variable, including information based on the Polity indicator places political violence on both sides of the equation. Additionally, if the democratization coding responds to changes of two points, the outbreak of violence would actually be misinterpreted as a small democratization. For this rea-

son, the new coding scheme should function independent of the indicator upon which it bases its coding.

The following section presents a new method that fulfills these three criteria.

3.3 Focusing on the Essential: The Period-Finding Mechanism

The previous section has presented three requirements that need to be addressed by an improved method of identifying democratization. Firstly, the method needs to be sensitive enough to identify all changes that affect the nature of the regime, but insensitive enough to ignore minor improvements, such as democratizing democracies. Secondly, it needs to deal gracefully with missing values, allowing for before-and-after comparisons for periods of state failure and foreign influence. Finally, the method should work with any governance indicator that provides at least an interval-level scale and a sufficiently large range of values.⁴

In a collaboration with Lars-Erik Cederman and Simon Hug (published in Cederman, Hug, and Krebs, 2010), I have proposed a two-step mechanism based on identifying periods of stability and periods of change, which is hence called “period finder”. The first step is to identify periods of stability, during which there is only minor variability in the governance indicator. Stable periods are ranges of time for which the indicator never falls outside a band defined as the center-point of the regime-type indicator values⁵ plus/minus an amount of variability, Δv (cf. Figure 3.2(a)). For the Polity indicator, a Δv of two points seems theoretically reasonable, since a variability band of four points ($\pm\Delta v$) corresponds to the range of values for countries coded as stable democracies or autocracies. This explicitly excludes changes that are potentially small enough not to alter a country’s regime-type category from being coded as democratization or autocratization.⁶

Such a stable period would only come to an end under one of two conditions. Firstly, if a country’s indicator value falls outside of the stable variability-band of center-point $\pm \Delta v$ (cf. Figure 3.2(c and d)). In such cases, the deviation from the prior nature of the regime is substantial enough to merit investigation. Secondly, if the country’s political process is interrupted by foreign interference, anarchy or regime change, as indicated by a missing value (cf. Figure 3.2(b)). Such situations represent a severe disruption of normal political processes so that cases of missing values also need to end stable periods.⁷

While a number of countries have remained politically stable for the entire duration of the Polity indicator, most countries exhibit more than one stable period. In these cases, the transitions between periods of stability need to be analyzed. This second step compares the prior stable period with the subsequent stable period and codes one of three outcomes:




Figure 3.2: Coding regime-type changes: the period finder

1. If the center-points of the preceding and following stable periods differ by less than Δv , then it is assumed that no significant democratization or auto-cratization has been observed. This can occur if a missing value forces the end of a stable period, but political processes resume in roughly the same fashion after the interruption is over (cf. Figure 3.2(b)). Alternatively, the transition period could contain an attempt to democratize or autocratize, which was then rolled back (cf. Figure 3.2(d), further discussed below).
2. If the center-point of the subsequent period lies at least Δv higher than the center-point of the preceding period (cf. Figure 3.2(c)), the first year of the new stable period is tagged as the end-point of a democratization.⁸ In such cases, not only was there a distinct deviation from the previous level of the governance indicator, but the new level also lies substantially higher than the previous level.
3. Conversely, if the center-point of the subsequent period is at least Δv lower than that of the preceding period, the transition will be labeled as an auto-cratization.


Thus far, the method corresponds with the approach published in Cederman, Hug, and Krebs (2010). However, the first decision rule listed above suggests an extension that is useful in the context of this study: the three theories contrasted in Chapter 2 do not require democratization attempts to be successful. Clearly, the direction of causality can run both ways: an attempted democratization can lead to conflict, but the outbreak of conflict will likely diminish the chances of successfully completing the democratization process. Cases of attempted democratization are therefore theoretically relevant and their explicit inclusion seems prudent.⁹ For this reason, the coding regime is extended with two additional rules:

4. If the transition did not fulfill the requirements for a successful democratization, but included at least one year for which the indicator exceeded the center-point of the last stable period + Δv , the period is considered to be an attempted democratization and the first year of the subsequent stable period is marked as its end-point (cf. Figure 3.2(d)).
5. Likewise, transitions not fulfilling the requirements for a successful autocratization that include an indicator value less than the center-point of the last stable period – Δv are coded as attempted autocratizations.


Special attention should be dedicated to cases of state formation resulting from break-up or secession, be it peaceful (as in the case of the Czechoslovakia) or warlike (as with Pakistan and Bangladesh). In such cases, it is valuable to take into account the last years of the predecessor state's indicator values. After all, a regime-type change and a redefinition of the state are often interlinked.¹⁰ It should be noted that data points from the predecessor state are not included in actual regression analyses; they are used only to determine whether any regime-type changes in the early history of newly formed states are rooted in political processes originating with its predecessor.

While Polity values were used thus far to describe the rules of the period finder, the method works equally well for any other indicator that is at least interval-scaled and has a sufficiently large range. Given that Polity has been criticized by multiple authors (Fearon and Laitin, 2003; Hegre et al., 2001; Vreeland, 2008) for the problematic coding of the participation component, Gates, Hegre, Jones, and Strand (2006) have provided an alternative, the Scalar Index of Polities (SIP). SIP replaces the problematic participation components¹¹ and calculates a continuous, uni-dimensional indicator value ranging between 0 (ideal autocracy) and 1 (ideal democracy), and with sufficiently detailed resolution to allow the period-finding method to be applied.¹²

As a demonstration of the period finder, Figure 3.3 shows the process at work using both the Polity IV indicator (without the problematic PARREG component, as used in Cederman, Hug, and Krebs, 2010) and the new Scalar Index of Polities.¹³ As can be seen in Figure 3.3(a), the mechanism codes four moves towards



(a) Coding based on Polity IV without PARREG



(b) Coding based on SIP

Figure 3.3: Coding democratization and autocratization periods in Pakistan using period finder

democracy (1956, 1962, 1973 and 1988) and three moves towards autocracy (1958, 1977 and 1999) in roughly the right years. The democratization codings coincide with substantial changes to the constitution while the autocratization codings are

in years of coups d'état. It should be particularly noted that the democratization that lead to civil war and the secession of Bangladesh is recognized despite the missing values.

So far, the period finder addresses the problems seen in other indicators. However, there still is room for improvement: the impressive push for democracy right after independence is not captured by the period finder. The reason lies in the choice to compare stable periods. Since the first two years in the data series are too different, no stable period can be established until the pace of changes slows down in 1948. Since there is no data for the regime-type of the British colonial regime before independence, there is nothing that the stable period starting in 1948 can be compared to.

Fortunately, this problem is partially resolved by changing to the less problematic SIP indicator (cf. Figure 3.3(b)). Here, the early changes between 1947 and 1948 are considered to be less drastic, allowing a stable period to be established already in 1947 and therefore enabling the earlier coding of democratization as the push for democracy continues. It should also be noted that SIP considers the 1962 recovery after the first *coup d'état* to be weaker and not as sustained as it is valued in Polity IV. As a result, that year is no longer considered as a democratization case. However, the results are identical for the last two democratization processes and for all moves towards autocracy, independent of whether Polity IV or SIP are used as data source.

The following section provides an initial test of the democratization and autocratization codings based on period finder by replicating the key results in Cederman, Hug, and Krebs (2010).

3.4 A First Test

The previous section described the period-finding mechanism originally published in Cederman, Hug, and Krebs (2010). Two changes were made in comparison to the original article. Firstly, democratization attempts are also coded to include situations in which the outbreak of conflict after the initiation of democratization has prevented the ultimate success of the democratization attempt (cf. rules 4 and 5 above). And secondly, SIP is considered as an alternative to the Polity-based indicator used in Cederman, Hug, and Krebs (2010). The original publication used the Polity IV indicator (Marshall and Jaggers, 2009) without its PARREG component, due to the critique leveled by Gleditsch, Hegre, and Strand (2009) and Vreeland (2008) against the participation components of the indicator. However, both participation components of the Polity indicator are affected by the critique, a situation that is fortunately remedied by the introduction of the SIP indicator.

This section replicates tests of two key results found in the original article. The first goal of Cederman, Hug, and Krebs (2010) was to separate the effect of

democratization as a change of the regime-type from the effect of the resulting regime type, arguing

H3.1. *Democratization increases the probability that a country experiences the onset of a civil war.*

Model 1.4 in Cederman, Hug, and Krebs (2010) supported this hypothesis, showing that democratization (and autocratization) significantly increase the risk of civil-war onset, and that they do so independently of the regime type that results from the change.

The second goal of the original article was to compare the time profile of democratization and autocratization processes. It was argued that democratization should have troubling effects over longer periods of time than autocratizations because it takes time to mobilize the newly-enfranchised citizens. Moreover, dissatisfaction with the democratic process may only show itself after the first elections have taken place. Years may pass between the initiation of democratic reforms and the time when the losers of the first elections start to question the legitimacy of the political system.

H3.2a. *Democratization increases the probability of civil-war onset over several years.*

On the other hand, autocratization was argued to have a much shorter lag between the onset of change and the outbreak of violence. This dynamic of disenfranchising parts of society that previously had access to political power may trigger immediate protests by those being excluded. Equally, violence may be part of the strategy employed by autocratizing actors to achieve their goal. In both cases, the outbreak of political violence should happen almost instantaneously.

H3.2b. *Autocratization increases the probability of civil war instantly.*

Model 2.4 in Cederman, Hug, and Krebs (2010) provided support to both hypotheses, showing that democratization and autocratization exhibit different time profiles in connection to civil war. An attempted move towards democracy in the current or the last three years was still associated with a significant increase in the risk of civil-war onset, while autocratizations did not have an impact over the same time period.

Table 3.1 replicates these two results using the modified period finder to code successful *and* attempted regime-type changes.¹⁴ In comparison to the original article, the counters for years and peace-years as well as the splines are replaced with the cubic polynomial of a counter ($t_{last\ onset}$) for the years since the last civil-war onset, as suggested by Carter and Signorino (2009). The first set of two columns is based on data from the original article, i.e. Polity IV without PARREG.

	Polity IV less PARREG				SIP			
	Model 1.4		Model 2.4		Model 1.4		Model 2.4	
Democratization t_0	0.843	*			1.660	***		
	(2.20)				(3.98)			
Autocratization t_0	1.212	**			1.739	***		
	(2.88)				(4.45)			
Democratization $t_{-3..0}$			0.677	***			1.372	***
			(3.39)				(5.56)	
Autocratization $t_{-3..0}$			0.418				0.347	
			(1.38)				(1.00)	
Polity IV	0.259	***	0.226	**				
	(3.30)		(2.87)					
Polity IV ²	-0.015	***	-0.013	**				
	(-3.41)		(-3.08)					
SIP					0.553		-0.232	
					(0.45)		(-0.18)	
SIP ²					-0.929		-0.450	
					(-0.73)		(-0.34)	
Population size (ln, t_{-1})	0.206	**	0.203	**	0.212	**	0.210	**
	(3.26)		(3.22)		(3.06)		(3.00)	
GDP per capita (ln, t_{-1})	-0.344	***	-0.327	***	-0.395	***	-0.346	***
	(-3.51)		(-3.34)		(-4.01)		(-3.59)	
$t_{last\ onset}$	-0.090		-0.083		-0.076		-0.070	
	(-1.94)		(-1.85)		(-1.50)		(-1.40)	
$t_{last\ onset}^2$	0.003		0.003		0.003		0.002	
	(1.69)		(1.58)		(1.21)		(1.14)	
$t_{last\ onset}^3$	-0.000		-0.000		-0.000		-0.000	
	(-1.49)		(-1.38)		(-0.98)		(-0.95)	
Constant	-4.293	***	-4.338	***	-3.474	**	-3.766	**
	(-3.37)		(-3.36)		(-2.69)		(-2.89)	
N	5722		5722		5288		5288	
$-2LL$	-621.2	***	-622.0	***	-573.6	***	-574.9	***

Table 3.1: Replication of results in Cederman, Hug, and Krebs (2010) using SIP
T-score in brackets; * $p < 0.05$ ** $p < 0.01$ *** $p < 0.001$

The second set of two columns repeats the regressions using the SIP indicator. For ease of comparison, the regression models are labeled with the same numbers as in Cederman, Hug, and Krebs (2010).

All key results of the original article are confirmed or improved upon when using SIP. The influence of democratization and autocratization in Model 1.4 is substantially more significant, as is the influence of democratization for the current and three preceding years in Model 2.4. Moreover, the significance for the curvilinear form of the Polity indicator is not matched by a similarly significant influence of the SIP indicator. The significance of the Polity IV indicator may depend mostly on the remaining, flawed participation component. The control variables, population size and GDP per capita, behave as expected.




Figure 3.4: Probability of civil-war onset by SIP score for democratizing and non-democratizing states

Figure 3.4 provides a visual representation of the onset-risk of civil war, and particularly the influence that a democratization in the current year—attempted or successful—has on it.¹⁵ The darker bars represent 95% confidence intervals for democratization cases, and show both a clearly higher probability of conflict onset and a higher variability in the risk than the non-democratization cases displayed in lighter gray. The x -axis represents the regime type as measured by the SIP indicator after democratization.¹⁶ Despite the fact that the curvilinear specification of SIP does not attain significance, we see some indication that the variability of risk may decrease for more thorough democratization processes.

Based on the successful replication of the results in Cederman, Hug, and Krebs (2010), following analyses in this dissertation will rely on the augmented version of period finder based on SIP data.

3.5 Chapter Summary

Previous means of coding democratization display two weaknesses. Firstly, they follow rigid rules that will provide either too coarse or too sensitive results depending on the data. Secondly, they fail to deal with missing data.

This chapter has presented a new method of coding democratization based on a collaboration with Lars-Erik Cederman and Simon Hug (Cederman, Hug, and Krebs, 2010). In a two-step process, the period finder first identifies stable periods during which there is little variation in the indicator. In a second step, the differences between stable periods are examined to determine whether a substantial improvement has been obtained.

The present chapter has then proposed a modification that allows the period finder to detect attempted as well as successful democratization processes. Finally, the results from the original publication were replicated using both the original data and democratization codings based on SIP, proving that the period finder can be used with multiple regime-type indicators and confirming that democratization processes lead to an increased risk of civil-war onset both immediately and in the medium run.

Notes

¹Autocratization is then a movement in the opposite direction, and can be detected by the same rules used for detecting a democratization with reversed signs.

²Polity IV provides a 21-point scale with a completely autocratic regime coded as -10 and a completely democratic regime coded as +10. Moreover, the Polity indicator allows users to aggregate regimes into three broad categories, with countries scoring between -10 and -6 considered to be autocratic, countries with a score of +6 to +10 considered democratic, and all other countries categorized as anocratic, or mixed regimes.

³Appendix B provides a tabular comparison of democratization codings based on Mansfield and Snyder (1995a), Hegre et al. (2001), the two versions of the period finder presented here and a qualitative coding by Cheibub, Gandhi, and Vreeland (2009) for all countries in the post-World War II period.

⁴Minimally, an ordinal indicator should have a range of 10 points. Correspondingly, continuous variables should have a range that exceeds the smallest possible change by one order of magnitude.

⁵The center-point is defined as the value that lies halfway between the minimum and maximum value for any period.

⁶E.g. a country that improves its Polity score by 4 points from an ideal autocracy (-10) to -6 still fulfills the criterion for a stable period, since the center-point, -8 ± 2 points encompasses both the start-point and the end-point of the improvement.

⁷While missing values signal the end of a stable period, they cannot signal the beginning of a new period. Any new stable period requires two numeric values for the indicator that lie within $2\Delta v$ of each other.

⁸Since the period finder can only determine the beginning of a new stable period with two yearly values outside the band of the previous period, this coding implies taking into account future values! In addition, given that the Polity values reflect the state of the regime *at the end* of the calendar year, some regime changes might occur after the outbreak of a civil war. Careful checking of the precise dates for regime change and civil war outbreak suggests that this might be the case for some of the civil wars that can be linked with democratization. One potential response, post-dating all regime change events to one year after completion of the change, prevents the capturing of direct reactions to the process of democratization. Moreover, such cases may still fit theoretical expectations, since the democratization process tends to be a longer process and an outbreak of political violence a few months before the laws are officially enacted can still be caused by the ongoing process. To test the sensitivity of the results, cases where democratization occurred after the outbreak of civil war were manually removed from the analysis: the resulting change was negligible. For both theoretical and empirical reasons, the simpler coding scheme without manual interference was maintained.

⁹It should be noted that the inclusion of rules 4 and 5, while sensible, is not likely to yield a large number of additional cases. Roll-backs of democratization and autocratization attempts usually occur so quickly that the attempted regime-type does not become the basis for the yearly indicator value.

¹⁰For the purpose of this study, five years' worth of indicator data was appended to the beginning of new states resulting from secession or break-up. Appendix A lists all countries were treated this way.

¹¹Instead of the flawed participation components in Polity IV, Gates et al. (2006) use Vanhanen's (2000) Polyarchy dataset, which measures participation as the population share of all voters in the last elections. While this avoids the implicit rewarding of violence, it is far from perfect. Democracies distinguish themselves by high potential participation, but this does not necessarily imply a high level of actual participation, particularly since voter fatigue has become a problem in numerous mature democracies.

¹² Δv is set equal to one standard deviation of the SIP indicator, since this approx. corresponds to the length of the SIP scale occupied by democracies. This is equivalent to the approach of setting $\Delta v=2$ when using Polity IV, since it prevents a low-score democracy from being coded as democratizing again when it improves its score.

¹³Appendix B contains all democratization processes identified on the basis of both indicators for all countries in the data set.

¹⁴Appendix C.1 provides descriptive statistics for all relevant variables.

¹⁵The graph is based on the Clarify method (King, Tomz, and Wittenberg, 2000).

¹⁶Since the graph is based on the SIP value after democratization, there can be no estimates with an SIP below 0.25 for the group of democratization cases.

Threats to Incumbents: Incentives for All?

This chapter is based on Krebs (2009).

4.1 Introduction

According to the theories presented in Chapter 2, periods that force the incumbent to defend his¹ political power may have a special dynamic. The *elite manipulation* theory argues that a threat to the ruling elite is what leads them to instigate diversionary wars in the first place. And while the *elite selection* theory reasons that leaders have less influence to frame public discourse, here too, campaigns for political power play a central role, motivating both incumbents and challengers to seek out topics of relevance to the public.

In essence, a heightened risk of civil war at times when the incumbent is threatened would provide some support to both of these theories. But until now, no useful indicator for threats to the incumbent's position exists. This chapter introduces an estimator for the risk to an incumbent's hold on power using newly available data on the reigns of political leaders worldwide.

The following section discusses how the threat itself should be conceptualized. Section 4.3 tests various explanatory factors and produces an estimator. Section 4.4 concludes with a summary.

4.2 Kinds of Threats

Two types of events can be understood as a threat to the incumbent: the loss of political power, and more drastically, the punishment of the leader. For both threats, there are subtypes that can be considered more or less threatening. For

example, a leader can lose power in a regulated, orderly manner, such as constitutionally mandated and scheduled elections. This type of power loss—while not necessarily desirable—has the advantage of leaving the departing leader with options for his future, including the possibility of regaining power through the same regulated means by which he lost it.

Irregular removals and punishments are a different matter. *Coups d'état*, assassinations, the threat of imprisonment or exile provide a much bleaker picture of the future. Incumbents may consider their options and decide that hanging on to political power by any means possible is the safest bet for them.

Of course, any threat to the incumbent is an opportunity for potential successors. And it seems likely that the lengths to which both sides are willing to go in campaigning for power is to some degree proportional to the threat to the current incumbent. A political leader grasping at straws is precisely the kind of leader that would seek to mobilize the masses for his support, either by trying to campaign on the topics most relevant to his constituents (*elite selection*) or by manipulating them directly (*elite manipulation*). Any challenger would have to follow suit in order to stay in the same race for political power.

For this reason, threats of irregular removal from power or of punishment after removal from power can be expected to produce the kinds of political dynamics that would increase the likelihood of civil war.

Fortunately, the new Archigos data set (Goemans, Gleditsch, and Chiozza, 2009, version 2.9) provides information on the reigns of political leaders on a global scale that enables the estimation of the risk faced by political leaders. Archigos provides personal information for incumbents, as well as the beginning and end dates of each leader's reign(s) and more importantly, how they ended and whether the leader was punished. Archigos recognizes four different ends of reigns: regular and irregular removal, death by natural causes and removal by another state. As argued above, irregular removals are more problematic than regular removals. Given that the other two categories are unlikely to be remedied by potentially conflict-inducing political campaigns, only irregular removals are considered in the creation of the risk estimator. Archigos also provides data on punishments meted out to leaders after their reign, including imprisonment, exile and death.² For the purpose of simplicity, all punishments are included in our analysis.

This yields two dependent variables capturing threats to political leaders: irregular removal from power and punishment in any form. The following section seeks to explain the risk of irregular removal and punishment by considering both personal and country-related factors.

4.3 Threat Factors

In Section 4.2, it was argued that the threats of irregular removal and of being punished after removal may encourage political leaders to campaign for their power in a way that could stimulate conflict. Potential indicators of such threats to incumbents can be grouped into three categories. The first category of threat indicators is related to the reign, particularly its length and the regime type. It can be hypothesized that rulers remaining in office for uncommonly long periods may only be removable through extraordinary means. Archigos allows the length of reign to be calculated.

H4.1a. The longer a reign lasts, the likelier it becomes that an incumbent will be removed in an irregular manner or punished.

Similarly, it can be hypothesized that incumbents ruling without any constraints on the executive may act in a self-serving way that attracts attempts to unseat and punish them. While this information is not included in Archigos, it can be obtained by matching the assessment of executive constraints from the Polity IV data set to the reign of each leader (Marshall and Jaggers, 2009).

H4.1b. Autocrats face a higher likelihood of irregular removals and punishment than incumbents whose power to govern is constrained.

The second threat indicator is a country's history of such threats against its leaders. Political actors will reasonably forecast the likelihood of future threatening events by using prior occurrences. This is operationalized as a continuous variable measuring the years since the last occurrence, since recent events are more comparable to the current situation and should influence leaders' actions more than older cases.³

H4.2. A prior history of irregular removal or punishment makes repetitions more likely.

Thirdly, attributes of the current situation can serve as indicators of threat. In particular, a regime-type transition can indicate an imminent threat to the leader. A dummy for such transition periods can be constructed using the Polity IV indicator (Marshall and Jaggers, 2009), coding '1' for every country-year in which a change in the indicator value or a missing value due to foreign intervention, anarchy or regime-type transitions is recorded.⁴

H4.3. An ongoing process of political transition increases the likelihood of irregular removal or punishment.

	Irregular Removal	Punishment
Age	0.004 (0.86)	0.000 (0.06)
Gender	-0.202 (-0.38)	-0.096 (-0.21)
Years in Office	0.012 (1.18)	0.017 (1.89)
Autocratic leader t_{-1}	0.383 * (2.56)	0.296 * (2.07)
Years since last occurrence	-0.057 *** (-8.15)	-0.043 *** (-7.01)
Ongoing transition	1.485 *** (11.81)	1.422 *** (11.29)
Constant	-3.344 *** (-11.18)	-3.184 *** (-10.88)
<i>N</i>	9493	9493
-2LL	-1322.9 ***	-1405.2 ***


Table 4.1: Likelihood of irregular removal or punishment after removal
T-score in brackets; * $p < 0.05$ ** $p < 0.01$ *** $p < 0.001$

Personal factors such as age and gender, which should not have any influence on the threat to the incumbent, are included in the analysis as controls.


Table 2 shows the results of logistic regression models assessing the likelihood of the two types of threats as a function of the six independent variables derived above.⁵ The individual units of analysis are years of leadership tenure.

As was to be expected, none of the personal characteristics of the leader and his reign play a significant role. And while an extraordinary length of time in office could reasonably be expected to attract attempts to unseat the incumbent in an irregular fashion, this does not seem to be a significant factor, weakening Hypothesis H4.1a. Of course, only leaders who succeeded at securing their power will be able to hold on to it for abnormally long periods. An autocratic leadership style is, however, associated with a significant increase in the risk of both irregular removal and punishment, strengthening Hypothesis H4.1b.

Finally, the second and third category of potential causes—prior history of such threats and ongoing regime-type transformations—have sizable and highly significant effects in the right direction: Hypotheses H4.2 and H4.3 are both strengthened. Recent cases of irregular removal from power or punishment after removal increase the likelihood of future recurrences substantially, an effect that wanes with time. An irregular removal in the immediate past leads to a 5.52%



(a) Probability of irregular removal



(b) Probability of punishment after removal

Figure 4.1: Estimated probability of irregular removal or punishment in conjunction with the end of reign by years since last incident, for transition and non-transition periods

higher probability of a future irregular removal when compared to no case of irregular removal for the entire 58-year period of observation. (The correspond-

ing value for punishments is 4.97%.) Ongoing regime-type transformations yield an even bigger risk to incumbents. In such years, the risk of irregular removal from power increases by 6.38%, with the risk of punishment increasing by 6.95%. Figure 4.1 visualizes this relationship, showing both the substantially higher risk during transition periods and the gradually reducing risk of repetition.

Based on this analysis, it seems reasonable to include the two most significant factors in the following models on the risk of civil-war onset: regime-type transformations and prior occurrences of threatening events.

It should be noted that the two types of threat share a large amount of cases.⁶ More importantly, the vast majority of political leaders who were punished at the end of their reign, were removed from their post irregularly. Since irregular removals are the more frequent event and encompass over three quarters of the cases with punishment, the following analysis will focus only on the risk of irregular removal.

The estimator values for the risk to any leader are based on the predicted impact for these two variables derived from the first regression model in Table 4.1. Since both the indicator for previous irregular removals and the dummy for an ongoing transition period vary only over time and by country, but not by leader,⁷ the resulting estimate for the risk to incumbents can safely be used in the country-level analyses to follow.

4.4 Chapter Summary

This chapter generates an estimator for the risk of an incumbent being irregularly removed or punished in connection with his reign. Given that the prospect of removal in an irregular manner or punishment by imprisonment, exile or death can present an incentive for political leaders to secure their power by any means necessary, such situations are likely to attract more intensive political campaigns that conform to the expectations of the *elite selection* or *elite manipulation* theories.

In a regression analysis with personal, reign- and country-related factors, two explanatory variables at the country-level proved to have the most significant influence on the likelihood of both irregular removal and punishment: the prior occurrence of the same event and the present occurrence of a transition period.

An estimator for the risk of irregular removal was calculated based on these two factors and will be used as an explanatory variable in the following analyses.

Notes

¹The vast majority of incumbents is male, so the male pronoun seems appropriate here.

²It should be noted that death as a post-tenure fate is coded to include not just death sentences handed down by the judiciary or new government after the removal from

power, but also any case where the leader is killed while in office (e.g. during a coup, assassination etc.).

³In country-years where there has been no prior recorded case in the post-World War II period, 1946 is used as the date of the last instance to avoid the loss of a large number of cases. All analyses were repeated twice, once with a dummy recording the occurrence of a prior case of irregular removal or punishment, and once using the continuous variable but omitting all country-years without a prior case. Appendix D.1 contains the corresponding models; the regression results remain equivalent to those presented here.

⁴Despite the limitations of the Polity IV data set discussed in Chapter 3, this indicator is used here due to its provision of transition onset information that is precise to the day. This information is required to avoid cases in which transformations follow the end of the leader's reign but occur in the same year. To avoid cases in which transitions are coded based on a heightened likelihood or the actual occurrence of conflict (cf. e.g. Vreeland, 2008), any transition triggered *only* by the problematic codes in the PARCOMP and PARREG components was recoded to '0'.

⁵Descriptive statistics for all variables can be found in Appendix C.2, robustness checks varying the operationalization of prior events are presented in Appendix D.1.

⁶Over 15% of all reigns ended with both irregular removal and punishment, while only 8.5% ended with one, but not the other.

⁷A minor exception to this rule are country-years with multiple irregular removals in which a regime-type transition begins between removals. Since regime-type transitions are only counted if they began before the removal of the incumbent, such a situation would lead to multiple different risk estimates for that country-year. In these cases, the lowest risk estimate is used.

Chapter 5

Linking the Three Factors: Democratization, Ethnic Divisions & Leaders

This chapter is based on Krebs (2009).

5.1 Introduction

This chapter provides a quantitative assessment at the global level of the three theories discussed in Chapter 2. The theories of *elite manipulation*, *elite selection* and *ethnic security dilemma* present differing causal paths that combine three components in different ways: democratization or regime-type change in general, ethnic divisions, and political leaders. The following section derives testable hypotheses that contrast the theories with regard to these three components.

The hypotheses are then tested empirically using the democracy coding derived in Chapter 3 and the estimator for threats to incumbents calculated in Chapter 4. Section 5.3 discusses the data and methodology to be used, while Section 5.4 presents the results. Section 5.5 concludes with a summary.

5.2 Hypotheses

This section derives testable hypotheses contrasting the theories of *elite manipulation*, *elite selection* and *ethnic security dilemma* along the same three dimensions that have guided the theoretical discussion in Chapter 2: democratization, ethnicity and threats to the incumbent.

5.2.1 Democratization

All three theories allow for the onset of civil war during periods of democratization, but the theory of elite selection is the only theory to *require* a move towards democracy. Here, the political necessity to address the *demos* question forces the population to weigh their loyalty to state and ethnic kin based on the potential threat from others. This causes a spiral of rising suspicion that eventually leads groups to favor taking the offensive.

H5.1. Democratization increases the risk of civil war.

The two competing theories only require a transition period that either motivates and allows political leaders to manipulate public discourse in their favor or that causes national anarchy and ergo, security worries. The *elite manipulation* theory argues that weak institutions or regimes undergoing reform facilitate the use of state tools by elites for their own purposes, while the theory of the *ethnic security dilemma* claims that safety concerns at the level of ethnic groups are engendered by the absence of a stabilizing force. Both of these theories would also expect Hypothesis H5.1 to hold true, though other types of transitions should have similar consequences.

5.2.2 Ethnicity

All three theories require the presence of ethnic identities: to be skillfully manipulated by self-serving leaders, to serve as one potential level of loyalty competing with others as an answer to the *demos* question, or to act as the primary level of loyalty for inhabitants in the absence of an overarching state authority. However, the theories differ when it comes to the extent of politicization required for the conflict dynamic to take effect.

According to the theory of *elite manipulation*, ethnicity is but a mere tool for mobilization, with political leaders defining or choosing ethnic boundaries for their use and escalating conflict along the most convenient ethnic division. This corresponds to Hypothesis H5.2a:

H5.2a. The presence of relevant ethnic dimensions increases the risk of civil war.

Given anarchy at the national level, the *ethnic security dilemma* argues that ethnic groups are the most relevant organizations for inhabitants, and threats to personal safety are perceived along ethnic divisions. This implies that Hypothesis H5.2a also holds true for this theory.

The requirements posed by the *elite selection* theory are more stringent: only ethnic identities that have been politicized through exclusion, discrimination or

even prior conflict should cause any realistic security worries during democratization periods:

H5.2b. *The presence of politicized ethnic dimensions increases the risk of civil war.*

This is a more extensive requirement, since ethnicity can be relevant in a political context without having been politicized. Whenever there are multiple ethnic identities, they can serve as one of several potential answers to the *demos* question. But politicization of these identities through exclusion, discrimination or conflict prior to the democratization process will tilt the playing field in such a way that loyalty to ethnic kin will be preferred over broader levels of identity. Strictly speaking, neither *elite manipulation* nor *ethnic security dilemma* require Hypothesis H5.2b to hold true; Hypothesis H5.2a is sufficient for the causal dynamics of these two theories. The causal mechanism of the *elite selection* theory requires Hypothesis H5.2b to hold true, too.

5.2.3 Elite influences

When it comes to the role of elites, the *ethnic security dilemma* differs from the two other theories in arguing that political leaders are not an important influence. Political elites are by default aligned with an ethnic group and are trapped in a situation where any action makes their group less safe. Not working to defend one's group leaves it at the mercy of others, working to defend one's group is perceived as preparation for an offensive and invites attack. Once the dilemma has formed, the actions of an individual leader would not matter.

Both *elite manipulation* and *elite selection* assume instead that a threat to the power of the incumbent is associated with a higher risk for conflict. Proponents of the *elite manipulation* theory go furthest in arguing that conflict is the direct result of an active reframing of the public discourse. Political leaders compete for public support by positioning themselves on the most relevant issues. Realizing that safety trumps more abstract economic and political issues, maverick politicians manipulate the public to create such fears, then portray themselves as undiplomatic defenders of their ethnic group, thereby increasing or securing their personal hold on power. The *elite selection* theory argues that while competing political leaders add momentum to pre-existing security worries (e.g. through a process such as ethnic outbidding), the initial cause is the democratization process. Given politicized ethnic divisions, campaigning elites will tend to address such divisions and will likely be selected for this trait.

H5.3. *A threat to the power of the incumbent leader is associated with a higher risk of civil war.*

Unlike the *ethnic security dilemma*, these two theories assume that Hypothesis H5.3 holds. However, they disagree over the type of relationship: *elite manipulation* claims that H5.3 portrays a causal relationship, while *elite selection* sees it as a correlation.

These hypotheses will now be tested. The following section discusses the data and methodology to be used.

5.3 Data & Methodology

The previous section has provided an overview of three competing theories that attempt to explain the onset of civil war, and has offered hypotheses regarding the role of democratization, ethnicity and threats to the power of incumbent leaders. In this section, the operationalization of the relevant concepts is discussed, starting with the onset of civil war as the dependent variable and then covering democratization, presence and politicization of ethnic divisions, and the control variables. (The indicators for democratization and threat to incumbents are described in detail in Chapters 3 and 4 and are therefore omitted here.) The section concludes with a description of the regression methods to be used.

Civil-War Onset The onset of civil war is the dependent variable for this analysis. An appropriate dummy variable indicating the onset of civil war is conveniently provided by the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflicts data set (ACD; Gleditsch et al., 2002, Version 4/2008). The ACD indicator is preferred over other data sets due to its extensive coverage and its sensitivity to low-intensity conflict.¹ Years of ongoing conflict are excluded from the analysis.²

Ethnic Relevance & Politicization The relevance and politicization of ethnicity is coded using the novel Ethnic Power Relations (EPR) data set introduced in Wimmer, Cederman, and Min (2009) and Cederman, Wimmer, and Min (2010). The data set relies on an extensive expert coding of all relevant ethnic groups and the extent to which they partook in government in the post-World War II period. This study uses two variables from version 1.07 of the EPR data set.

Firstly, information on whether ethnic distinctions were relevant at all will be used to operationalize the presence of ethnic dimensions required by hypothesis H5.2a. This dummy variable distinguishes between cases where ethnic differences play a role in the country's political life (the majority of countries and 82.1% of all country-years under analysis), and cases where it does not (both Koreas are examples for this category).

Secondly, the EPR data set provides country-level summaries of the population share of ethnic groups that are actively excluded from political power on the basis of their ethnicity.³ This share is based on the total population of politically relevant ethnic groups in the county and includes groups that have no or

only local access to political power as well as groups that are actively discriminated against. It is based directly on the experts' assessments of each group. This variable presupposes the existence of relevant ethnic identities and therefore is missing for all countries without ethnic distinctions.

Control Variables As was already done in Chapter 3, all models include lagged indicators for GDP per capita and population size in their natural logarithmic forms (using Gleditsch, 2002b, Version 4.1). Hegre and Sambanis (2006) find that these two factors show a robust influence on the onset of conflict and therefore should not be omitted from such regression analyses. According to theory, an increase in income should decrease the likelihood of civil-war onset, e.g. by increasing opportunity costs and strengthening state capacity. And since larger states may reach the battle-death threshold required for coding civil war more easily, the conflict risk for smaller states should be lower in our models. Moreover, the absolute and squared value of SIP are included to allow for effects that the regime type may have on the likelihood of conflict (and that may otherwise be partially captured by the democratization indicator).⁴ In order to minimize the complexity of the regression models, other less robust control variables found in the literature are omitted.

Modeling Approach A binomial logit model with country-year observations as units of analysis is used to empirically test the hypotheses developed in Section 5.2. Temporal autocorrelation is compensated by a cubic polynomial of the years since the most recent civil-war onset, or in the absence of any civil war, 1946 or the year of independence, whichever is more recent.⁵ Observations are clustered by country to account for correlation among the observations of each country. Finally, any years of ongoing civil war are excluded from the data set.

The following section presents the results of the analysis.

5.4 Results

The empirical analysis proceeds in three steps that correspond to the three factors theorized to drive conflict. Firstly, the role of democratization is assessed. Secondly, information on the relevance and politicization of ethnicity is included. Finally, information on the threat to political leaders is added to the model. Table 5.1 presents the results.

Model 1a provides an initial test of the influence that democratization has on the likelihood of civil war. The effect is both significant and oriented in the right direction: as predicted in hypothesis H5.1, democratization increases the risk of civil-war onset substantially, by 5.09%. This confirms the earlier finding (Cederman, Hug, and Krebs, 2010 and Chapter 3) that democratization phases increase the likelihood of civil war.

	All cases			Cases with relevant ethnicity		
	Model 1a	Model 2a	Model 1b	Model 2b	Model 3	Model 3
Democratization	1.375 *** (5.46)	1.360 *** (5.48)	1.422 *** (5.58)	1.442 *** (5.44)	1.345 *** (4.97)	1.345 *** (4.97)
Relevant ethnicity	1.099 ** (2.86)					
Politicized ethnicity			0.928 ** (3.21)		0.928 ** (3.20)	
Risk of irregular removal					25.410 † (1.89)	
SIP	-0.261 (-0.19)	-0.724 (-0.52)	-0.671 (-0.46)	-0.514 (-0.34)	-0.523 (-0.35)	-0.523 (-0.35)
SIP ²	-0.389 (-0.28)	0.127 (0.09)	0.107 (0.07)	0.063 (0.04)	0.100 (0.06)	0.100 (0.06)
Population size	0.221 ** (2.95)	0.199 ** (2.64)	0.214 ** (2.76)	0.219 ** (2.81)	0.220 ** (2.85)	0.220 ** (2.85)
GDP per capita	-0.348 *** (-3.43)	-0.347 *** (-3.42)	-0.323 ** (-3.00)	-0.275 * (-2.46)	-0.277 * (-2.49)	-0.277 * (-2.49)
$t_{last, onset}$	-0.069 (-1.34)	-0.065 (-1.26)	-0.029 (-0.55)	-0.029 (-0.55)	-0.025 (-0.50)	-0.025 (-0.50)
$t_{last, onset}^2$	0.002 (1.09)	0.002 (1.11)	0.001 (0.36)	0.001 (0.40)	0.001 (0.37)	0.001 (0.37)
$t_{last, onset}^3$	-0.000 (-0.90)	-0.000 (-0.96)	-0.000 (-0.23)	-0.000 (-0.28)	-0.000 (-0.25)	-0.000 (-0.25)
Constant	-3.927 ** (-2.87)	-4.588 ** (-3.26)	-4.107 ** (-3.02)	-4.866 *** (-3.51)	-4.945 *** (-3.57)	-4.945 *** (-3.57)
N	4'881	4'881	3'887	3'887	3'887	3'887
-2LL	-550.9 ***	-500.2 ***	-545.1 ***	-496.3 ***	-495.2 ***	-495.2 ***

Table 5.1: Onset of civil war T-score in brackets; † p < 0.10 * p < 0.05 ** p < 0.01 *** p < 0.001

The control variables behave roughly as expected: increases in average income reduce the probability of civil-war onset while increases in population size make conflict more likely. There seems to be no general time trend and an effect of the curvilinear regime type variables also does not materialize.⁶

Model 2a adds the indicator for the presence of politically relevant ethnic divisions. Indeed, the presence of such ethnic divisions seem to increase the likelihood of civil war without influencing the effect of the other explanatory terms, strengthening hypothesis H5.2a. Countries in which multiple ethnic groups are politically relevant are saddled with a 1.54% higher risk of civil conflict.

In order to test hypothesis H5.2b, the presence of relevant ethnic divisions becomes a precondition, since the indicator for exclusion along ethnic lines requires the existence of such lines. In order to check for the effect of the reduction in the number of observations, Model 1a is first replicated for the subset of country-years with politically relevant ethnic distinctions. Model 1b shows no relevant changes to the results when compared with Model 1a, except for a small loss of significance in the GDP/capita indicator that can be attributed to the decreased sample size.

Model 2b then introduces the share of politically excluded ethnic groups into the subset of observations for which ethnicity is relevant. Exclusion has a noticeable effect: when comparing the extreme cases of virtually complete exclusion of ethnic groups and no exclusion whatsoever along ethnic lines, the former country faces a 2.89% higher risk of an outbreak of civil war. This coefficient achieves significance at the 1% level despite the fact that the sample is already limited to cases where ethnicity is politically relevant.

While this result conforms with the predictions of the *elite selection* theory, it does not necessarily weaken the competing theory of *ethnic security dilemmas*. A pre-existing conflict could be argued to strengthen the structural forces leading to such a dilemma. On the other hand, this result highlights the distinction between the *elite manipulation* and *elite selection* theories. Can one speak of elites reframing public debate if the concerns are already present in the population and conflict onset appears more likely when the population has substantial, justified concerns about the behavior of other ethnic groups? Instead, this seems to indicate that political leaders respond to the worries of their constituents.

Finally, model 3 introduces the indicator for the risk to the incumbent developed in Chapter 4. As argued by hypothesis H5.3, the presence of a threat to the incumbent leader increases the risk of an outbreak of civil war with some significance ($p = 0.058$).⁷ In the absence of any risk factors related to the irregular removal of incumbents, the likelihood of civil war is 2.72% lower than in a case where both risk factors—a history of prior irregular removal and an ongoing transition period—are both present to the maximum extent observed in the data.⁸

Figure 5.1 summarizes the results of Model 3 visually.⁹ The 95% confidence intervals in dark gray represent the likelihood of civil-war onset for countries that feature a combination of risk factors: ongoing democratization, a high level




Figure 5.1: Probability of civil-war onset by years since last onset for low- and high-risk situations

of ethnic politicization (as measured by the population share of excluded groups) and a high risk of an irregular removal of the incumbent. The confidence intervals in lighter gray represent countries that feature none of these three risk factors, i.e. countries with no ongoing democratization process, no politicization of ethnic divisions and a low level of threat to the incumbent.

While the confidence interval for the high-risk cases is very wide, there is clearly no overlap, showing that the risk is significantly higher. Based on these estimates, the estimated probability of civil-war onset for countries with high values for all three risk factors lies around 35% while the estimated probability for countries without these risks lies near 0%.

5.5 Chapter Summary

This chapter has provided a preliminary, quantitative test of the three different theories regarding the influence that political leaders have on the onset of civil war in ethnically heterogeneous countries. The results of this and prior studies (Cederman, Hug, and Krebs, 2010; Mansfield and Snyder, 2008) show that democratization phases face a higher risk of civil conflict, confirming the joint prediction

by all three theories that democratization increases the risk of violent conflict. The democratization indicator achieved a high level of significance and a substantial influence on the likelihood of civil war throughout the analysis, strengthening H5.1.

Secondly, the relevance of ethnicity was contrasted with the more narrowly defined presence of politicized ethnic divisions. Both indicators had the hypothesized effect, with the existence of politicized divisions *adding* to the risk of conflict even after the relevance of ethnicity had been accounted for. This conforms to the expectations of the *elite selection* theory and highlights the difference between it and the theory of *elite manipulation*. If security concerns are already present in the population, campaigning on them cannot be considered manipulation. Instead, it seems that political leaders are sensitive to bottom-up messages.

Thirdly and finally, an indicator for the threat to the incumbent was included in order to differentiate between the *ethnic security dilemma*, which assumes that the risk to the incumbent has no influence on the likelihood of civil war, and the theories of *elite selection* and *elite manipulation*, which both assume a correlation and which are both strengthened by the results.

The outcome of the empirical analysis provides some support to the proposed theory of *elite selection*. Democratization periods do appear substantially more risky and the presence of previously politicized ethnic divisions suggests that the population is already concerned about the potential risks of ethnic cohabitation. Finally, the fact that the risk to incumbent leaders has a somewhat significant influence on the outbreak of violent conflict suggests that the competition between the present leader and potential challengers does play an important role in the dynamic of conflict onset.

However, the tools of large-N regression analysis only serve to test the correlation between factors and both the theories of *elite manipulation* and *ethnic security dilemma* are supported by the evidence to some extent. The resulting challenge is therefore to establish the causal chain leading up to civil war. For this reason, Part II presents qualitative case studies tracing the event history from the initiation of democratization until the outbreak of conflict or its avoidance.

Notes

¹ACD uses a minimum of 25 annual battle-related fatalities, while others such as the Correlates of War (COW) data set operate with a substantially higher threshold of 1'000 deaths. Cederman, Hug, and Krebs (2010) show that this high threshold makes it difficult to establish the effect of democratization periods.

²The operationalization used in this analysis requires an intermixture of two years before a new civil war can be coded. Alternative operationalizations requiring longer periods of intermixture are available in the ACD data set. Robustness checks in Appendix D.2 show that these more restrictive versions of the dependent variable do not lead to major changes in the results. The same appendix also presents a model focusing exclusively on the outbreak of ethnic civil wars, using the very restrictive coding in the Ethnic

Power Relations Dataset (EPR; Cederman, Wimmer, and Min, 2010; Wimmer, Cederman, and Min, 2009) with 10 years intermittency. Again, the results for all major explanatory variables remain roughly unchanged.

³Using the population share of excluded ethnic groups seems realistic, since group size is related to the likelihood of success should a group pursue conflict. However, it is also possible to measure the share of excluded groups simply by the number of excluded groups divided by the total number of relevant ethnic groups. Appendix D.2.2 shows a model that replaces the population-based exclusion indicator with one based on the number of groups. The results do not differ dramatically.

⁴Hegre et al. (2001) and Gleditsch (2002a) find a substantial effect for mixed regime types or anocracies.

⁵Carter and Signorino, 2009 argue that this method is equally effective as splines and dummies in accounting for temporal autocorrelation, with the added benefit of being easier to interpret.

⁶Both the cubic polynomial of the time counter and SIP and its square are jointly insignificant.

⁷The low significance of the threat indicator is likely due at least in part to the correlation between this indicator and the democratization indicator, since the threat indicator is partially based on ongoing transition periods (correlation with democratization periods $r = 0.180$, χ^2 -test significant at the 1% level).

⁸It would be attractive to further test the relation between democratization, politicized ethnicity and threats to the incumbent with the inclusion of an interaction term. Unfortunately, a quick check of the available data shows that cases in which high values for the share of excluded population and for the threat against the incumbent coincide with the aftermath of a democratization process and the onset of conflict are few and far in between. However, this does not disprove the hypothesized interaction: instead, it is likely due to the fact that the quantitative data cannot capture the interaction. Several years will likely pass from the initiation of a democratization process, past the point when changes are sizable enough to be picked up by governance indicators, and finally to the onset of civil war. While the democratization process, politicized ethnicity and threats to the incumbent clearly have an influence, none of the theories require that they peak in the same year. For this reason, no interaction term has been included in this model.

⁹The graph is based on the Clarify method (King, Tomz, and Wittenberg, 2000).

Part II
Case Studies

Overview

Part I has shown that ongoing democratization periods, politicization of ethnicity through the exclusion of ethnic groups from political power and factors associated with a threat to the incumbent's power all positively correlate with an elevated likelihood of civil-war onset.

However, such correlations do not allow a testing of the causal logic proposed by the theories of *elite manipulation*, *ethnic security dilemma* and *elite selection*. This part provides two case studies that use process tracing to clarify the chain of events leading from the initiation of democratization to the outbreak of civil war—or its avoidance. Chapter 6 discusses the method, case selection and source data. Chapters 7 and 8 each present one case studies: Burundi 1988–1993 and Yugoslavia 1987–1992.

Chapter 6

Method, Case Selection & Data

This chapter is based on Krebs (2010).

6.1 Introduction

As argued in Chapter 2, multiple theories consider times of regime-type change and particularly democratization attempts as risky periods in the history of countries. Especially in combination with the presence of ethnic cleavages, violent conflict can result. While the theorized contribution of elites to the onset of civil war varies between different schools of thought, large-N empirical results presented in Chapter 5 suggest that a threat to the incumbent—and the competition for political power associated with it—also significantly increase the risk of internal conflict. These quantitative results need to be followed up: what precisely is the dynamic in which political elites contribute to the outbreak of conflict?

In order to establish causal relations, “relevant, verifiable causal stories resting in differing chains of cause-effect relations” (Tilly, 1997, p. 48 as quoted in George and Bennett, 2004, p. 205) need to be examined: something that becomes possible through the method of process tracing. The following section discusses how this method will be used to differentiate between the predicted behavior of elites according to the theories of *ethnic security dilemma*, *elite manipulation* and *elite selection*. The case selection is presented in Section 6.3. Finally, the sources to be used for the case studies are outlined in Section 6.4. Section 6.5 concludes with a summary.

6.2 Methodology

Unlike statistical analyses, process tracing targets not only correlations between explanatory factors and outcomes, but places the focus on the intermediary pro-

cess that connects starting points and results (George and Bennett, 2004). It does so by piecing together a coherent causal chain from original sources and other reports in a process that roots in the *Quellenkritik* (source criticism) of German/Scandinavian historical science of the 19th century. The goal is to figure out “which aspects of the initial conditions observed, in conjunction with which simple principles of the many that may be at work, could have combined to generate the observed sequence of events” (Goldstone, 1991, p. 59).

The kind of process-tracing to be employed here most closely conforms to George and Bennett’s (2004) type of analytic-explanatory process-tracing, which is founded in a historical narrative and attempts to provide an analytical causal explanation. This type seems most suitable for causal processes with interacting explanatory variables, since it allows the process to be viewed as a narrative first before transposing it to the analytical level.

In order to assemble the narrative, news reports¹ were analyzed for any statements made by public figures that addressed ethnicity either directly—by referring to individual ethnic groups—or indirectly—by speaking of “tribal” feelings, group loyalties, linguistic or cultural divisions and so forth. These are contrasted with any statements that explicitly refer to supra-ethnic levels of identity, such as statements regarding “national unity.” These statements are then assessed as a) supporting, b) neutral/descriptive, or c) opposing such ethnic or supra-ethnic loyalties. To illustrate, the following line from a report in the Burundi case study contains a statement in support of national unity and opposing tribal divisions: “Transport Minister Simon Rusuku told Reuters the government reshuffle announced in Bujumbura on Wednesday was an important step towards national unity and ending tribal violence which killed thousands in August” (Reuters News Agency, 1988a).

While actions and reactions by the public will generally not be reported in such detail in the source reports, all reports were assessed to identify popular sentiments. This was done along a similar scheme, but generally required more interpretative work. Again an example from the Burundi case study: the statement “the students, supporters of Buyoya’s *Uprona* party, were stunned by the extent of his defeat and have charged the Hutu with voting along ethnic lines” (Reuters News Agency, 1993e) is superficially an opposition to tribal identities. However, the fact that the students identify themselves as supporters of the previously Tutsi-dominated *Uprona* party and are verbally attacking members of the Hutu majority also indicates that they themselves are supporting ethnic divisions.

Individual reports were collected and assembled into a coherent narrative using secondary literature covering the relevant period.² The theoretical assessment was then conducted by comparing the individual reports in the narrative with expectations of elite and popular behavior rooted in all three theories. The following types of behavior were expected:

- Associating other groups or particular members of such groups with positive or negative attitudes or actions.

- Addressing or denying the existence of threats or security concerns.
- Appealing to smaller identity units, including direct ethnic appeals, but also appeals to geographically, linguistically, religiously or otherwise defined sub-groups of the population that directly relate to an ethnic group.
- Appealing to uniting characteristics that clearly apply to multiple ethnic groups.
- Events highlighting the presence of security concerns, such as demonstrations, questions from the public during political events, and so forth.
- Coordinated or uncoordinated defense efforts, such as hoarding, the formation of militias etc.
- Localized episodes of violence.

Most of these events can fit more than one theory, and their ultimate meaning is dependent on context. For example, addressing the existence of security threats *before* there has been any evidence of such threats corresponds closely to the behavior of elites described by the theory of *elite manipulation*. However, addressing such threats after an incident corresponds more to the *elite selection* dynamic and may also apply to *ethnic security dilemmas*. Likewise, appeals to smaller identity units early in the campaign are more likely to be an attempt at manipulation than similar appeals closer to the election, once political leaders have received numerous signals from the public and are able to hone in on their target constituency. Violent episodes or instances of sustained protest that occur without any direct link to events involving leaders or stimuli from leaders are more likely to be a sign of a security dilemma than similar episodes that are closely associated with campaign events of individual politicians.

The narrative serves to highlight relevant events and provide sufficient context so that the developments can be evaluated in relation to all three theories. The result will then be a case-wide assessment highlighting the degree of support that each theory receives from the case. It should be noted that each case may include events supporting more than one theory, so that its conclusion will need to present a reasoned weighing of the evidence. George and Bennett (2004, p. 222) consider it problematic “that there may be more than one hypothesized causal mechanism consistent with any given set of process-tracing evidence”. However, democratization processes inherently include a vast array of different actors and none of the three theories requires that all actors behave according to one pattern only. Instead, they suggest what the dominant dynamic should be at the level of society, and the case studies should be assessed along the same requirement.

This study primarily seeks to analyze the interactions between leaders and followers, however the type of causal process is a “convergence of several conditions, independent variables, or causal chains” (George and Bennett, 2004, p. 212).

For this reason, the selected cases need to fulfill the requirements for a most-likely scenario: democratization, politicized ethnicity and political competition threatening to the incumbent.

The following part describes the prior history of both cases and assesses their suitability based on these three requirements.

6.3 Case Selection

6.3.1 Burundi 1988–1993

Burundi, a former German and Belgian colony in the Great Lakes region of Africa, is a clear case of democratization in an atmosphere of charged inter-ethnic relations.

This is true despite the difficulty in determining the exact roots of ethnicity. While the division of roles and power between different groups of inhabitants prior to colonization and the extent to which colonization by Germany and Belgium shaped ethnicity is still being debated (Uvin, 1999), the minimum consensus seems to be that the origin of ethnic groups lies in socio-economic differences.³ The Hutu, which make up 85% of Burundi's population, were simple farmers, while the Tutsi (14%) were wealthier cattle owners.⁴ This economic cleavage became further entrenched when the colonial administration decided to align access to political power with socio-economic status.

When Burundi gained independence from Belgium in 1962, the first elections were won by the bi-ethnic *Uprona* party. However, at the time the "state was the main source of enrichment and power in society and conferred great opportunities to those who controlled it" (Uvin, 1999, p. 256). Only four years after independence, a Tutsi faction ("Tutsi-Hima") seized power in a military *coup d'état* to ensure the continued elevated economic and political status of the Tutsi minority. From then on until the beginning of this case study in 1988, the Hutu majority was excluded from political power and discriminated against by state institutions in many areas. Moreover, political competition was eliminated and *Uprona* became the only legitimate political party, dedicated completely to Tutsi interests.

A recurring conflict pattern establishes itself from this point forward: since the Tutsi are a small minority, they use a "much higher dose of repression" (Uvin, 1999, p. 258) than e.g. the ruling Hutu in Rwanda. On several occasions, Hutu rise up violently against local Tutsi. The government then sends in the Tutsi-controlled army which kills a larger number of Hutu in retaliation.⁵ The most horrific such case, a Hutu rebellion in the South of Burundi during 1972 is considered genocidal in nature due to the estimated 100'000 to 150'000 Hutu killed by the army. Even if differing access to political power and socio-economic status had not yet solidified the Hutu-Tutsi division, the recurring cycle of violence most certainly did, creating "a climate of permanent mutual fear" (Uvin, 1999, p. 258).

On September 3, 1987, Major Pierre Buyoya came to power by military *coup d'état*. His reign was strongly influenced by another episode of intertribal violence towards the end of his first year in office. During August 1988, Hutu farmers in the North of Burundi rebelled, killing an estimated 3'000 Tutsi. As usual, the army retaliated by killing a disproportionately larger amount of Hutu, in this case an estimated 20'000 victims (Reyntjens, 1993; Uvin, 1999). In the aftermath and under international pressure, President Buyoya initiates the first small steps of a democratization process (Reyntjens, 1993; Young, 2006). The first stage consisted of an almost immediate opening of the political arena to Hutu representatives and the initiation of projects on the subject of national unity (1988–1990). They were then followed by the move towards constitutional multi-party democracy (1990–1992) and finally the lead-up to the first democratic elections (1992–1993).

While the process was conducted in a slow and careful manner, the threat to President Buyoya's person and to his access to political power were clear from the start: Only four months after the initiation of the first steps, a *coup d'état* was attempted against him (February 1989).

At this point, it should be clear that Burundi fulfills all three conditions to be considered a most-likely case for the dynamics described by the three theories. Firstly, prior history has clearly shown that ethnic differences, even though they may have had very flimsy roots initially, have been used as a dividing line along which violent conflict has formed on many occasions, which in turn has strengthened the perceived ethnic differences. Additionally, ethnic and political divisions coincide with economic divisions, with the Tutsi being the politically powerful "haves" and the Hutu the politically excluded "have nots."

Secondly, the political changes initiated in 1988 are clearly a democratization process. The literature unanimously agrees that it was a clear move towards democracy that was conducted in a very careful and deliberate manner, focusing first on opening access to political power to the previously excluded Hutu majority before moving on to more challenging tasks such as establishing a constitutional multi-party democracy.

Finally, there was clear threat to the incumbent that signals the potential of competition for political power. The careful behavior described by Uvin (1999) and the fact that it was likely caused by both ongoing patterns of violence and concerted external pressure certainly suggest that Buyoya was consciously trying to keep control of the process in a way that also protected him. If he had not realized the danger to himself from the start, the first attempted *coup d'état*—only four months after his initial move to open the political arena to previously excluded Hutu—would have served as a clear signal of the personal risk.

6.3.2 Yugoslavia 1987-1992

The Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia⁶ was the successor state of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia⁷ that had been founded in the Balkans after the end of World

War I as part of the dissolution of the Austro-Hungarian empire. Democratization took place in a setting of institutionalized ethnic divisions that had escalated violently in Kosovo in the recent past.

The Yugoslavian Federation was inhabited by several ethnic groups whose settlement patterns only partially corresponded to the political boundaries of the six constituent republics, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia (including the two autonomous provinces Vojvodina and Kosovo), and Slovenia. The three largest ethnic groups speak variants of Serbo-Croatian,⁸ but differ by religion. The Serbs (approx. 36% of the Yugoslavian population)⁹ belong predominantly to the Serbian Orthodox Church, while the Croats (20%) are Roman Catholic and the Bosnians (10%) are Muslim. Albanians (9%, Muslim), Slovenes (8%, Roman Catholic) and Macedonians (6% Macedonian Orthodox, Muslim) each speak their own language. Finally, Montenegrins are very similar to Serbs in culture, religion and language, as is underlined by the excessive variability in the number of Serbian inhabitants of Montenegro and Montenegrin inhabitants of Serbia in surveys that is not matched by actual population movements. With the exception of the Albanians, each of these ethnic groups had a corresponding constituent republic where they contributed the largest share of the population. However, with only 40% of the population, Bosnians did not have an absolute majority in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina.¹⁰ Serbs were the majority in the Republic of Serbia, but constituted significant and clustered minorities in the Croatian and Bosnian Republics. They were also outnumbered in the autonomous province Kosovo within the Serbian Republic, where 80% of the population belonged to the only ethnic group without a constituent republic, Albanians. (Figure 6.1 shows the complicated mix of ethnic groups for Yugoslavia in 1987.) Economic factors reinforced other ethnic divisions: the country had a North-South divide, with the northern Slovenes and Croats being substantially better off than the inhabitants of southern Kosovo.

The point of departure for this case was Yugoslavia under the 1974 constitution, which had elevated Kosovo and Vojvodina to the status of autonomous provinces and had given them voting rights at the federal level that equaled those of the constituent republics. After the death of founder and decade-long leader Josip Broz Tito, the country was governed by a presidency with nine members, one each for all constituent republics and autonomous provinces plus one member for the federal level. The country followed a socialist ideology, though it had already distanced itself from the USSR during the reign of Stalin and was a co-founder of the Non-Aligned Movement in the early 1960s.

Democratization was brought about by several factors. Republics oriented towards the West, particularly Slovenia (which borders on Austria and Italy), started in the early 1980s with smaller gestures such as the publication of an independent magazine, *Nova Revija*. Moreover, popular criticism of the government in connection with the economic conditions repeatedly led to demonstrations and calls for change in the following years. Finally, with the *glasnost* movement across

Ethnic Distribution of Yugoslavia 1987




Figure 6.1: Ethnic distribution of Yugoslavia in 1987

Eastern Europe in the second half of the 1980s, a general trend towards reforming the system became apparent. However, this process was particularly complex in the Yugoslavian case, since each republic (enabled by the federal constitution) followed a different time table and had a different approach to democratization. As a result, some republics had already concluded two-stage multi-party elections while the citizens of others (particularly Serbia) were still demonstrating for the same right. Democratic elections were implemented in all republics by the end of 1990, with referenda on independence following shortly after in a number of cases.

The mass mobilization that produced the move towards democracy was marked from the start by ethno-nationalist undertones that have been interpreted as examples of elite manipulation and ethnic security dilemmas.¹¹ Yugoslavia has a history of ethnic violence, with the most recent large-scale events occurring during World War II, when the Croatian separatist movement *Ustaše* transformed from a terrorist group into the government of a part of Yugoslavia occupied by Axis powers. The *Ustaše* behaved with extreme brutality particularly towards

Serbs and were partially responsible for 500'000 dead on the Serbian side—more than twice as many victims as suffered by other ethnic groups during this conflict (Posen, 1993a). Approx. 200'000 Croatian victims and repeated attempts by Serbs to achieve local hegemony and create a “Greater Serbia” were concerns for Croats.

While nationalism was banned in the new Yugoslavian Federation under Tito, occasional nationalist protests occurred. The most prominent source of ethnic conflict was the autonomous province Kosovo. Even though the 1974 constitution elevated Kosovo to the status of autonomous province and gave it voting rights at the federal level, this was seen as unsatisfactory by the Albanian inhabitants, who were the only ethnic group not to have a constituent republic of their own. An Albanian protest calling for the elevation of Kosovo to constituent republic was put down violently in April 1981, with the federal government declaring a state of emergency and activating special forces. Since then, Albanians had put forward repeated claims of heavy-handedness by the authorities, with over 1'000 Albanians being tried for agitation, separatism or violent crimes between 1981 and 1988 (New York Times, 1988b). Simultaneously, the local Serbian minority expressed fears of “Albanian terror”, with repeated claims of rape, “murder, assault, arson and destruction of crops and cattle” by Albanians toward Serbs (New York Times, 1988b). Individual cases of violence with victim and perpetrator on different sides of the ethnic division generated widespread reactions of fear and anger upon publication. The Serbian minority protested a lack of support by the government and 30'000 people, over 10% of Serbian population in Kosovo, were estimated to have emigrated from the province between 1981 and 1988 (New York Times, 1988b). This led to a well-organized mass mobilization of Serbs in 1987 and 1988.

While the threat to leadership figures was not as existential as in the Burundian case, there nonetheless was a clear threat to incumbents' access to power. Already during the mass mobilization prior to the initiation of democratic reforms, the turnover of political figures and administrative officials was immense, and often came about as a direct result of competition for political power, with communist officials being replaced before or during the first democratic elections. Slobodan Milošević was remarkably adept in removing politicians with differing views (New York Times, 1989), whether they were old-guard communist officials opposing his message of Serbian nationalism, or nationalist challengers like Vuk Drašković, who threatened to dethrone him (Financial Times, 1990c) once Milošević himself had begun to be seen as an outdated representative of the communist system (New York Times, 1990). Milošević was joined by proponents of nationalism in other republics, such as Franjo Tuđman in Croatia, once free elections had been initiated there.

Yugoslavia clearly fulfills the three requirements for a most-likely case: most of its republics underwent a speedy democratization process that ended in free, democratic elections and in some cases, independence referenda. The coun-

try's history had been marred by prior violence along ethnic lines and recurring protests in the years leading up to the democratization process—these protests even contributed to the mass mobilization that eventually fed the political reforms. Finally, political leaders were clearly threatened and faced a high turnover not only due to elections but also in connection with firings, forced resignations and early retirements.

6.4 Source Data

The goal of this study is to create a narrative of the developments from the initiation of the move towards democracy to the outbreak of large-scale internal violence or to the preliminary avoidance of large-scale violent conflict. The focus of the narrative must be the behavior of leaders and followers, so that manipulation of the public by leaders and signalling by the public to its leaders can be detected.

News reports are generally a good source for such fine-grained analyses. This holds especially for reports disseminated by news agencies, since they cover events at small time intervals, allowing a more precise tracing of events as they unfold. More importantly, news agency reports undergo fewer levels of processing than e.g. newspaper reports before they are published. At the same time, news agency reports have unique disadvantages. They often portray an outside perspective of events and therefore provide less depth than local reporting. Whereas international news agencies will often focus only on the top echelon of political actors in their reporting, local sources discuss the behavior of additional politically important figures that are not well known beyond the country's borders, as well as reactions of the general population.

Since the study requires a more detailed understanding of local interactions, it needs to be based on both agency reports and local news sources. For reasons of availability, Reuters has been selected as the source for agency reporting, while the Factiva Database has been chosen as the source for local coverage.

Burundi 1988–1993 In the case of Burundi, only a few hundred Reuters reports were available, though they did cover the main events. To augment the international perspective, additional reporting by BBC Monitoring was included in the analysis. BBC Monitoring collects and aggregates a wide array of local sources including the *Agence Burundaise de Presse (ABP)*, *La Voix de la Révolution (Bujumbura)*, and *Radio Burundi*, as well as additional international sources with local knowledge such as *Radio France International*, *Radio Rwanda* and *Radio Uganda*. Using the Factiva database service yielded 721 reports with direct relation to Burundian politics from both Reuters and BBC Monitoring. In order to augment the fragmented nature of individual news reports, additional analytical sources in academic literature were used to provide a more structured narrative (Gahama, 1995; Lemarchand, 1994; Reyntjens, 1993; Uvin, 1999; Young, 2006). The

selection was assembled with the goal of including authors favorable to all sides of the conflict.

Yugoslavia 1987-1992 For Yugoslavia, almost no original Reuters reports were available, though this was compensated by the availability of numerous newspaper, radio and TV reports by Western news sources, including the *Times* and *Sunday Times* (London), the *New York Times*, the *Financial Times*, the *Toronto Star*, as well as NBC and CBS television news. This also compensates for the lack of local reporting: no Yugoslav media reports have been translated and made available in the Factiva database. Given that the Yugoslav media landscape was partially free at best during the period of study, this may not be a great loss when it comes to assembling the timeline of events. However, the Yugoslavian media is often listed as one factor that contributed to the outbreak of conflict, necessitating its inclusion in the narrative. This is accomplished by including a number of studies that directly investigated the role of the media (Đurić and Zorić, 2009; Jusić, 2009; Mihelj, Bajt, and Pankov, 2009). Additionally, Auerswald and Auerswald (2000) provide useful translations of relevant local news reports and transcripts of speeches. Finally, secondary academic literature was used in order to assemble a coherent narrative (Gagnon, 2004; Mansfield and Snyder, 2005; Melander, 2009; Posen, 1993a; Snyder, 2000; Woodward, 1995).

6.5 Chapter Summary

This chapter has outlined the method, case selection and source data to be used in the following two chapters. Analytic-explanatory process tracing was selected to develop a historical narrative of both cases that allows analytical evidence for the theories of *elite manipulation*, *ethnic security dilemma* and *elite selection* to be extracted and evaluated.

Most-likely cases were selected for the study to ensure a high probability of finding evidence in support of one of the three theories. The democratization efforts in Burundi (1988–1993) and Yugoslavia (1987–1992) meet the preconditions of an ongoing, substantial democratization attempt, the existence of ethnic cleavages that have been politicized in the past, and a substantial threat to the incumbent that serves as a potential stimulus for manipulation by the incumbent and for an extensive political campaign by would-be successors.

The narrative for each case is based on Reuters news reports augmented with reporting from local sources to provide a more detailed view of the actions and reactions of political leaders in the top and lower echelons and of the public at large. Secondary, academic literature is used to facilitate the shaping of individual reports into a coherent narrative.

Notes

¹Cf. Section 6.4 for details on the sources.

²Cf. Section 6.4 for details on the secondary literature used in the individual case studies.

³N.B. Both Gurr (1993) and Uvin (1999) argue that precise knowledge of the origin of ethnic divisions is not absolutely necessary as long as there is the current, shared perception that a certain set of traits sets groups apart from each other.

⁴The remaining 1% is made up by the Twa, who play a negligible role in the conflict.

⁵These episodes of violence are generally accompanied by waves of refugees seeking shelter either elsewhere within Burundi or in neighboring countries, particularly Rwanda.

⁶Previously known as Democratic Federal Yugoslavia and as Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia.

⁷Previously known as the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes.

⁸These variants are now known as Bosnian, Croatian and Serbian, and differ also by the writing system, with Serbian employing the Cyrillic alphabet while Bosnian and Croatian use Latin letters.

⁹Population figures at the federal level are drawn from the EPR data set (Cederman, Wimmer, and Min, 2010; Wimmer, Cederman, and Min, 2009) and represent the population estimates for 1988.

¹⁰Cf. Federalni Zavod za Statistiku (2010). It should be noted that this statistic is based on surveys that allow respondents to select the supra-ethnic Yugoslavian nationality, which 7.9% of respondents did. The ethnic affiliation of these persons is therefore unknown, but their size would have been insufficient to give Bosnians an absolutely majority even if all Yugoslavian respondents were Bosnians.

¹¹See Gagnon (2004); Posen (1993a); Snyder (2000) and the theoretical discussion in Chapter 2.3.

Burundi 1988–1993

This chapter is based on Krebs (2010).

7.1 Introduction

The Burundian democratization attempt of 1988–1993 shows how ethnic violence can break out despite massive popular support for peaceful democratization and the absence of political leaders with a divisive message.

With the benefit of hindsight, the political developments in Burundi following the outbreak of violence in August 1988 and eventually leading to the murder of the Burundi's first democratically elected president in October 1993 can be organized into four distinct phases:

1. 1988–1990. The opening of the political arena to Hutu representatives and the initiation of projects on the subject of national unity, starting in October 1988.
2. 1990–1992. The move towards constitutional multi-party democracy, starting with the publication of a first draft of the *Charter of National Unity* in April 1990 and continuing with the installation of a constitutional committee in April 1991.
3. 1992–1993. The lead-up to the first democratic elections, starting with the successful referendum on the constitution in March 1992 and the official acceptance of multiple opposition parties.
4. June–October 1993. The aftermath of the first democratic elections for president (June 1) and parliament (June 29), leading up to the bloody *coup d'état* against President Ndadaye on October 21 that marks the beginning of wide-spread violence.

At the start of the democratization process, the country was governed by Pierre Buyoya, a member of the Tutsi minority who had ascended to the presidency in September 1987 after orchestrating a successful *coup d'état*. As his predecessors, he was a member of the *Union pour le Progrès national (Uprona)*, the sole legitimate party in Burundi that represented exclusively Tutsi interests. The Hutu majority was excluded from political participation and education, barred from joining the police and military, and in an economically detrimental position.

Sections 7.2–7.5 describe the development of the democratization process from this starting point to the outbreak of large-scale violence. Section 7.6 evaluates the events in relation to the three theories, and Section 7.7 concludes with a summary.

7.2 Opening Access to Political Power (1988–1990)

After the violence of August 1988, “vigorous international reaction compelled [President] Buyoya to abandon the exclusionary policies pursued since 1965” (Young, 2006, p. 313). While President Buyoya stressed national unity already in his first reactions to the outbreak of violence (Reuters News Agency, 1988f, cf. also Reuters News Agency, 1988d,g), the first concrete actions followed in October, once the violence had abated. This initial reaction consisted of the appointment of a committee on national unity composed of 24 members evenly divided between Hutu and Tutsi (Reuters News Agency, 1988e), and of a government of national unity, also with 12 Hutu and 12 Tutsi members and led by a newly appointed prime minister, Adrien Sibomama, a Hutu (Reuters News Agency, 1988c). These changes were accompanied by continued speeches on the need to combat divisiveness (Reuters News Agency, 1988b) and personal visits by President Buyoya to all 114 administrative districts (Reuters News Agency, 1988h).

This new approach indicated “profound dynamics of change” (Reyntjens, 1993, p. 564) and the start of “a noticeable increase in the representation of Hutu in the formal economy and public sector” (Uvin, 1999, p. 257). However, it also attracted strong criticism: “From the very beginning, [...] Buyoya’s move to liberalization faced a double-barrelled challenge: extremists at both ends of the spectrum made their reservations abundantly clear, and violently. What for some Hutu is a clear-cut case of ‘too little too late’ is viewed by Tutsi hard-liners as a sellout to the Hutu” (Lemarchand, 1994, p. 132).

This translated almost directly into a personal threat against Buyoya, who faced a coup attempt only four months after the introduction of the first political changes. While both President Buyoya and his (Hutu) Prime Minister Adrien Sibomana continued to make public arguments for bridging past divides (cf. Reuters News Agency, 1988i, 1989a), it already became clear at this point that

the true opposition did not intend to make a political argument to support its views.

7.3 Moving towards a Democratic Constitution (1990–1992)

After the first forays into a more pluralist society, President Buyoya began in earnest to move the country towards democracy. The pace of this process is described by observers as careful: “Buyoya may be compared to Gorbachev, reforming the worst aspects of the system that produced him, while seeking to keep its functioning intact” (Uvin, 1999, p. 261).

The process was kicked off with the unveiling of the *Charter of National Unity* (Reuters News Agency, 1990b), which stipulates the sanctity of life and equal rights for all ethnic groups. This was accompanied by “intense propaganda on the concept of national (ethnic) unity” (Uvin, 1999, p. 261) leading up to a national referendum on the revised charter in February 1991. Once accepted, the charter became the foundation for the work of the constitutional commission instated in April 1991 (Reuters News Agency, 1990b).

Reyntjens (1993, p. 564) argues that “the progress made between late 1988 and early 1991 was obvious”: equal representation had been achieved for Hutu in many state bodies, Hutu held important offices within the previously Tutsi-only *Uprona* party (including the position of secretary general), and access to civil service and secondary education had increased substantially for Hutu. Despite (or because of, respectively) these substantial changes, elements of unrest persisted on both Hutu and Tutsi sides. Smaller acts of Hutu resistance were reported occasionally: e.g. in November 1991, the *Parti pour la libération du peuple hutu* (*Palipehutu*, Party for the Liberation of the Hutu People) initiated an insurgency in the capital Bujumbura (Reuters News Agency, 1991a). State organs with enforcement and arrest powers had generally stayed outside the reach of the Hutu majority despite the opening of other areas of public life, and the army and police retaliated against Hutu civilians as they had done many times prior to the initiation of democratization, undermining the ongoing arguments for national unity by the political leadership (Reyntjens, 1993; cf. Reuters News Agency, 1990a, 1991b,c; BBC Monitoring, 1991).

On the Tutsi side, another coup attempt was directed at President Buyoya (Reuters News Agency, 1992c). The goal of the attackers was clearly to disrupt the ongoing opening and democratization of the political system: “the arrested soldiers said they wanted to prevent a referendum due on March 9 on whether to introduce a multi-party system” (ibid., line 6).

Again, it was clear that substantial resistance to the project of national unity existed, yet elements on both sides of the ethnic divide purposefully did not choose to engage in political competition.

7.4 Preparing for the First Democratic Elections (1992–1993)

Despite resistance at both extreme ends of the political spectrum, the new constitution was accepted by a vast majority in a constitutional referendum in March 1992 (90.2% votes in favor with a 97% turnout; Reuters News Agency, 1992b). The “‘spirit of national unity’ [was] formulated as a principle in as many as 12 articles” (Reyntjens, 1993, p. 565), and the government continued to move the democratization process forward by installing a multi-party system in April, enabling the foundation of opposition parties. While seven opposition parties were operating by the end of 1992, the *Front pour la Démocratie au Burundi* (Frodebu, Front for Democracy in Burundi) was the only significant opponent of the governing *Uprona* (Reyntjens, 1993).

While President Buyoya and Prime Minister Sibomana continue to make the case against ethnic divisions and for national unity (Reuters News Agency, 1992a), another rebellion broke out in April 1992, killing hundreds (Uvin, 1999). And as the country continued to move towards its first democratic elections, there was “no doubt that political propaganda increasingly manipulated ethnicity as the elections approached” (Reyntjens, 1993, p. 574). “Starting at the end of 1992, the salience of ethnicity as a major electoral element emerged increasingly clearly” (Reyntjens, 1993, p. 567), however, the division was intended to be along the lines of multi-ethnic vs. mono-ethnic parties. An example of such campaigning is captured in Reuters News Agency (1993b): Prime Minister Sibomana (*Uprona*, Hutu) accuses *Frodebu* of associating with the Hutu rebel organization *Palipehutu*, recruiting *Palipehutu* members, and refusing to distance themselves from the rebel organization’s methods. In essence, *Uprona* was trying to make up for a perceived disadvantage as the symbol of military dictatorship and Hutu suppression by painting its opposition as mono-ethnic and divisive, while portraying itself as multi-ethnic and therefore a guarantor of national unity.

Even though the electoral campaign is described as relatively open by observers (cf. Reyntjens, 1993, p. 567), these campaign tactics, the fact that “government-owned media were far from impartial”, small acts of resistance and small-scale heavy-handedness of the authorities foreshadowed the coming events. Not only had there been continuous attempts to resist President Buyoya’s democratization; by then, the people implementing the democratization themselves were starting to scratch the veneer of national unity.

It should be noted that *Uprona*’s campaign tactics did constitute an attempt at manipulation. However, the message differed from those foreseen by supporters of the *elite manipulation* theory, since it did not attempt to split the population along ethnic lines, but along the lines of unity vs. division. As such, it was not only directed at the core constituents of *Uprona*, but also at the core constituents of its opposition. While the stereotypical manipulating leader is argued to play to the “home crowd”, *Uprona*’s leadership did the opposite. Additionally, their reac-

tion followed persistent signalling of safety worries by their constituents, which despite multiple violent episodes had not been addressed by the heads of government and opposition. For these reasons, it seems unlikely that this was elite manipulation as presented by Gagnon (2004) or Snyder (2000).

7.5 Election Aftermath (June–October 1993)

The presidential elections on June 1, 1993 “took place in considerable calm and dignity” and was “conducted in a fair manner” (Reyntjens, 1993, p. 568), as was confirmed by other observers: “Les élections de juin 1993 [...] s’étaient déroulées dans le calme, le calendrier électoral avait été scrupuleusement respecté, tous les partis politiques avaient été associés à ces consultations populaires, les résultats avaient publiés rapidement” (Gahama, 1995, p. 77).¹

Despite the respective histories of *Uprona* and *Frodebu*, and despite the manipulative tactics late in the election campaign, voting did *not* follow ethnic lines. While President Buyoya achieved only 32% of the vote, the number of votes itself was more than double the amount of votes he could have gotten if voted for by Tutsi alone.² Likewise, “the support of at least some Tutsi for *Frodebu*’s Hutu candidate, Ndadaye, was well know” (Reyntjens, 1993, p. 574). Outgoing President Buyoya and the army chief of staff, head of an important source of Tutsi power, both accepted the verdict and proclaimed their loyalty to the president-elect (Reyntjens, 1993).

Unfortunately, despite voting patterns that did not follow ethnic lines and calls for calm by political leaders (BBC Monitoring, 1993a; Reuters News Agency, 1993a), parts of the population started to indicate worries for their safety. Right after the presidential election and weeks before the parliamentary election, the first protests started to appear (e.g. Reuters News Agency, 1993a), initially formed by students and later joined by school children and civil servants. They were first indications that the worst fears “of many Tutsi that they would be victimized as the outcome of voting that would be essentially on an ethnic basis” had been confirmed (Reyntjens, 1993, p. 577). These fears were reinforced by the outcome of the parliamentary elections on June 29, 1993, which saw a substantially lower share for *Uprona* than outgoing President Buyoya had been able to achieve: a mere 21.43% of the vote. Due to the system of distributing parliament seats, this resulted in less than 20% of the votes in parliament for *Uprona*, meaning that it would not be able to block changes to the constitution, despite the required 80% majority (Reyntjens, 1993).

Only days after the parliamentary elections, radical Tutsi within the army and police start to separate themselves from the political process. The first indication came when a group of soldiers attempted to seize the residence of the president-elect in the night of July 2–3, 1993 (Reuters News Agency, 1993d). Initially, the coup plotters appeared to be fringe elements who failed to get support

for their goal from other elements of the Burundian military. President Ndadaye continued to communicate a message of national unity, substantiated by concrete measures, such as the presentation of a government of national unity with a Tutsi prime minister, prominent posts for *Uprona* members and the ministries of defense and internal security under control of independent, but *Uprona*-leaning army officers (BBC Monitoring, 1993c,d,e). Other concrete actions, such as an amnesty for political prisoners (BBC Monitoring, 1993c,d), followed and President Ndadaye as well as his predecessor continued to speak on the need for national unity (BBC Monitoring, 1993b,e).

Unfortunately, extremist elements among the police and military did not heed the message and started killing Hutu indiscriminately in September 1993 (Uvin, 1999). The situation deteriorated until a second coup attempt against President Ndadaye was successful on October 21, 1993, killing both the president and his two constitutional successors (Reuters News Agency, 1993c). The resulting Hutu unrest and army intervention left 50'000 – 100'000 dead and over a million people displaced. Ethnicity had “re-emerged as the single most important factor of political life. [...] Years of efforts at national reconciliation may well have been lost overnight” (Reyntjens, 1993, p. 582).

7.6 Discussion

How should the unfortunate events in Burundi be interpreted theoretically? First and foremost, the incumbent, President Buyoya, did not behave according to the prediction of the *elite manipulation* theory. “The successful conclusion of the policy initiated by the president in 1988 carried with it the logic of the displacement of the old order, including that of the architect of the transition” (Reyntjens, 1993, p. 580). It is clear that Buyoya was aware of this. And even though he was undermining his own power base, inviting coup attempts from disgruntled Tutsi and facing an uphill battle in gaining the trust of the Hutu, he did not succumb to the temptation to use the obvious dividing line running through Burundi to secure his own power. Still, Watt (2008: 44) argues that Buyoya may have been manipulating behind the scenes: “Buyoya is always very careful not to say anything in public that would compromise him and he claims that he was loyal to Ndadaye, but could he not have stopped the powerful elements in the army [...]?” While such speculation can of course not be disproven, the question itself shows that this was not a case of top-down mass mobilization.³

The same goes for all other political leadership figures that were mentioned in the source material. At no point was there any attempt by elites defending or running for office to mobilize the masses using one-sided ethnic rhetoric. The only well documented attempts to use ethnic identities for political gain—*Uprona*'s accusations that *Frodebu* was catering only to Hutu—actually tried to attract voters of both ethnic groups.⁴

At the same time, elite behavior also does not conform to the expectations of the *elite selection* theory. Even though there were constant and clear indications of fear and opposition in the population, political leaders campaigning for office do not seem to address them. Regardless of what goals elites could have pursued, it is baffling that this subject was not discussed by any leader in any report, especially since “violence has tended to occur at key points of political change”, and since “the most prevalent motive [in Burundi] is fear” (Uvin, 1999, p. 263). It should be noted that candidates of both major parties continuously broadcast their support for national unity and peaceful political development, but this is not the same as directly addressing the safety worries of the population or offering more concrete, institutional assurances to them. It is particularly damning that the military and police were not included in the political reforms and were clearly able to continue escalating the situation throughout the democratization process and beyond.

In the end, the democratization attempt was not halted by political elites or the people, but by decision makers outside of the political realm. It seems clear that popular support for peaceful democratic development was substantial, as highlighted by the vast majority of people voting in favor of the *Charter of National Unity* and constitution, as well as by the large amount of voters that did not cast their vote along ethnic lines in the first elections.

The failure to get additional support by the coup plotters in early July 1993 indicates that such popular support can serve to isolate extremists and possibly foil their plans. By not addressing very realistic safety worries in the population and by not taking precautions against radical elements within the police and the army, the incumbents may have left the country vulnerable to the disaster that followed. Yet, publicly addressing inter-ethnic threats could also have undermined the arduously cultivated argument for national unity, leading to a mass mobilization process along ethnic lines that could also have plunged the country into war.

The *ethnic security dilemma* may be the most applicable theory in the Burundian case. Most remarkably, this dynamic developed not only in the absence of manipulating leaders, but in the presence of elites purposefully working to create an atmosphere conducive to national unity and receiving impressive popular support for their work. Weeks of violence against the civilian population and political leaders managed to destroy hopes for a peaceful outcome and reasserted the security dilemma despite the careful, constructive and collaborative nature of the democratization process.

7.7 Chapter Summary

This chapter has presented the developments in Burundi from the initial opening of the political arena to the previously excluded Hutu in October 1988 to the first

democratic elections for president and parliament and June 1993 and the outbreak of deadly violence along ethnic lines in October 1993.

At no point did the behavior of political elites conform to the expectations of the *elite manipulation* theory. Incumbents and opposition politicians continuously expressed support for national unity and even when they attempted to use ethnic identities for political gains, they tried to attract voters from both major ethnic groups. This is visible not only in the reports of elite statements and behavior, but also in the election results that do not follow ethnic lines.

The case also does not fit the *elite selection* theory. There are bottom-up expressions of safety worries and there are incidences of ethnic violence, yet no political leader seemed to address these concerns until after the election, when President Ndadaye tried to reassure the Tutsi minority by leaving control of the police and military in the hands of neutral, *Uprona*-leaning representatives.

Finally, the outbreak of violence most resembles the dynamic of the *ethnic security dilemma*, even though it took weeks of violent provocation from non-political actors to undo the willingness of large parts of the population to patiently support the new democratic process.

Notes

¹Roughly: "The elections of June 1993 took place peacefully, the electoral calendar was respected scrupulously, all political parties were associated with the referendums, the results were published speedily."

²Given that Tutsi only make up 14% of the Burundian population.

³Moreover, it seems likely that Buyoya, as the initiator of power-sharing with the Hutu, may not have had much influence on disgruntled Tutsi, as is highlighted by multiple attempted *coups d'état* against him.

⁴Admittedly, *Uprona* may not have tried to position itself as a multi-ethnic, uniting party if the Tutsi population had occupied a larger share of the Burundian population. However, this remains speculation.

Yugoslavia 1987–1992

8.1 Introduction

The Yugoslavian case presents a clear example of the strategic use of ethnic identity by leaders seeking to protect their access to political power. But simultaneously it shows that such identity-based campaigning needs to be founded in the pre-existing views of the population, and should therefore not be considered a manipulation or diversion.

Dividing the political developments in Yugoslavia on the path to democracy into distinct periods is substantially more difficult than in the case of Burundi. This is due the federal nature of Yugoslavia that allowed its constituent republics to democratize according to very different time-tables. For example, Serbs were still taking to the streets to demand the right to democratic elections, at a time when Slovenes and Croats already had concluded two-stage multiparty elections and sworn in the winners (New York Times, 1990).

Nonetheless, the Yugoslavian democratization process can be divided into three rough periods.

- 1987–1989. Mass mobilization with a nationalistic flavor in all Serbian areas (Serbia proper, Kosovo, Montenegro, and Vojvodina) in reaction to economic problems and a perceived threat from Albanians, starting in April 1989.
- 1989–1990. Appearance of nationalism in other republics and initiation of concrete reform processes at the level of individual republics, starting in July 1989. Reform attempts at the federal level do not succeed.
- 1990–1991. Elections and the post-electoral move towards break-up, beginning with the elections in Slovenia and Croatia in spring, and in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia, Serbia and Montenegro in fall, continuing

with referenda on independence in Slovenia and Croatia, and finally culminating in the activation of the army one day after the declarations of independence by Slovenia and Croatia on June 25, 1991.

At the start of mass mobilization, Yugoslavia was structured by the 1974 constitution with a federal system that recognized six constituent republics and two autonomous provinces—Vojvodina and Kosovo—with voting rights equal to the republics'. In the case of Kosovo, its status as autonomous province was a compromise that was not accepted by Serbian and Albanian inhabitants. This led to open protests in 1981, when Kosovo-Albanians took to the street to demand the elevation of Kosovo to republic. The protests were ended by special forces under a state of emergency, with hundreds injured and several killed; after which, the conflict flared up time and again. Kosovo-Albanians claimed heavy-handedness on the side of the state, with over 1'000 arrested between 1981 and 1988, while Kosovo-Serbs claimed to live with the constant threat of violence perpetrated by Albanians, with over 30'000 Serbs emigrating from the province over the same period (New York Times, 1988b).

This volatile dynamic coincides with the dismal performance of the Yugoslavian economy. Both situations led to demonstrations against the government, marking the beginning of mass mobilization.

8.2 Mass Mobilization (1987–1989)

A speech given by Slobodan Milošević as President of the League of Communists in Serbia in April 1987 is often considered to be the starting point of popular mobilization in Yugoslavia. Milošević was in Priština for meetings with local representatives to prevent the escalation of ethnic tensions after continued discrimination and instances of violence directed at Serbian inhabitants of the province. In local council sessions, he was arguing strongly for national unity: “we must draw the line that divides the honest and progressive people, who struggle for brotherhood and unity and national equality from the counterrevolutionaries and nationalists on the other side” (Auerswald and Auerswald, 2000, p. 11). However, when confronted by crowds of worried Serbs outside the meeting place he addressed the public in an impromptu speech, stating that “no one should dare beat you” (Auerswald and Auerswald, 2000, p. 10).

Shortly thereafter, Serbian protest rallies started occurring at frequent intervals, and they were not limited to the province of Kosovo. These rallies often had a nationalistic theme referring to unity among Serbs¹ or threats to Serbs from others². Even at this point, it was clear that the protests belonged to “a series encouraged by Serbian party leader Slobodan Milošević”, and that by backing these protests, he was acting against the wishes of party leadership: “The presidency is against all rallies and manifestations instigating separatist aspirations, national

intolerance and hatred,' [Chairman of the Collective Presidency of Yugoslavia] Dizdarević said" (Reuters News Agency, 1988j).

More than a few members of the communist party expressed their concern at the possible consequences of stimulating nationalist emotions given the history of the country. Stipe Šušar, freshly-elected Chairman of the Presidium of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia, condemned both Albanian and Serbian nationalism in his acceptance speech, arguing additionally that a harsh treatment of ethnic Albanians might threaten Yugoslav territorial integrity, unleashing "bloodshed and fire in the Balkans" (The Sunday Times, 1988b). In an unprecedented step, two members of the *politburo* resigned to alert the public to the risk of ethnic conflict. Slovene Franc Šetinc wrote in his letter of resignation: "This is a warning—if it can be heard above the general clamor—that the last hour has come for us to come to our senses and rid ourselves of harmful emotions and passions, varied nationalistic and dogmatic legends and follow the voice of reason and progress" (New York Times, 1988b).

However, this did not seem to intimidate Milošević, as demonstrated by this report on September 9, 1988: "The Yugoslav Republic of Serbia has rejected an order from the country's Communist Party to put an end to public demonstrations which, according to the federal authorities, are endangering security. In an official statement, the Presidium of the Serbian Communist Party and the Serbian State Presidency said that by issuing such an order the federal leadership of the party was making itself a force opposed to the will of the people. This open rift between Serbia and the federal party could have serious consequences, as it sets a precedent for republics to defy federal decisions" (The Times, 1988a).

The ongoing protest rallies became a major source of power for Mr. Milošević, but reports raised doubts regarding the level of grass-roots participation. A London *Times* report from Kraljevo, Serbia, described the presence of professional agitators associated with Milošević. "The ringleaders, fists clenched, crying 'Serbs unite! Power to Serbs', sport Montenegrin pillbox hats and Balkan moustaches. Many believe they are the same people, day after day, perhaps no more than 200, who pop up in each town to whip up the masses." (The Times, 1988b) The report went on to describe "well-known techniques of stimulating mass hysteria", reiterating the same fears that party officials of the old guard proclaimed: "It remains to be seen whether Mr. Milošević will bequeath anything but a legacy of hatred to Yugoslav politics."

The protests themselves helped Milošević solidify his power and allowed him to challenge those politicians who opposed him or his nationalist message, as demonstrated by his attempt to unseat Stipe Šušar (Financial Times, 1989d). Examples of this tactic abound, beginning as early as the fall of 1987, when the Belgrade City head of the Serbian League of Communists, Dragiša Pavlović, and the President of Serbia, Ivan Stambolić, were ousted less than a fortnight after warning of fermenting Serbian nationalism (Auerswald and Auerswald, 2000). Milošević also succeeded on a larger level: protests by tens of thousands in Novi Sad

caused the resignation of the entire Vojvodinan parliament (October 6, 1988; New York Times, 1988c; The Times, 1988d), and over 100'000 protesters in Titograd led to the mass resignation of the presidencies of Montenegro and the local Communist Party (January 11, 1989; The Times, 1989b). In connection with the forced resignation of the heads of the Kosovo government³ and subsequent efforts to install leaders loyal to Mr. Milošević in all three locations, this implied that the leadership of both provinces and both republics most closely affiliated with Serbian interests are under his control.

The protests fostered fear and ultimately the will to commit violence in defence. This *Toronto Star* report from early October 1988 quoted a young Serb at a protest rally in Belgrade: “‘These people [Kosovo-Albanians] rape our women, sabotage our industry, and steal our land. We should get rid of them all,’ said Misha” (*Toronto Star*, 1988). The *Sunday Times* found similar sentiments and reported that Kosovo-Serbs were arming themselves already in mid-September of 1988 in the Serbian village of Prekale not far from Priština and the Albanian border. “At night, vigilantes drawn from the village’s 22 Serbian families patrol the streets. [...] People here remember only too well that seven years ago several people died in ethnic rivalry. Then the victims were Serbs, and a number of Albanians ended up before a firing squad” (*The Sunday Times*, 1988a).

Kosovo-Albanians were the first to react to the ongoing series of nationalist Serbian protests, after two leaders of the Kosovo government were forced to resign (*New York Times*, 1988a). The situation escalated and first episodes of violence occurred after Kosovo and Vojvodina lost their status as autonomous provinces (*The Times*, 1989a; Auerswald and Auerswald, 2000).

This did not seem to perturb Slobodan Milošević, who continued to address Serbian rallies that were carefully balanced between strengthening the Serbian identity and not attacking the Yugoslav identity. An example of a speech given in early 1989:

“Comrades, comrades, there is no price or force that can undermine the Serbian leadership and the citizens of Serbia in their fight for just causes. Comrades, be assured, be assured, as I am convinced that in the fight for justice, equality, socialism, and Yugoslavia, every Yugoslav, regardless of his nationality, in every one of our republics, all our peoples and nationalities [...]” (February 28; Foreign Broadcast Information Service, 1989, cited in Auerswald and Auerswald, 2000, p. 25).

Despite the initially careful rhetoric, a build-up can be found in the speeches. On June 28, 1989, Milošević spoke at the memorial of the Battle of Kosovo, commemorating the 600th anniversary of the battle in which Serbs were defeated by Turks (*Financial Times*, 1989e). Again, the *leitmotiv* was a reawakening of Serbia: “Through the play of history and life, it seems as if Serbia has, precisely in this year, in 1989, regained its state and its dignity [...]” (Auerswald and Auerswald,

2000, p. 30). He continued to criticize the lack of unity and incidences of betrayal throughout Serbian history, addressing not only the Battle of Kosovo, but also World War II and present-day Yugoslavia.

A substantial part of the speech was used to argue against division, but eventually, the threat of ethno-nationalism and violent conflict was directly addressed:

“Serbia has never had only Serbs living in it. Today, more than in the past, members of other peoples and nationalities also live in it. This is not a disadvantage for Serbia. I am truly convinced that it is its advantage. [...] Socialism in particular, being a progressive and just democratic society, should not allow people to be divided in the national and religious respect.”

“The threat is that the question of one nation being endangered by the others can be posed one day—and this can then start a wave of suspicions, accusations, and intolerance, a wave that invariably grows and is difficult to stop—has been hanging like a sword over [different nations’] heads all the time.”

“Six centuries later, now, we are being again engaged in battles and are facing battles. They are not armed battles, although such things cannot be excluded yet” (Auerswald and Auerswald, 2000, pp. 30, 32 and 33, respectively).

It should be noted that throughout this period, the promotion of the Serbian identity was done in reference to only one out-group, Kosovo-Albanians, and in relation to an ongoing conflict considered real and threatening by Kosovo-Serbs. Moreover, the above statements highlight that the detractors of Mr. Milošević were not alone in their realization of the risk in activating nationalistic identities in Yugoslavia—he himself exhibited a clear understanding of the kinds of processes he was promoting.

8.3 Reform Processes (1989–1990)

A distinct change of pace can be felt in mid-1989. Concrete political reforms were being initiated, as shown by Serbian drafts proposals to allow for “political pluralism, the codification of guarantees of civil and individual freedoms and curtailment of the dominant position of the Communist Party” (July 25, 1989; *New York Times*, 1989). Such reforms were mirrored in the other republics, with constitutional amendments enabling free elections being passed.

Simultaneously, the attention of the public seemed to shift from nationalist rhetoric to concrete concerns over the economic situation: “Thousands of Yugoslavs marched Sunday against poverty and runaway inflation, warning Communist leaders that hungry workers are ready to take matters into their own

hands" (Reuters News Agency, 1989c). "It now appears that while the nationalist tensions continue to exist, there is growing evidence that Yugoslavs are becoming increasingly impatient with the economic crisis" (Financial Times, 1989a).

This deviation from a predominantly nationalist discourse was considered by some observers as a threat to Milošević's power, with politicians at the federal level regaining the initiative. In late October 1989, an observer for the *Financial Times* diagnosed the waning influence of Mr. Milošević and compared him to Yugoslavian Prime Minister Ante Marković: "The upshot is that Mr. Milošević can neither match Mr. Marković's economic competence, nor his popularity, except by bringing the people out into the streets. But to what purpose? The nationalist tension, engendered by Serbia, is not as sharp as it was a few months ago. Besides, even if Mr. Milošević were to accuse Mr. Marković of not introducing a 'shock therapy' anti-inflation plan, the Serbian president has no alternative policies that would not risk alienating his supporters" (Financial Times, 1989c).

Despite the reduction in nationalist fervor, lasting damage had been done already. By this time, Serbia was seen as isolated (Financial Times, 1989c) and other republics, particularly Slovenia and Croatia, were considering independence. The Yugoslavian redistributive system included capital flows from the economically better-performing republics in the North to other regions (Lake and Rothchild, 1996), providing economic incentives to considerations of independence. However, when Slovenia introduced free elections, strengthened its right to secede by referendum (Financial Times, 1989f) and prohibited a Serbian protest rally in its capital Ljubljana, Serbia interrupted the trade relationship with Slovenia in an unprecedented and unconstitutional move, further escalating the situation (Reuters News Agency, 1989b). This conflict continued at the party congress of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia, where Serbia blocked Slovenian moves towards a democratic opening of the party itself, causing a walkout of the Slovenian delegation (Financial Times, 1990b).

Moreover, there was a beginning fight for control of the media. A shared media landscape has the potential to moderate political discourse because it provides a larger, more diverse audience. The media was never truly shared in Yugoslavia, as "even during Tito's era, Yugoslavia was characterized by low levels of cross-ethnic and inter-public communication, with strong divisions along ethnic lines" (Jusić, 2009, p. 29). However, the divisions were now growing: "Liberalization of the media scene in the early 1990s further complicated the situation as ruling elites gained control over the newly emerging media, or created media for their own political purposes" (Jusić, 2009, p. 30), thereby creating communication channels directed only at their core constituencies and removing any incentives to moderate their messages.

In this second phase, we see that the nationalist dynamic had taken on a life of its own. While protests and violence flared up repeatedly in Kosovo, such as on the occasion of a trial against Kosovo-Albanian leaders (Financial Times, 1989b), they were no longer driven by organized series of rallies and speech campaigns.

However, Serbian nationalism in the first period had stimulated fears in the surrounding republics that caused both political opposition by the other republics and political support for local nationalism, as will become visible in the next period.

8.4 Breaking Up (1990–1991)

Slovenia and Croatia were the first to organize democratic multiparty elections,⁴ far in advance of the other republics who only followed suit in the fall of 1990.⁵

In reaction to the growing animosities between Serbia and the rest of Yugoslavia, local nationalists were set to dominate the elections. “The explosion of Croatian nationalism, which has been exploited by Mr. Tuđman and the HDZ, resembles the nationalist fervour stirred up in Serbia by Mr. Slobodan Milošević, the Serbian leader. Essentially, the HDZ has managed to harness the widespread hostility to neighbouring Serbia, the largest republic, and the privileged position of the Serbian minority in Croatia” (Financial Times, 1990a).

Not surprisingly, the political campaigns also included the clear use of the media to present advantageous definitions of ethnicity. Especially during the first round of elections before the victorious HDZ moderated itself to attract more voters in the second round, “ethnic sentiments of the electorate were extensively manipulated and exploited by the parties that competed for the status of central, ‘the most Croatian’ and the most popular.” (Đurić and Zorić, 2009, p. 64–65). The ongoing nationalist mobilization in Croatia was now regarded with worry in Serbia: “In its coverage of the elections in Croatia the Serbian press repeatedly dwelt on a set of inflammatory and divisive statements made by HDZ leader Franjo Tuđman. These were interpreted as supporting evidence for their own negative constructions of political and ethnic otherness” (Đurić and Zorić, 2009, p. 66).

Both in Slovenia and Croatia, the communists were roundly defeated and the emboldened Mr. Tuđman celebrated his victory by making clearly separatist statements: “We want to establish Croatian sovereignty [...] The Croatian people wanted it before the war, during the war and they want it today” (Toronto Star, 1990a). Due to the direct reference to World War II and the violent conflict surrounding Croatian *Ustaše* separatists, such statements could only be perceived as threats by the local Serbian minority.

Tuđman’s demands for “historical justice” and Croatian threats of secession lead to an early precursor of the civil war when the predominantly Serbian inhabitants of Knin in Croatian Dalmatia contemplated the possibility of becoming a threatened minority in a Croatian nation-state: “In recent months Serbs in Knin have become alarmed by a post-Communist flush of Croatian nationalism. [...] People here remember World War II, when some Croats collaborated with Nazis in setting up the [*Ustaše*] government. Under that regime, tens of thou-

sands of Serbs - many of them from the Knin area - were murdered. The new Croatian government has begun to fly a flag similar to that flown by the [*Ustaše*]" (Toronto Star, 1990b). The inhabitants of Knin decided to take matters into their own hands, arming themselves, throwing up road blocks and threatening to secede from Croatia. Police helicopters sent by the Croatian government were prevented from intervening by MiG fighter jets dispatched from Belgrade. While the situation was resolved without bloodshed, it was a first sign of things yet to come.

Some argue that the incident itself was orchestrated to serve as a symbol of an outside threat to Serbs. Gagnon (2004, p. 143) puts the blame entirely on Milošević, claiming that the events were "stage-managed from Belgrade" and providing evidence to that effect. Even at the time, there was general agreement that such behavior would be to Milošević's benefit: "According to Western diplomats and many Yugoslav analysts, Milošević's best hope of overcoming his doctrinaire past is to stir up ethnic trouble. 'In a period of peace, Milošević's popularity declines,' said Vladimir Gligorav, an economist and leader of an opposition party in Belgrade. 'But if there is trouble, his popularity rises. Serbs rally around him. He needs constant conflict'" (Toronto Star, 1990b). And indeed, there is substantial pressure against Mr. Milošević in Serbia, with recurring protest marches calling for his resignation. "Pictures of Mr. Milošević were carried by the crowd, but with his face crossed out and the slogan, 'We don't want another dictator'" (New York Times, 1990; see also Financial Times, 1990c for continued reporting).

There were other instances of local populations arming themselves and preparing for violent conflict, and often, local leaders with potential ties to Belgrade were directly involved (cf. Judah, 1997 and Melander, 2009 for a discussion thereof). But it is not necessarily clear to what extent these incidents were directed from afar and to what extent they were initiated locally out of concrete security worries. In the case of Knin, the nationalist rhetoric and the symbols used by Franjo Tuđman's HDZ communicated a direct threat of violence to the Serbian minority. It stands to reason that some—even the same—defensive reaction could have occurred without any encouragement. Judah (1997, p. 195) argues that some of the offensive moves by the Serbian population, such as firing guns on public holidays, were meant as defensive signalling, quoting a Serbian inhabitant of a muslim quarter of Sarajevo: "We were much more afraid than they were" (cited in Melander, 2009, p. 101).

From this point forward, the dynamic seems to resemble an *ethnic security dilemma*, with all sides seeing the world through the lens of nationalism that had reasserted itself in prior years. Security worries existed on all sides, with every side concerned that they would be the victims if they did not choose to be the perpetrators (Melander, 2009). This led to many acts that may have been intended to be defensive, but that had an inherent offensive potential, such as the impounding of heavy weapons on Croatian territory by the *Jugoslovenska Narodna Armija* in October 1990 (Yugoslav People's Army, JNA; see Posen, 1993a).

The security worries were supported by a gradual shift in the media. In a comparative study of TV reports from Ljubljana and Belgrade, Mihelj, Bajt, and Pankov (2009) find that “deictic expressions signalling attachment to a wider Yugoslav ‘we’, still so unambiguously present in 1988, had by this time [1991] almost disappeared” (p. 49) and that actors from other ethnic groups were portrayed negatively. For instance, “Slovenian representatives are now recurrently bunched together with Croatian ones, and collectively described as internal enemies” in reports by TV Belgrade (p. 51).⁶

It should be noted that large parts of the population were oriented towards peace, and that resistance to nationalists continued long after all republics had held elections that strengthened the nationalist dynamic. In Serbia, there were well-organized protests by thousands of people against Milošević’s politics: “They called Mr. Milošević ‘Saddam’ and ‘Stalin’”, leading the Serbian government to declare a state of emergency despite the peaceful nature of the protests and to portray the internal opposition as the acts of foreign powers trying to destabilize Serbia (Financial Times, 1991).

In the end, the spiral of violence proved to be stronger than the de-escalation efforts. On June 25, 1991, Slovenia declared independence and the Croatian parliament voted in favor of independence, triggering the activation of the JNA on June 26 and the beginning of armed violence on June 27. While the first armed conflict between the remainder of Yugoslavia and the newly independent Slovenia was resolved in less than a fortnight, it was followed by massacres and eventually war in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina with over 100’000 estimated victims.

8.5 Discussion

The Yugoslavian case provides support for all three theories, each of which will now be discussed.

A number of factors indicate that there is a process of *elite manipulation*. For instance, increases in the occurrence of nationalist protests in Serbia and its provinces seem to coincide clearly with the times when Slobodan Milošević needed to strengthen his power. In 1987–1989, when he was climbing the career ladder and removing political opponents from office, he was clearly associated with a long series of well-attended protest rallies with clearly nationalistic messages. Once his power was temporarily secure, these events seemed to disappear until he was threatened with removal from power, both before and after the 1990 elections in Serbia. The correlation between threats to Mr. Milošević’s personal power and waves of nationalism was not lost on observers at that time: “If there is trouble, [Milošević’s] popularity rises. Serbs rally around him. He needs constant conflict” (Financial Times, 1990c). The same holds true for proponents of nationalism in the other republics, particularly for Franjo Tuđman’s rise to power,

and both sides are actively helping each other by presenting the ideal threatening opponent.

Moreover, there is clear evidence that individual steps of escalation were pre-planned, including the seizure of military assets by the JNA, the capture of broadcasting towers, etc. While this could be diligent planning for worst-case eventualities rather than the active seeking of such an outcome, evidence of agitators at rallies, potential instigation of the Knin incident, and the distribution of weapons even to citizens who still had to be convinced of their need seem to indicate that there was more to this than just well-meaning protection of the own population.

A final point in support of *elite manipulation* is that fact that Slobodan Milošević, who was mostly associated with the old communist system and had only recently started a nationalist campaign, was able to stay in power when communists all over Yugoslavia were voted out of office. He, on the other hand, was even able to sideline other nationalists with much stronger credibility, such as Vuk Drasković, the author of multiple books on the threat to Serbs and a well-established nationalist figure. Both Mr. Milošević's association with the old communist system and his relatively young credentials as a nationalist should have weakened him and kept him from overtaking his much more popular challengers. It may be a tribute to his control of the situation that he was able to stay in power against all expectations and in the face of substantial protests.

At the same time, a large part of the events can also be explained using the dynamics of an *ethnic security dilemma*. Serbian nationalism reasserts itself much earlier than in other republics, and its only reference point during the first period is clearly the security situation in Kosovo. Nationalism elsewhere in Yugoslavia seems to always be conceived in opposition to Serbia, both in relation to the strong role of Serbs in the Yugoslavian Federation generally⁷ and to the threatening tone of Serbian nationalism of the previous years. In the third period, Serbian nationalism then reorients itself in opposition to the newly nationalist and potentially secessionist republics, rather than the comparatively smaller threat in Kosovo. But in all three steps, nationalist propaganda orients itself along actual conflict lines, strongly suggesting that this may not be a diversion.

Given that there is evidence both in favor of *elite manipulation* and of an *ethnic security dilemma*, this suggests that neither dynamic is truly applicable. Instead, Yugoslavia can be interpreted as a case of the *elite selection* dynamic. Two pieces of evidence support this claim. Firstly, while Slobodan Milošević had a clear head start because he was agitating from within the Communist Party before the political landscape had opened sufficiently to allow real political competition, nationalists appear in all republics as soon as democratization sets in and campaigns for public office become possible. The presence of nationalist candidates and their success at the ballot box indicates that they are answering a real need of the population.⁸ As discussed before, all nationalist campaigns are always in relation to perceived threats grounded in reality—can campaigning on such topics really be considered manipulation or diversion? More importantly,

the presence of this threat and popular calls for a politician to address them predates Slobodan Milošević's skillful rhetoric: his first nationalist speech was in reaction to protests by the Serbian inhabitants of Kosovo that precede his arrival on the political scene.

While Mr. Milošević clearly was a cunning politician that knew how to work an audience, and while he had certainly enjoyed a first-mover advantage and privileged access to state tools including the media, it should be clear that he was addressing a real issue. Admittedly, this issue was localized at first, which can explain why surveys of the entire Yugoslavian population (as quoted by Gagnon, 2004) do not show concerns about threats to be very strong. However, local reporting and the effectiveness of the threat-centric message of the nationalists shows that the security worries in the affected areas differed substantially from the national average. Moreover, the intensity of the reaction by inhabitants outside the directly affected areas indicates that security worries resonated on a nation-wide scale, which is not surprising given prior episodes of ethno-nationalist violence.

Although no proponent of *elite manipulation* would suggest that the identity dimensions to be manipulated are pulled from thin air, even the weaker argument that the manipulated identities did not matter politically until the diversion set in seems too strong. At least in the case of Yugoslavia, continuing incidents of inter-ethnic animosity can be found before the first nationalist rhetoric sets in, and such events were usually associated with a substantial outcry from the general population. The effectiveness of Mr. Milošević's message and the fact that nationalism in other republics does not truly take hold until a few years of Serbian nationalism gave a convincing foundation to worries of a Greater Serbia suggest that security worries were present well in advance and that they served to attract (and reward) politicians who campaigned on these matters.

8.6 Chapter Summary

This chapter has presented the political developments in Yugoslavia from the first episodes of mass mobilization in 1987 until the secession of Slovenia and the outbreak of armed violence that marks the beginning of the Yugoslavian Wars.

Three phases could be distinguished. Between 1987 and 1989, Slobodan Milošević was the key driver behind a Serbian nationalist reawakening that expressed itself through a long series of rallies with messages of Serbian unity and alarm at the perceived threat posed by Kosovo-Albanians to the Serbian minority in the province. The protests served to elevate Mr. Milošević to the presidency of Serbia and allowed him to install officials loyal to him across Serbia, Vojvodina, Kosovo and Montenegro. In the second phase, the opening of the political system allowed for political competition in other Yugoslavian republics, where local nationalists profited from popular concern at the sabre-rattling and

expanding influence of Mr. Milošević and allowed them to come to power on an anti-Serbian platform. In the third phase, nationalism in Croatia, Slovenia and Bosnia-Herzegovina led to a reorientation of Serbian nationalism in opposition to the republics, allowing Mr. Milošević to retain political power while communists lost all other elections, and steering the country on a confrontation course between the republics that eventually led to the break-up of Yugoslavia and the outbreak of large-scale violence.

Even though there is substantial and well-executed nationalist propaganda on all sides, it is rooted in concrete threats perceived by the population at all times, suggesting that the ongoing process is not one of diverting or manipulating the public, but one of skilful campaigning on well-established matters of public concern.

Notes

¹For example, a rally on July 10, 1988 in Novi Sad, Vojvodina, protested the refusal of Vojvodinan authorities to cede authority to Serbia (St. Louis Post-Dispatch, 1988).

²Consider a rally on June 26, 1988 in Belgrade, where 1'000 Kosovo-Serbs and -Montenegrins protested the situation in their home province (New York Times, 1988b).

³The resignation took place on November 17, 1988, (New York Times, 1988a; Foreign Broadcast Information Service, 1988, cited in Auerswald and Auerswald, 2000). An earlier attempt to unseat the same officials was rebuked in October 1989 (The Times, 1988c).

⁴Slovene elections took place on April 8 and 22, 1990, Croatian elections followed on April 22–23 and May 6–7, 1990.

⁵Serbia held elections already in November of 1989, but while these elections were secret and featured multiple candidates, no party other than the Communist Party was allowed to participate.

⁶Efforts by all sides to control the media continue right until the outbreak of violence, as shown by the seizure of broadcasting towers for the shared TV and radio station RTV Sarajevo by Serbs residing in Bosnia-Herzegovina with support from the JNA already in August 1991 (Jusić, 2009).

⁷75% of the officer corps of the JNA was of Serbian nationality and the Serbian population was twice as large as the second-largest population group

⁸Here, I disagree with Kaufman's (2001) assessment. In his assessment, Kaufman recognizes the interconnected nature of the security dilemmas, but sees it as evidence of a top-down logic. However, the narrative described in this chapter shows that bottom-up signalling preceded elite rhetoric.

Conclusion

9.1 Introduction

Democratization periods are times of hope, promising broad public participation in the political process, greater focus on economic and human development and in the longer run, peaceful prosperity. But these high expectations are not always fulfilled. Instead, countries moving towards democracy can succumb to a brutal civil war along the way. The source of the elevated risk of conflict is argued to be the democratization process itself. This includes the influence that political leaders can have in either guiding their country safely through the period of heightened risk—or driving it to the brink of war.

This dissertation has addressed the question of how much influence political leaders have on the likelihood of civil-war onset in ethnically heterogeneous, democratizing countries. This chapter summarizes the theoretical, methodological and empirical contributions of this dissertation before concluding with a discussion of the resulting policy implications.

9.2 Key Contributions

This dissertation makes theoretical, methodological and empirical contributions to the study of conflict risk during democratization periods. This section summarizes the proposed theory of *elite selection*, the new method of identifying democratization periods using the “period finder,” and mixed-methods evidence in favor of the *elite selection* theory.

Firstly, this dissertation proposes a new theory, *elite selection*, that explains why democratization periods are associated with a higher risk of civil-war onset than other times in a country’s history. It does so by investigating the role played by political leaders.

So far, the literature on the influence of political elites has been dominated by two theories situated at the opposite ends of the same scale: the theory of *elite manipulation* argues that political leaders carry most of the blame for the outbreak of violent conflict when they divert public discourse towards potential outside threats that strengthen their personal campaign for political power. Proponents of the *ethnic security dilemma* argue instead that political leaders cannot be blamed for conflicts arising from the nature of the situation itself: ethnic groups without a protecting force in a potentially threatening environment will simply seek to protect themselves, causing a spiral towards violence that works without the influence of political leaders.

I have claimed that neither of these theories can adequately explain the heightened risk of conflict during democratization since they are equally (if not more) applicable to a much broader set of situations. An alternative explanation is needed that takes the specific dynamic of a democratization process into account, and this dissertation proposes and tests such a theory.

I have argued that the necessity to define the *demos* while initiating intense political competition leads to a process wherein the public needs to address its concerns over the potential behavior of other ethnic groups, and political leaders face incentives for campaigning on these worries. While not denying the importance of *ethnic security dilemmas*, this theory gives political leaders a clear role in the situation. But the process described by the theory of *elite selection* does not focus solely on top-down communication. Instead—and in contrast to the *elite manipulation* theory—political leaders are argued to be responsive to bottom-up stimuli from the public, and perceptive to existing security worries that may make good campaign topics.

In order to test the theory of *elite selection* in comparison to the theories of *elite manipulation* and *ethnic security dilemma*, I have employed a mixed methods approach. Part I was dedicated to a quantitative assessment of factors theoretically associated with a higher risk of civil-war onset to show whether they truly follow this pattern on a global scale. According to the logic of the *elite selection* theory, three factors should coincide with a higher incidence of conflict onset: democratization, politicization of ethnicity such as the use of ethnicity to exclude or discriminate people, and a risk to the incumbent indicating competition for political power.

To conduct this test, it was necessary to accurately identify democratization periods. As part of this dissertation, I have contributed to the development of a novel method for identifying such periods that clearly improves on early, more rigid methods. The period finder discards approaches focusing only on changes in regime-type categories or scores and instead identifies periods of stability, during which changes to the regime type are so small that they cannot affect the nature of the regime. By comparing different stable periods in a country's history, it becomes possible to determine whether an actual move towards democracy has occurred.

Moreover, it was necessary to develop an estimator for the risk to the position of the incumbent to identify periods during which there can be an ongoing competition for political power, and during which political leaders have a potential incentive to manipulate the public. Regression analysis on irregular removals of incumbents has revealed two highly significant factors at the country-level: ongoing transition periods and a prior history of similar events. An indicator based on the predicted probability of an irregular removal was prepared on the basis of these results.

The final regression analysis found significant, positive influences of all three factors on the likelihood of civil-war onset. While this cannot be considered proof of any particular theory regarding the causal process, it confirms that all components hypothesized to matter for the *elite selection* theory do play a role.

In Part II, I followed up the initial positive evidence from the quantitative study by presenting qualitative tests of the causal relationships described in the theories of *elite manipulation*, *elite selection* and *ethnic security dilemma*. Two detailed studies of most-likely cases investigated the roles played by relevant political actors.

The Burundian democratization attempt of 1988–1993 shows commendable behavior by all political leaders in a very careful and well-grounded democratization process. It also shows the limits of elite influence when horrific violence breaks out despite vast support for national unity from the population and active efforts from all leaders to bridge divisions. This suggests that it may be substantially more difficult to overcome ethnic divisions than it is to create them. It also highlights the need to actively address security risks among the population.

The democratization and eventual break-up of Yugoslavia between 1987 and 1991 highlights the extent to which political leaders in Yugoslavia were broadcasting divisive messages, but finds that nationalist rhetoric always occurred in direct relation to security concerns that were clearly perceived by the population, and that should therefore not be considered as a manipulation.

While two case studies do not allow for sweeping generalizations, the conflict dynamic observed in Burundi and Yugoslavia suggest that the *elite manipulation* theory may be overstating its case. In both cases, no political leader broadcast a diversionary message. In Burundi, political leaders on all sides broadcast strongly unifying messages, even though the incumbent faced a clear threat not only to his power but also to his life, while opposition candidates could have been forgiven for harboring resentment after decades of discrimination and violence. The only reported use of ethnicity for political gain is a clear repudiation of divisive conceptions of ethnicity. In Yugoslavia, numerous politicians beginning with Slobodan Milošević run ethnicity-based campaigns of a divisive nature, but they never try to raise the spectre of a conflict that is not already relevant. It is clear that the likes of Messrs. Milošević and Tuđman face few scruples in talking up conflict, yet their capability to do so seems limited to conflicts that already exist.

This corresponds closely to the theory of *elite selection*, but follow-up research into additional cases and cross-case comparisons will be needed before general validity of this theory can be claimed.

The theoretical and empirical contributions of this dissertation have policy implications for actors seeking to foster democratization in ways that do not lead to violence. They are presented in the following section.

9.3 Policy Implications

The case studies of this dissertation provide two lessons of value to policy-makers. Firstly, political leaders clearly play a role in determining whether a country is headed towards war or not, but their influence may be limited particularly when it comes to avoiding war. The Burundian case studies shows that despite the best efforts by political leaders on all sides, the escalation of violence is still possible. While the strong campaigns for national unity by both the incumbent and opposition are highly commendable, avoiding to directly address potential security worries in word and action may have left a dangerous tool of escalation unchecked. Both outgoing President Buyoya and incoming President Ndadaye left the army and police under Tutsi control, hoping that inaction in this area would sufficiently reassure the Tutsi. Instead, the police and army became tools of escalation precisely because they had been left unchecked, and those in control of army and police never had to enter political discourse before driving the country into a horrific civil war. While it is uncertain whether openly addressing the problem, sharing control over army and police, and allowing Hutu to join both forces would have been able to prevent their use as escalation tools. Indeed, tackling such a sensitive issue may have brought about conflict much earlier. But leaving the most potent tools of state power outside of the process and in the hands of the group that stood to lose from the transition process without any safe-guards against their abuse seems unwise to say the least. Actors seeking to escalate the situation were then able to do just that without even having to enter the public arena. Political leaders seeking to do good have the power to reason and to convince, but this power may not be enough when it has to compete with guns.

Secondly, ethnic divisions are powerful factors in determining whether a country will go forward as one nation or not. Political leaders are the linchpin that can make a reasoned argument for either option, and they can do so in a confrontational or in a cooperative way. Setting the right incentives may be crucial in structuring political competition positively during this decisive phase. Two suggestions can be found in the literature and evidence from the Yugoslavian case seem to support them. First, the timing of elections seems crucial. Given that elections will create winners and losers, it seems wise to hold them at a late stage in the democratization process. This gives all sides sufficient time to practice

constructive collaboration, and to design institutional safe-guards that reassure potential losers that they have more to gain by participating as opposition parties in a peaceful political process than by taking up arms and trying to seize power by non-democratic means. Second, election periods should be structured in a way that promotes non-divisive campaigns. Centripetal voting systems provide political candidates with an opportunity to get votes not only from their own constituents, but also secondary votes from the members of other groups. Such incentives can encourage politicians to moderate their message and create political platforms that provide benefits to more than their direct kin, even going so far as to encourage vote pooling and cross-ethnic coalitions. Again, it is not certain whether such systems could have prevented the Yugoslavian slide into civil war—Mr. Milošević started his nationalism-fueled ascent to power years before actual elections were held. But the true escalation coincides with election campaigns across all republics, so that incentives for moderate campaigns could at least have slowed the divisive dynamics, given local and international actors more time to support a peaceful transition.

In future research, I intend to gather additional evidence and provide cross-case comparisons of the political dynamics leading from democratization to conflict, widening the sample to also include cases in which conflict was likely but was avoided.

Appendices

Newly Formed States and their Predecessors

A number of states formed during the post-World War II period as the result of secession or the break-up of their predecessors. For these states, the governance indicators of their predecessors for the five years prior to the establishment of the new state were included in the period-finding analysis to ensure that democratization attempts preceding and overlapping with independence do not go unnoticed.

Country	Year	Predecessor
Armenia	1991	USSR
Azerbaijan	1991	USSR
Belarus	1991	USSR
Bosnia & Herzegovina	1992	Yugoslavia
Croatia	1992	Yugoslavia
Czech Republic	1993	Czechoslovakia
East Timor	2002	Indonesia
Eritrea	1993	Ethiopia
Estonia	1991	USSR
Georgia	1991	USSR
Kazakhstan	1991	USSR
Kyrgyzstan	1991	USSR
Latvia	1991	USSR
Lithuania	1991	USSR
Macedonia	1993	Yugoslavia
Moldova	1991	USSR
Namibia	1990	South Africa

Country	Year	Predecessor
Papua New Guinea	1975	Australia
Russia	1992	USSR
Serbia & Montenegro	1992	Yugoslavia
Slovakia	1993	Czechoslovakia
Slovenia	1992	Yugoslavia
Taiwan	1949	China
Tajikistan	1991	USSR
Turkmenistan	1991	USSR
Ukraine	1991	USSR
Uzbekistan	1991	USSR

Table A.1: Newly formed states and their predecessors

Appendix B

Comparison of Democratization Codings

This appendix provides a tabular overview of the results of different ways to code democratization. The methods to be compared are:

- M&S An upward shift in the Polity IV regime-type category from one year to the next, as used in Mansfield and Snyder (1995a).
- HEGG An upward shift in the Polity IV score by two or more points, as used in Hegre, Ellingsen, Gates, and Gleditsch (2001).
- PF P4 The beginning of a new period as calculated by the period finder using Polity IV without the PARREG component, as used in Cederman, Hug, and Krebs (2010) and chapter 3.
- PF SIP The beginning of a new period as calculated by the period finder using the Scalar Index of Polities, as used in Krebs (2009) and chapter 3.
- CGV A change to “democracy” in the qualitative country coding used in Cheibub, Gandhi, and Vreeland (2009).

To provide a common basis for comparison, the values for the first three indicators have been recalculated using the same version of Polity IV (Marshall and Jaggers, 2009). The countries are grouped by world region as coded by the Minorities at Risk (MAR) project (Minorities at Risk Project, 2009). The results are ordered alphabetically and chronologically.

B.1 Western Democracies & Japan

Country	Year	M&S	HEGG	PF P4	PF SIP	CGV
France	1969	●	●	○	○	○
France	1986	○	○	●	○	○
Greece	1974	—	—	○	○	●
Greece	1975	—	—	●	●	○
Greece	1986	○	●	○	○	○
Ireland	1952	○	●	○	○	○
Portugal	1976	—	—	●	●	●
Spain	1977	—	—	○	○	●
Spain	1978	—	—	●	●	○

Table B.1: Democratization Codings for the Western World

● Democratization coded ○ No democratization coded — No data for current country-year

B.2 Eastern Europe & Former Soviet Union

Country	Year	M&S	HEGG	PF (P4)	PF (SIP)	CGV
Albania	1990	●	●	●	○	○
Albania	1991	○	○	○	●	●
Albania	1992	○	●	●	○	○
Albania	1997	○	●	○	○	○
Albania	2002	●	●	○	—	○
Armenia	1990	—	—	●	○	—
Armenia	1991	—	—	●	●	—
Armenia	1998	●	●	●	●	○
Azerbaijan	1990	—	—	●	○	—
Azerbaijan	1992	○	●	○	●	○
Belarus	1990	—	—	●	○	—
Belarus	1991	—	—	●	●	—
Bosnia & Herzegovina	1996	—	—	—	●	○
Bulgaria	1990	●	●	●	●	●
Croatia	1992	○	○	○	●	○
Croatia	2000	—	—	●	○	○
Czech Republic	1990	—	—	●	●	—
Czechoslovakia	1989	○	○	○	○	●

Country	Year	M&S	HEGG	PF (P4)	PF (SIP)	CGV
Czechoslovakia	1990	●	●	●	●	○
Estonia	1990	—	—	●	○	—
Estonia	1991	—	—	●	●	—
Georgia	1990	—	—	●	○	—
Georgia	1991	—	—	○	●	—
Georgia	1995	○	○	●	○	○
Georgia	2004	●	●	○	—	●
Hungary	1988	●	●	●	○	○
Hungary	1990	—	—	●	●	●
Kazakhstan	1990	—	—	●	○	—
Kyrgyzstan	1990	—	—	●	○	—
Kyrgyzstan	1995	○	○	○	●	○
Latvia	1990	—	—	●	○	—
Latvia	1991	—	—	●	●	—
Lithuania	1990	—	—	●	○	—
Lithuania	1991	—	—	●	●	—
Macedonia	1993	○	○	●	●	○
Macedonia	2002	○	●	○	—	○
Moldova	1990	—	—	●	○	—
Moldova	1992	○	○	○	●	○
Moldova	1993	●	●	●	○	○
Poland	1989	●	●	●	●	●
Poland	1991	●	●	○	○	○
Poland	1995	○	○	●	○	○
Romania	1990	—	—	●	●	●
Romania	1996	●	●	○	○	○
Romania	2004	○	○	●	—	○
Russian Federation	1992	●	●	●	○	○
Russian Federation	2000	●	●	○	○	○
Serbia & Montenegro	2000	●	●	●	●	●
Slovakia	1990	—	—	●	●	—
Slovakia	1998	○	●	○	○	○
Slovenia	1992	○	○	●	●	○
Tajikistan	1990	—	—	●	○	—
Tajikistan	1997	●	○	○	○	○
Tajikistan	1998	○	●	●	○	○
Turkmenistan	1990	—	—	●	○	—
USSR	1953	○	●	○	○	○
USSR	1989	●	●	●	○	○
USSR	1990	○	●	●	●	○
Ukraine	1990	—	—	●	○	—

Country	Year	M&S	HEGG	PF (P4)	PF (SIP)	CGV
Ukraine	1991	—	—	●	●	—
Ukraine	1994	●	●	○	○	○
Uzbekistan	1990	—	—	●	○	—
Yugoslavia	1980	●	●	○	○	○

Table B.2: Democratization Codings for Eastern Europe & FSU

● Democratization coded ○ No democratization coded — No data for current country-year

B.3 Asia

Country	Year	M&S	HEGG	PF (P4)	PF (SIP)	CGV
Afghanistan	1964	○	●	○	○	○
Bangladesh	1978	●	●	○	○	○
Bangladesh	1986	●	●	○	○	●
Bangladesh	1991	●	●	●	●	○
Bhutan	1953	○	●	—	—	○
Cambodia	1972	—	—	●	○	○
Cambodia	1993	—	—	●	●	○
Cambodia	1998	●	●	○	○	○
Fiji	1990	○	●	●	●	○
Fiji	1992	○	○	○	○	●
Fiji	1997	○	○	○	●	○
Fiji	1999	●	○	○	○	○
Fiji	2004	●	○	○	—	○
Indonesia	1998	●	●	○	○	○
Indonesia	1999	●	●	●	●	●
Indonesia	2004	○	●	○	—	○
Malaysia	1971	○	●	○	○	○
Mongolia	1952	○	●	○	○	○
Mongolia	1990	●	●	●	●	●
Mongolia	1992	●	●	●	●	○
Myanmar	1960	○	○	○	○	●
Myanmar	1988	○	●	○	○	○
Nepal	1957	—	—	●	●	○
Nepal	1981	●	●	●	○	○
Nepal	1990	○	●	●	●	●
Nepal	1999	●	○	○	○	○

Country	Year	M&S	HEGG	PF (P4)	PF (SIP)	CGV
Pakistan	1948	○	●	○	○	○
Pakistan	1949	○	●	○	○	○
Pakistan	1951	○	○	○	●	○
Pakistan	1956	●	●	●	○	○
Pakistan	1962	●	●	●	○	○
Pakistan	1972	—	—	○	○	●
Pakistan	1973	—	—	●	●	○
Pakistan	1985	●	●	○	○	○
Pakistan	1988	●	●	●	●	●
Pakistan	2002	●	○	○	—	○
Philippines	1950	○	●	○	○	○
Philippines	1986	—	—	○	○	●
Philippines	1987	—	—	●	●	○
South Korea	1960	●	●	●	●	●
South Korea	1963	●	●	●	●	○
South Korea	1981	●	●	○	○	○
South Korea	1988	—	—	●	●	●
South Korea	1998	○	●	○	○	○
Sri Lanka	1989	○	○	○	○	●
Sri Lanka	2001	●	○	○	—	○
Taiwan	1987	●	●	●	○	○
Taiwan	1992	●	●	●	●	○
Taiwan	1996	○	○	○	○	●
Thailand	1955	●	●	○	○	○
Thailand	1969	—	—	●	●	○
Thailand	1974	—	—	●	●	○
Thailand	1975	○	○	○	○	●
Thailand	1979	○	○	○	○	●
Thailand	1992	●	●	●	●	●
Timor-Leste	1999	—	—	●	—	—

Table B.3: Democratization Codings for Asia

● Democratization coded ○ No democratization coded — No data for current country-year

B.4 North Africa & Middle East

Country	Year	M&S	HEGG	PF (P4)	PF (SIP)	CGV
Algeria	1989	●	●	●	○	○

Country	Year	M&S	HEGG	PF (P4)	PF (SIP)	CGV
Algeria	1995	●	●	○	●	○
Algeria	2004	○	●	●	—	○
Bahrain	1973	○	●	○	○	○
Cyprus	1974	○	●	○	○	○
Cyprus	1983	○	○	○	○	●
Iran	1982	—	—	●	●	○
Iran	1997	●	●	●	○	○
Jordan	1951	●	●	●	●	○
Jordan	1952	○	●	○	○	○
Jordan	1989	●	●	●	○	○
Jordan	1992	○	●	○	○	○
Kuwait	1981	○	●	○	○	○
Kuwait	1992	○	●	○	○	○
Lebanon	1970	○	●	○	○	○
Morocco	1997	○	○	○	●	○
Syria	1950	●	●	○	○	○
Syria	1954	●	●	●	●	○
Syria	2000	○	●	○	○	○
Tunisia	1987	●	●	○	○	○
Tunisia	1993	○	●	●	○	○
Turkey	1961	—	—	●	○	●
Turkey	1973	●	●	●	●	○
Turkey	1983	●	●	●	●	●
Turkey	1989	○	●	○	○	○
Yemen Arab Republic	1962	●	●	●	○	○
Yemen Arab Republic	1988	●	○	○	○	○

Table B.4: Democratization Codings for North Africa & Middle East

● Democratization coded ○ No democratization coded — No data for current country-year

B.5 Sub-Saharan Africa

Country	Year	M&S	HEGG	PF (P4)	PF (SIP)	CGV
Angola	1997	—	—	●	○	○
Benin	1970	●	●	○	○	○
Benin	1991	—	—	●	●	●
Burkina Faso	1970	●	●	○	○	○

Country	Year	M&S	HEGG	PF (P4)	PF (SIP)	CGV
Burkina Faso	1978	—	—	●	●	○
Burkina Faso	1991	●	●	○	○	○
Burkina Faso	2001	○	●	●	—	○
Burundi	1993	—	—	○	○	●
Burundi	1996	—	—	●	○	○
Burundi	1998	○	●	○	○	○
Cameroon	1992	●	●	○	○	○
Cape Verde	1990	—	—	—	—	●
Central African Republic	1993	●	●	●	●	●
Chad	1975	○	●	○	○	○
Chad	1992	—	—	●	○	○
Chad	1996	○	●	○	○	○
Comoros	1990	●	●	●	●	●
Comoros	2002	○	●	●	—	○
Comoros	2004	●	●	○	—	●
Congo	1992	—	—	●	●	●
Congo	2001	●	○	○	—	○
Côte d'Ivoire	1999	—	—	○	●	○
Côte d'Ivoire	2000	—	—	●	○	○
Djibouti	1999	●	●	●	●	○
Equatorial Guinea	1993	●	●	○	○	○
Ethiopia	1994	—	—	○	●	○
Ethiopia	1995	—	—	●	○	○
Gabon	1991	—	—	●	○	○
Gambia	1997	●	○	○	●	○
Ghana	1966	○	●	○	○	○
Ghana	1969	—	—	○	○	●
Ghana	1970	—	—	●	●	○
Ghana	1979	—	—	●	●	●
Ghana	1992	—	—	●	●	○
Ghana	1993	○	○	○	○	●
Ghana	1996	○	●	○	○	○
Ghana	2001	●	●	●	—	○
Ghana	2004	○	●	○	—	○
Guinea	1984	○	●	○	○	○
Guinea	1991	●	●	●	○	○
Guinea	1995	○	●	○	○	○
Guinea	1997	○	○	○	●	○
Guinea-Bissau	1991	○	●	○	○	○
Guinea-Bissau	1994	●	●	●	●	○
Guinea-Bissau	2000	—	—	○	○	●

Country	Year	M&S	HEGG	PF (P4)	PF (SIP)	CGV
Guinea-Bissau	2004	○	○	○	—	●
Kenya	1991	●	●	○	○	○
Kenya	1997	○	●	●	●	○
Kenya	1998	○	○	○	○	●
Kenya	2002	●	●	●	—	○
Lesotho	1973	○	●	○	○	○
Lesotho	1993	●	●	●	●	○
Liberia	1997	—	—	●	●	○
Madagascar	1992	—	—	●	●	○
Madagascar	1993	○	○	○	○	●
Malawi	1994	●	●	●	●	●
Malawi	2004	●	○	○	—	○
Mali	1992	—	—	●	●	●
Mozambique	1994	●	●	●	●	○
Niger	1992	—	—	●	●	○
Niger	1993	○	○	○	○	●
Niger	1999	●	●	●	○	○
Niger	2000	○	○	○	○	●
Nigeria	1979	—	—	●	●	●
Nigeria	1989	●	●	○	○	○
Nigeria	1999	—	—	●	●	●
Rwanda	2000	●	●	○	○	○
São Tomé & Príncipe	1991	—	—	—	—	●
Senegal	1978	●	●	●	○	○
Senegal	2000	●	●	●	●	●
Sierra Leone	1968	●	●	○	○	○
Sierra Leone	1996	●	●	●	●	●
Sierra Leone	1998	—	—	○	○	●
Sierra Leone	2002	—	—	●	—	○
South Africa	1994	—	—	●	○	○
Sudan	1965	—	—	●	●	●
Sudan	1986	—	—	●	●	●
Tanzania	1995	●	●	●	○	○
Tanzania	2000	○	●	○	○	○
Togo	1993	—	—	●	○	○
Uganda	1980	—	—	●	●	●
Uganda	1993	●	●	○	○	○
Uganda	1996	○	○	○	●	○
Zambia	1991	●	●	●	●	○
Zambia	2001	○	●	●	—	○
Zimbabwe	2000	●	○	○	○	○

Table B.5: Democratization Codings for Sub-Saharan Africa

● Democratization coded ○ No democratization coded — No data for current country-year

B.6 Latin America & Caribbean

Country	Year	M&S	HEGG	PF (P4)	PF (SIP)	CGV
Argentina	1957	—	—	●	●	○
Argentina	1958	○	○	○	○	●
Argentina	1963	○	○	○	○	●
Argentina	1973	●	●	●	●	●
Argentina	1983	●	●	●	●	●
Bolivia	1978	●	●	○	○	○
Bolivia	1979	○	○	○	○	●
Bolivia	1982	●	●	●	●	●
Brazil	1958	●	○	○	○	○
Brazil	1974	●	●	●	○	○
Brazil	1985	●	●	●	●	●
Chile	1955	○	●	○	○	○
Chile	1964	●	○	●	○	○
Chile	1970	○	○	○	●	○
Chile	1988	●	●	●	○	○
Chile	1989	●	●	●	●	○
Chile	1990	○	○	○	○	●
Colombia	1957	●	●	●	●	○
Colombia	1958	○	○	○	○	●
Colombia	1974	○	○	○	●	○
Costa Rica	1949	○	○	○	○	●
Cuba	1961	—	—	●	○	○
Dominican Republic	1961	—	—	●	○	○
Dominican Republic	1962	—	—	○	●	○
Dominican Republic	1966	—	—	●	○	●
Dominican Republic	1978	●	●	●	●	○
Dominican Republic	1996	●	●	○	○	○
Ecuador	1948	○	●	○	●	●
Ecuador	1968	○	●	●	●	○
Ecuador	1979	●	●	●	●	●
Ecuador	2002	○	○	○	—	●
El Salvador	1950	—	—	●	●	○
El Salvador	1956	●	○	○	○	○
El Salvador	1960	○	●	○	○	○
El Salvador	1964	○	●	●	○	○

Country	Year	M&S	HEGG	PF (P4)	PF (SIP)	CGV
El Salvador	1984	—	—	●	●	●
Grenada	1984	—	—	—	—	●
Guatemala	1958	●	○	○	○	●
Guatemala	1966	○	●	●	●	●
Guatemala	1986	—	—	●	●	●
Guatemala	1996	●	●	●	○	○
Guyana	1992	●	●	●	●	○
Haiti	1988	—	—	●	○	○
Haiti	1990	●	●	●	○	○
Haiti	1994	●	●	●	●	○
Honduras	1956	○	●	○	○	○
Honduras	1957	○	○	○	○	●
Honduras	1971	○	○	○	○	●
Honduras	1982	—	—	●	●	●
Honduras	1989	●	○	○	○	○
Mexico	1977	●	●	○	○	○
Mexico	1988	○	●	●	○	○
Mexico	1994	○	●	●	●	○
Mexico	1997	●	●	○	○	○
Mexico	2000	○	●	●	○	●
Nicaragua	1981	—	—	●	○	○
Nicaragua	1984	○	●	○	○	●
Nicaragua	1990	●	●	●	●	○
Nicaragua	1995	○	●	○	○	○
Panama	1949	○	●	○	○	●
Panama	1952	○	○	○	○	●
Panama	1955	○	●	●	●	○
Panama	1982	●	○	○	○	○
Panama	1989	●	●	●	●	●
Paraguay	1947	●	●	○	○	○
Paraguay	1989	●	●	●	●	●
Paraguay	1992	●	●	●	○	○
Peru	1950	●	●	○	○	○
Peru	1956	○	●	●	○	●
Peru	1963	●	●	○	○	●
Peru	1980	—	—	●	●	●
Peru	1993	○	●	○	○	○
Peru	2001	—	—	●	—	●
Suriname	1988	—	—	—	—	●
Suriname	1991	—	—	—	—	●
Uruguay	1952	●	●	●	●	○

Country	Year	M&S	HEGG	PF (P4)	PF (SIP)	CGV
Uruguay	1985	●	●	●	●	●
Venezuela	1958	●	●	●	●	○
Venezuela	1959	○	○	○	○	●
Venezuela	1969	○	●	○	○	○

Table B.6: Democratization Codings for Latin America & Caribbean

● Democratization coded ○ No democratization coded — No data for current country-year

Descriptive Statistics

C.1 Chapter 3: Democratization

C.1.1 Measures Based on Polity IV

Dichotomous Variables

Variable	N	Events	Description
<i>Civil-war onset</i>	6'536	195	Onset of civil war, at least 2 years since last conflict
<i>Democratization</i>			Democratization or democratization attempt...
— t_0	6'536	142	...ending in the current year
— $t_{-3..0}$	6'536	574	...ending in the current or three previous years
<i>Autocratization</i>			Autocratization or autocratization attempt...
— t_0	6'536	85	...ending in the current year
— $t_{-3..0}$	6'536	322	...ending in the current or three previous years

Table C.1: Descriptives for Chapter 3, dichotomous variables based on Polity IV

Continuous Variables

Variable	N	Mean	St. Dev.	Min	Max	Description
<i>Polity IV</i>	6'536	8.991	6.796	0.0	18.0	Polity IV indicator without PARREG, rescaled to run from 0 to 18
<i>Population size</i>	6'536	15.974	1.507	11.9	21.0	Population size (ln, t_{-1})
<i>GDP per capita</i>	6'536	8.202	1.097	5.2	11.3	GDP per capita (ln, t_{-1})
<i>t_{last onset}</i>	6'536	25.251	16.356	1.0	59.0	Time counter since last onset, life of the country or 1946

Table C.2: Descriptives for Chapter 3, continuous variables based on Polity IV

C.1.2 Measures Based on SIP

Dichotomous Variables

Variable	N	Events	Description
<i>Civil-war onset</i>	6'053	183	Onset of civil war, at least 2 years since last conflict
<i>Democratization</i>			Democratization or democratization attempt...
— t_0	6'053	103	... ending in the current year
— $t_{-3..0}$	6'053	416	... ending in the current or three previous years
<i>Autocratization</i>			Autocratization or autocratization attempt...
— t_0	6'053	68	... ending in the current year
— $t_{-3..0}$	6'053	264	... ending in the current or three previous years

Table C.3: Descriptives for Chapter 3, dichotomous variables based on SIP

Continuous Variables

Variable	N	Mean	St. Dev.	Min	Max	Description
<i>SIP</i>	6'053	0.017	0.171	0.0	1.0	Two-dimensional SIP indicator
<i>Population size</i>	6'053	15.907	1.547	11.9	21.0	Population size (ln, t_{-1})
<i>GDP per capita</i>	6'053	8.189	1.097	5.2	11.3	GDP per capita (ln, t_{-1})
$t_{last\ onset}$	6'053	24.094	15.319	1.0	55.0	Time counter since last onset, life of the country or 1946

Table C.4: Descriptives for Chapter 3, continuous variables based on SIP

C.2 Chapter 4: Risk to Incumbent

C.2.1 Dichotomous Variables

Variable	N	Events	Description
<i>Irregular removal</i>	9'493	337	Incumbent removed from office in irregular manner in the current year
<i>Punishment</i>	9'493	354	Incumbent removed from office in current year and punished in direct relation to reign
<i>Gender</i>	9'493	163	Gender of incumbent (female = 1)
<i>Autocratic leader</i>	9'493	1'660	No constraints on the executive (XCONST = 1 in Polity IV)
<i>Prior irregular removal</i>	9'284	4'354	Prior occurrence of irregular removal from power
<i>Prior punishment</i>	9'284	4'551	Prior occurrence of punishment of leader in direct relation to reign
<i>Transition period</i>	9'493	1'029	Ongoing transition period (based on Polity IV periods), transitions beginning after removal of incumbent were excluded

Table C.5: Descriptives for Chapter 4, dichotomous variables

C.2.2 Continuous Variables

Variable	N	Mean	St. Dev.	Min	Max	Description
<i>Age</i>	9'493	56.251	11.448	15	93	Age of incumbent
<i>Time in office</i>	9'493	6.078	7.431	0	47	Years in office (current reign)
<i>Time since last...</i>						Years since the last case of...
— <i>irr. removal</i>	9'493	16.080	14.427	0	58	...irregular removal from power
— <i>punishment</i>	9'493	15.617	14.006	0	58	...punishment of leader in direct relation to reign

Table C.6: Descriptives for Chapter 4, continuous variables

C.3 Chapter 5: Combined Analysis

C.3.1 Dichotomous Variables

Variable	N	Events	Description
<i>Civil-war onset</i>			Onset of civil war,...
— <i>2 yrs.</i>	4'881	126	...at least 2 years since last conflict
— <i>5 yrs.</i>	4'859	104	...at least 5 years since last conflict
— <i>8 yrs.</i>	4'852	97	...at least 8 years since last conflict
<i>Ethnic civil-war onset</i>	4'044	50	Onset of ethnic civil war, at least 10 years since last conflict
<i>Democratization $t_{-3..0}$</i>	4'881	319	Democratization in the current or in the three preceding years
<i>Relevant ethnicity</i>	4'881	3'887	Ethnicity is politically relevant
<i>Transition period</i>	4'881	350	Ongoing transition period (based on Polity IV periods), transitions beginning after removal of the <i>first</i> incumbent in the current year were excluded

Table C.7: Descriptives for Chapter 5, dichotomous variables

C.3.2 Continuous Variables

Variable	N	Mean	St. Dev.	Min	Max	Description
<i>Politicized ethnicity...</i>						Relevant ethnic groups excluded from political power, ...
— <i>by pop. share</i>	4'881	0.165	0.256	0.0	1.0	...based on their population share
— <i>by group share</i>	4'881	0.378	0.325	0.0	1.0	...based on their group share
<i>Threat to incumbent</i>	4'881	0.001	0.004	0.0	0.0	Estimated probability of an irregular removal from office
<i>Time since last...</i>						Years since the last case of...
— <i>irregular removal</i>	4'881	17.089	13.580	0.0	54.0	...irregular removal from power
— <i>punishment</i>	4'881	16.625	13.260	0.0	54.0	...punishment of leader in direct relation to reign
<i>Population size</i>	4'881	15.987	1.384	12.8	21.0	Population size (ln, t_{-1})
<i>GDP per capita</i>	4'881	8.206	1.080	5.2	11.1	GDP per capita (ln, t_{-1})
$t_{last\ onset}$						Time counter since last onset, life of the country or 1946
— <i>2 yrs.</i>	4'881	25.056	14.853	1.0	55.0	— ACD, 2 years intermittency
— <i>5 yrs.</i>	4'859	25.347	14.739	1.0	55.0	— ACD, 5 years intermittency
— <i>8 yrs.</i>	4'852	25.629	14.653	1.0	55.0	— ACD, 8 years intermittency
— <i>EPR</i>	4'044	29.276	14.557	1.0	55.0	EPR, ethnic civil war, 10 years intermittency

Table C.8: Descriptives for Chapter 5, continuous variables

Robustness Checks

D.1 Chapter 4: Risk to Incumbent

Table D.1 presents three iterations of the models in Table 4.1:

1. The original model using the time since the last occurrence as IV.
2. A modified version using a dummy for any prior occurrence as IV.
3. A modified version using the time since the last occurrence as IV, while excluding all cases without a prior occurrence.

	Irregular Removal			Punishment		
	Original	Excluding	Dummy	Original	Excluding	Dummy
Age	0.004 (0.86)	-0.001 (-0.11)	0.005 (0.84)	0.000 (0.06)	-0.004 (-0.83)	0.004 (0.72)
Gender	-0.202 (-0.38)	-0.453 (-0.86)	-0.506 (-0.85)	-0.096 (-0.21)	-0.263 (-0.58)	-0.309 (-0.60)
Years in Office	0.012 (1.18)	-0.017 (-1.61)	0.011 (0.77)	0.017 (1.89)	-0.004 (-0.37)	0.013 (0.96)
Autocratic leader (t_{-1})	0.383 * (2.56)	0.514 ** (3.29)	0.255 (1.49)	0.296 * (2.07)	0.394 ** (2.67)	0.252 (1.53)
Years since last occurrence	-0.057 *** (-8.15)	-0.059 *** (-5.84)		-0.043 *** (-7.01)	-0.048 *** (-5.20)	
Prior occurrence			0.634 *** (4.98)			0.518 *** (4.25)
Ongoing transition	1.485 *** (11.81)	1.496 *** (11.43)	1.079 *** (7.36)	1.422 *** (11.29)	1.454 *** (11.19)	0.959 *** (6.34)
Constant	-3.344 *** (-11.18)	-3.938 *** (-12.59)	-3.071 *** (-8.87)	-3.184 *** (-10.88)	-3.647 *** (-11.80)	-3.082 *** (-8.90)
N	9'493	4'563	9'284	9'493	4'760	9'284
-2LL	-1322.9	-858.8	-1334.3	-1405.2	-899.0	-1398.1

Table D.1: Leader-year analysis: varying the prior-incident variables T-score in brackets; * p < 0.05 ** p < 0.01 *** p < 0.001

D.2 Chapter 5: Combined Analysis

D.2.1 Varying the DV

Table D.2 presents multiple repetitions of Model 3 from Table 5.1, differing by the dependent variable. The first three columns code the onset of civil war based on ACD with different intermittencies, the last column codes the onset of ethnic civil war with 10 years intermittency. $t_{last\ onset}$ is based on the dependent variable for each model.

	ACD			EPR
	2 yrs.	5 yrs.	8 yrs.	
Democratization	1.345 ***	1.441 ***	1.574 ***	1.479 ***
$t_{-3..0}$	(4.97)	(4.66)	(4.77)	(3.45)
Politicized ethnicity	0.928 **	0.736 *	0.748 *	1.267 **
	(3.20)	(2.39)	(2.41)	(2.88)
Risk of irregular removal	25.410 †	33.865 *	36.731 **	35.070 †
	(1.89)	(2.39)	(2.60)	(1.68)
SIP	-0.523	-0.559	-0.542	-2.772
	(-0.35)	(-0.35)	(-0.33)	(-1.40)
SIP ²	0.100	0.088	-0.054	2.920
	(0.06)	(0.05)	(-0.03)	(1.37)
Population size (ln, t_{-1})	0.220 **	0.215 **	0.189 †	0.238 †
	(2.85)	(2.63)	(1.92)	(1.96)
GDP per capita (ln, t_{-1})	-0.277 *	-0.258 *	-0.287 *	-0.500 *
	(-2.49)	(-2.00)	(-1.97)	(-2.53)
$t_{last\ onset}$	-0.025	0.013	0.005	-0.172
	(-0.50)	(0.20)	(0.06)	(-1.63)
$t_{last\ onset}^2$	0.001	0.000	0.001	0.007 †
	(0.37)	(0.11)	(0.36)	(1.65)
$t_{last\ onset}^3$	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000
	(-0.25)	(-0.21)	(-0.52)	(-1.58)
Constant	-4.945 ***	-5.678 ***	-5.199 ***	-3.835 †
	(-3.57)	(-3.93)	(-3.38)	(-1.62)
<i>N</i>	3'887	3'867	3'860	4'044
-2LL	-495.2 ***	-428.6 ***	-400.1 ***	-245.5 ***

Table D.2: Country-year analysis: varying the dependent variable
T-score in brackets; † $p < 0.10$ * $p < 0.05$ ** $p < 0.01$ *** $p < 0.001$

D.2.2 Varying the IVs

Tables D.3 and D.4 show variations of Model 3 from Table 5.1 with alternative versions of independent variables.

Groups

Table D.3 replaces the indicator for ethnic politicization based on the population share of excluded ethnic groups with a similar indicator based on the group share of excluded ethnic groups.

	Population share		Group share	
Democratization $t_{-3..0}$	1.345 (4.97)	***	1.325 (5.00)	***
Politicized ethnicity population-based	0.928 (3.20)	**		
Politicized ethnicity group-based			0.786 (2.36)	*
Risk of irregular removal	25.410 (1.89)	†	26.142 (1.97)	*
SIP	-0.523 (-0.35)		-0.770 (-0.52)	
SIP ²	0.100 (0.06)		0.335 (0.22)	
Population size (ln, t_{-1})	0.220 (2.85)	**	0.159 (1.98)	*
GDP per capita (ln, t_{-1})	-0.277 (-2.49)	*	-0.369 (-3.41)	***
$t_{last\ onset}$	-0.025 (-0.50)		-0.025 (-0.48)	
$t_{last\ onset}^2$	0.001 (0.37)		0.001 (0.35)	
$t_{last\ onset}^3$	-0.000 (-0.25)		-0.000 (-0.25)	
Constant	-4.945 (-3.57)	***	-3.375 (-2.51)	*
N	3'887		3'887	
-2LL	-495.2	***	-496.5	***

Table D.3: Country-year analysis: group-based politicization statistics
T-score in brackets; † $p < 0.10$ * $p < 0.05$ ** $p < 0.01$ *** $p < 0.001$

D.2.3 Risk to Leader

Table D.4 replaces the risk estimator derived in Chapter 4 with its components: a dummy for ongoing transition periods and counters for the years since the last occurrence of an irregular removal or the punishment of a leader in direction relation to his reign.

While the transition indicator retains significance despite a weak correlation with the democratization indicator, the counters since last occurrence correlate much more strongly with $t_{last\ onset}$ ($r = 0.475$ and $r = 0.435$, respectively, both significant at the 1% level) and do not attain any significance.

	Combined risk		Separate factors			
			Irr.	Removal	Punishment	
Democratization	1.345	***	1.128	***	1.182	***
$t_{-3..0}$	(4.97)		(4.29)		(4.29)	
Politicized ethnicity	0.928	**	0.938	**	0.948	**
	(3.20)		(3.18)		(3.20)	
Risk of irregular removal	25.410	†				
	(1.89)					
Years since...						
— irregular removal			-0.013			
			(-1.26)			
— punishment					-0.004	
					(-0.33)	
Ongoing transition			0.962	***	0.974	***
			(3.89)		(3.96)	
SIP	-0.523		-0.437		-0.617	
	(-0.35)		(-0.29)		(-0.41)	
SIP ²	0.100		0.078		0.237	
	(0.06)		(0.05)		(0.15)	
Population size	0.220	**	0.242	**	0.225	**
(ln, t_{-1})	(2.85)		(3.27)		(2.92)	
GDP per capita	-0.277	*	-0.237	*	-0.257	*
(ln, t_{-1})	(-2.49)		(-2.07)		(-2.33)	
$t_{last\ onset}$	-0.025		-0.026		-0.022	
	(-0.50)		(-0.49)		(-0.42)	
$t_{last\ onset}^2$	0.001		0.001		0.001	
	(0.37)		(0.41)		(0.28)	
$t_{last\ onset}^3$	-0.000		-0.000		-0.000	
	(-0.25)		(-0.29)		(-0.16)	
Constant	-4.945	***	-5.559	***	-5.214	***
	(-3.57)		(-3.96)		(-3.71)	
N	3'887		3'887		3'887	
$-2LL$	-495.2	***	-488.3	***	-489.4	***

Table D.4: Country-year analysis: disaggregated risk measure
T-score in brackets; † $p < 0.10$ * $p < 0.05$ ** $p < 0.01$ *** $p < 0.001$

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Curriculum Vitae

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Degrees

Master of Science (Agriculture), University College Dublin, 2004.

Bachelor of Social Sciences with Honours, Waikato University, 2002.

Doctorandus der Economischen Wetenschappen, Universiteit Maastricht, 2002.

Publications

Peer-Reviewed Articles

Cederman, Lars-Erik, Simon Hug & Lutz F. Krebs. 2010. Democratization and civil war: Empirical evidence. *Journal of Peace Research* 47(4).

Vorrath, Judith & Lutz F. Krebs. 2009. Democratisation and conflict in ethnically divided societies. *Living Reviews in Democracy* 1.

Edited Volumes

Krebs, Lutz F., Stefanie Pfändler, Corinna Pieper, Saghi Gholipour & Nico Luchsinger (eds.). 2009. *Globale Zivilgesellschaft: Eine kritische Bewertung von 25 Akteuren*. Norderstedt: BoD.

Unreviewed Publications

Krebs, Lutz F. 2010. Starting off on the wrong foot: Elite influences in multi-ethnic democratization settings. Paper prepared for presentation at the 51st ISA Annual Convention, New Orleans, LA, February 17–20, 2010.

Krebs, Lutz F. 2009. How influential are political leaders? Elites and ethno-nationalist conflict during democratization. Paper prepared for presentation at the 5th ECPR General Conference, Potsdam, September 10–12, 2009.

Vorrath, Judith, Lutz F. Krebs & Dominic Senn. 2007. Linking ethnic conflict and democratization: An assessment of four troubled regions. NCCR Challenges to Democracy in the 21st Century Working Paper No. 6, Zurich, 2007.

Krebs, Lutz F. 2007. Ethnicity, political leaders and violence: The aftermath of the Hariri-killing. Paper prepared for presentation at the 6th Pan-European Conference on International Relations, Torino, September 12–15, 2007.

Krebs, Lutz F. 2007. Trust and social cohesion: An agent-based model. Paper prepared for presentation at the 4th ECPR General Conference, Pisa, September 6–8, 2007.

Work Experience

Lecturer ETH Zurich, Switzerland, since 2009

Lecturing full-time in an ongoing, collaborative redevelopment of the double-semester course series “International Conflict Research” in the B.A. program in Political Economics for Swiss Army officers.

Research Assistant ETH Zurich, Switzerland, since 2005

Covering the Middle Eastern region within the research project “Democratizing Divided Societies in Bad Neighborhoods” in the Swiss National Center of Competence in Research (NCCR) Challenges to Democracy in the 21st Century. Developed a software tool for the automated coding of democratization/autocratization periods and collaborated in the statistical analysis of the role of regime-type changes on the onset of civil war. Co-organized a series of workshops on democratization and ethnic conflict, co-authored a working paper on the results. Participated in the creation of the “Ethnic

Power Relations” and “NSA-to-EPR Docking” data sets as a regional expert and country coder. Contributed to the launch of the journal *Living Reviews in Democracy* and co-authored an article for the first issue. Supervised and assisted students in the writing of four M.A. theses and one B.A. thesis.

Lecturer Zurich University, Switzerland, 2007–2008

Developed, lectured and tutored the graduate-level course “Global Civil Society” on the history and current work of civil-society actors for two semesters, and published an edited volume based on the course results.

Tutor Zurich University, Switzerland, 2005–2007

Co-developed and taught tutorials, graded assignments and exams in the double-semester course series “Methods of Political Science” for three semesters.

Tutor ETH Zurich, Switzerland, 2005–2007

Co-developed, tutored, guest lectured and graded the double-semester course series “International Conflict Research” for four semesters. Assisted in and graded the course “European Integration” for one semester. Worked as the assistant to the B.A. program in Political Economics for Swiss Army officers and participated in the education commission for the program for four semesters.

Lecturer Maastricht University, Netherlands, 2002–2003

Co-developed, lectured, tutored and graded the two-block course series “Quantitative Methods” for over 800 freshmen in economics and business administration. Tutored and graded quantitative methods courses for 2nd-year business students and for freshmen at University College Maastricht. Tutored a quality management course for 3rd- and 4th-year business and management students. Co-wrote and edited student and tutor manuals for introductory mathematics and statistics. Participated in the team that introduced the BlackBoard electronic learning environment for all courses and activities at the Faculty of Economics and Business Administration. Represented the university in promotional events abroad.

Freelance Lecturer Center for European Studies, Maastricht, Netherlands, 2001–2003

Developed, lectured and graded exams for multiple courses on introductory and advanced quantitative methods and computer skills for Asian MBA candidates.

Tutor & Research Assistant Maastricht University, Netherlands, 1999–2002

Tutored and graded a three-block series of courses on quantitative methods for freshmen in economics and business administration for two years. Contributed to a controlled study of the didactic use of electronic learning environments. Developed course and examination material, as well as extensive computer skills manuals for dissemination to several hundred students. Participated in research on the effects of the introduction of admission restrictions on enrollment, for use by faculty council. Represented the students of the university in promotions abroad.

Awards

Best Junior Lecturer 2002

Faculty of Economics & Business Administration, Maastricht University, Netherlands

Professional Activities

Continuing Education & Training

O'Reilly School of Technology University of Illinois, USA, since 2006

Completed courses on Unix, PHP, HTML and CSS, currently participating in online courses on AJAX.

Teaching Skills Program Zurich University, Switzerland, 2005–2010

Completed ten didactics courses, multiple peer observations and hospitations of my courses and assembled a “teaching portfolio” describing my didactic philosophy and work experience.

Doctoral School NCCR Challenges to Democracy in the 21st Century, Switzerland, 2006–2009

Completed a course on democratic theories, participated in and presented at research colloquia for three semesters, co-organized two panels for a workshop event of the doctoral school and fulfilled several external requirements including summer schools and didactic training.

Misc. Courses 2006–2008

Completed courses on spatial data analysis, analysis of event history and panel data, qualitative interviewing, grant application writing and scientific writing.

Peer Reviewing

African Journal of Political Science & International Relations

Conflict Management & Peace Science

Nationalism and Ethnic Politics

Memberships

American Political Science Association

International Political Science Association

International Studies Association

Peace Science Society (International)